FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 9 JANUARY, 1931 No. 2

THE PERMANENT BASES OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

By Richard von Kühlmann

GERMANY today is in such a state of ferment that it cannot but seem venturesome to point out the permanent bases of her foreign policy. If we look a little closer, however, we find that, after all, geographical position and historical development are so largely determining factors of foreign policy that, regardless of the kaleidoscopic change of contemporary events, and no matter what form of government has been instituted or what political party may be in power, the foreign policy of a country has a natural tendency to return again and again to the same general and fundamental alignment.

France, whose problems of foreign policy have been so brilliantly discussed in these pages by M. Jules Cambon,[1] one of the oldest and most experienced European diplomatists, may be cited as a pertinent example of what has been said. Since the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the forms and principles of government as well as the ruling classes have undergone more frequent change in France than anywhere else in Europe. Nevertheless, it was not a mere phrase but the very truth when M. Thiers, during the National Assembly at Bordeaux in 1871, was able to affirm that the admirable continuity of French history throughout manifold changes in régime has been the chief source of strength of this mighty, vehement and restless nation.

Italy, to quote another example, found some permanent elements of her foreign policy laid in her cradle, as it were, by her position between the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. It is on this account that her foreign policy concerning several highly important groups of questions (notably her relation to the ruling sea-power, England) has been forced into permanent channels.

[1] See "The Permanent Bases of French Foreign Policy," by Jules Cambon, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. 8, No. 2.

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But, as already pointed out by M. Cambon, perhaps the most striking example is that of the Russian Soviet Republic. Probably no newly instituted form of government has ever before gone to such lengths in overthrowing, changing and turning upside down the established order of things as the Soviet Republic. The process is carried so far that, in many cases, even considerations of state policy have to give way when not in complete accord with the party doctrine. But notwithstanding all this, a bird's-eye view of the foreign policy of the Soviets shows astonishing similarities to the foreign policy of the Tsarist Empire. In Asia, above all, the leading idea of indirectly furthering purely Russian political aims by supporting local nationalistic movements has been followed out by the communistic republic to the same extent as under the Tsars. The external aspect of things may change, the intensity of application may vary, but the guiding principles remain the same.

The difficulty of pointing out the permanent bases of German foreign policy is due to several reasons. The German Reich of today is a very young political entity. There is still a generation living which witnessed its foundation. Sixty years is not a great age for a state, nor a long enough period for forming solid traditions.

Considering that, up to its expulsion in 1866, Austria practically had the hegemony in the German Confederation, logic would seem to suggest that one might first search Austria's foreign policy in its larger aspects for influences or principles of a permanent nature which could be regarded as equally enduring and authoritative for the guidance of the German Empire. But the most superficial examination suffices to show that the Vienna cabinet had to contend with too many anxieties and aspirations in other directions — in Italy and along the Adriatic, in the Balkans, in Poland — to render the history of its policy very illuminating in regard to the present aims of German foreign policy. Austria's attempts to secure German support for aims essentially foreign to German interests — attempts such as were made, for example, during the Crimean War with great vigor and considerable skill — played an essential part in estranging Germany from Austria and in preparing the way for the final parting.

Nor is the policy pursued by rising Prussia, around which the new German Empire was built up, as instructive with regard to permanent guiding principles as might be thought at first. Prussia owed her ascendancy in the first place — it would be foolish to

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deny it — to a line of eminent princes, among whom Frederick the Great was the most gifted and the most brilliant. Her position between the Great European Powers — England, Russia, Holland, France and the Hapsburg realm — forced her, if she was to survive and develop, into perpetually changing combinations, treaties and alliances, too manifold and diverse to be reduced to a formula applicable to the new Germany.

We are therefore compelled to seek for light as to the permanent bases of Germany's foreign policy in her geographical position and in her diplomatic history since the foundation of the Reich.

The only natural frontiers of the Germany we know today are to be found to the south and the north. In the south the rampart of the Alps forms a barrier which, since the days of the Romans, has permitted only insignificant changes. To the north, Germany borders upon two seas, the North Sea and the Baltic. The North Sea forms part of the Atlantic main; but in many respects, and especially from the military view, it is hardly more than an inland lake, for the naval power of Great Britain blocks the way to the high seas. The Baltic, linked as it is with the outer world only by the narrow Danish straits, is an inland sea. While eminently suitable for local trade, it has never been able to play a significant part in a struggle for world power.

Apart from these practically immovable boundaries in the north and south, Germany is unprotected by natural frontiers. In the west, it adjoins France, a country completely unified ever since the time of Louis XI and welded together into a massive block by its culture, its customs, its language and its history. As early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this most gifted, most restless, most ambitious and most warlike nation of the Continent directed the powerful momentum resulting from its national consolidation against the only open continental frontiers which it possessed — against upper Italy, where the eastward course of the River Po provided a military highway and battlefields; against upper Germany, where the same holds good in respect of the valleys of the Danube and the Main, which also run from west to east; and against the Lower Rhine, where increased elbow-room seemed to beckon. No wonder, then, that poor discordant Germany, torn a thousand ways, suffered heavy losses of area, nor that even today there are prudent and provident Frenchmen who regard it as possible and desirable that the Rhine should form the frontier against Germany.

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Germany's eastern frontier has suffered radical changes in consequence of the treaties terminating the war. Prior to the war, this frontier from Upper Silesia southwards adjoined the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, that is to say, a friendly and allied country, while northwards, and up to the Baltic, it touched Russia. Today, the southerly half of this eastern frontier borders on the newly created republic of Czechoslovakia, a state animated by violently anti-German feelings on account of its old resentment against Austrian rule: associated, moreover, with France in the closest diplomatic and military alliance. Russia's relations with Prussia and Germany before the World War were friendly rather than hostile, and her support in serious crises — during the Napoleonic wars, as well as in the wars of 1866 and 1870 which created the German Empire — was always of inestimable value to the Hohenzollern dynasty. Today, this powerful friend, whose sympathies could perhaps not always be counted on, but whose usefulness had been demonstrated by the events of history, has been replaced by the Polish Republic, another new commonwealth, an emotional and restless state whose pronounced anti-German orientation has also found expression in a close political and military alliance with France.

So much for the frontiers of Germany. Let us now consider her internal arteries. The rivers of Germany, on account of their size and their importance for commerce and traffic, are of the greatest significance not only as waterways, but also because of their valleys.

For sentimental reasons, the first place among German rivers is accorded to the mighty Rhine, rich in legendary lore; to this region more than to any other the Germans are attached with heart and soul. Throughout its whole course, with the exception only of Alsace-Lorraine and of the estuaries, which are held by the friendly Dutch, the Rhine is a German river, washing German shores and fostering German economic life. But great as has been its emotional and cultural significance since the days of the Romans, the Rhine valley has never given rise to the formation of a large political unit. Small political entities, such as free cities and ecclesiastical principalities, glorious enough in their cultural development, have always prevented the Rhine valley from attaining any decisive political significance as a whole.

The same is true of the Main, the most important tributary of the Rhine on the right bank. Its source is in German soil, and all

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its long winding course is entirely through German territory. The Main forms a right-angle with the Rhine, and the junction is one of the most vital spots in Germany.

Whereas the mouth of the Rhine since olden times has been in the hands of the Dutch, a Low-Saxon tribe and thus related to the Germans in language and customs, though independent for many centuries, the mouth of the Elbe is entirely under German control. Not far distant arose the illustrious Hanseatic town Hamburg, whose name, together with that of Bremen, is symbolical of Germany's important over-sea interests.

Flowing for the most part in the same direction as the Rhine and the Elbe, *i.e.*, largely from south to north, are the Vistula and the Oder, two other German rivers which should be mentioned here. Emptying into the Baltic, which must be regarded altogether as an inland sea, as was already pointed out, they have never been able to aspire to the importance of the rivers flowing into the German ocean.

Among all the great rivers of Germany, the Danube next to the Rhine wears the richest garland of legend and history. The great heroic epic, the Nibelungen, was sung on its shores. Thus does a song of tragic import mark the beginning of German literature. Taking its rise not so very far from the Rhine, the Danube flows in a parallel but opposite direction to that of the Main and almost in a straight line from west to east. But only its upper reaches wash German soil. Since it is navigable as far upstream as Ulm, the Danube has always formed one of the most important routes for trade and for the migration of peoples. Near Passau it receives the waters of the River Inn, which has its source far away in the south. Its green and limpid waters carry southern manners, architecture and implements into the valley of the Danube, thus adding to the Danube's own rich culture — sprung from the meeting of east with west — new and diversified elements of yet another origin.

In this way, Germany's rivers point to her various spheres of interest: the Rhine, the Weser and the Elbe to the ocean and to the wide world beyond the seas; the Oder and the Vistula to Scandinavia and Russia; the Danube to the Near East. These many outlooks make it all the more necessary for the German people to practice the strictest concentration and self-restraint, if the great diversity of their interests is not to lead to a futile splitting up of energies.

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In the interior of Germany are mountains, which, while not so very high, are sufficiently difficult of passage to divide the north from the south and to direct the course of development in these two parts along very different lines. Only in the north was there a plain extensive enough to foster the development of a self-contained political unit. Here Prussia arose, and it was Prussia which was destined to become the nucleus of the German Empire.

Prussia was carried to great heights of power and prestige by Frederick the Great, but was temporarily eclipsed through the defeat inflicted by Napoleon. She gained her supremacy in Germany through Austria's secession from the Confederation in 1866 following a war of exemplary brevity. With the support of the other German states she then forced France to assent to the foundation of the new German Reich.

German history since the end of the Middle Ages has for the most part been tragic. Until 1870 cultural and religious disunion combined with the fact that the country was divided into a bewildering number of minute political entities to lead to frequent and frightful catastrophes. By far the worst of these was the Thirty Years' War, which left Germany depopulated, impoverished and brutalized. Many generations were needed to extricate the country from its misery.

During the whole eighteenth and the first decades of the nineteenth century, Germany furnished the military highroad, the foraging ground and the battlefield for the grandiose contest between the House of Hapsburg and France — the France of kings, of revolutionary generals, and of Napoleon. These pages of Germany's history are also written in blood and tears. The overthrow of Napoleon terminated the terrible wars of the French Revolution and of the First Empire, which are to be regarded essentially as the continuation of the gigantic struggle between England and France for naval supremacy, as well as of the old rivalry between France and the Hapsburgs. It was left to the Congress of Vienna to effect the reorganization of Europe and of the rest of the world; and notwithstanding all the criticism to which its work has been subjected, one cannot withhold respect for what was achieved by those diplomats of the old school. For to all essential purposes, the conditions established by the Congress of Vienna lasted a century, right down to the World War.

A brief glance at one of those historical charts on which the

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war periods are tinted red shows what a peaceful century the nineteenth has been: how small the number of wars, as compared with previous centuries, and how short their duration. This largely explains why mankind was able to make such astounding progress during that period, and why the peoples of Europe were able to enjoy such a visible increase in civilization, prosperity and comfort.

The last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed simultaneously the unification of Germany and the unification of Italy. These developments marked the beginning of radical changes in the European equilibrium, changes which ultimately caused the monstrous coalition war of the years 1914 to 1918.

Germany's complete collapse after her heroic struggle against practically the whole world ended in the Peace of Versailles. There probably are few thoughtful statesmen today who would deny that, among all the peace treaties terminating the great wars of coalition fought during the past three centuries, the Treaty of Versailles was the least satisfactory and the least wise. To transform it into something practicable and supportable is the main task of the present generation. For, conspicuous and deplorable as its defects may be, one must not forget for one moment that the Peace of Versailles, together with its supplementary agreements, now constitutes the basis of public law in Europe, and that its disappearance would be bound to result in a murderous war of all against all.

Germany's central position in the heart of Europe is chiefly responsible for the disastrous reverses which have been so frequent in her history. They have balked her progress at every step, nipped every growing bud, doomed every hopeful development to a tragic ending. No one ever recognized this more clearly than did Bismarck himself. He saw that owing to her central position Germany might at any moment be endangered and overwhelmed by powerful coalitions, and the thought cost him many sleepless nights. The *cauchemar des coalitions* with which a Russian diplomat once teased the Prince was anything but an imaginary nightmare. It was his clear realization, based on history and experience, of the fact that a terrible danger continually hung over Germany's head. Viewed in this light, the foreign policy of the great chancellor, which sometimes seemed so complicated, becomes astonishingly clear and lucid.

As long as there has been any French foreign policy at all,

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France has held to the principle that no unified central Power must be allowed to grow up in Europe. In accordance with this tradition, she was bound to oppose by force the attempt to create a united and unified Germany. This united Germany was nearer home, more rigidly disciplined, better organized and more dangerous than Austria could ever have become. And the struggle against the Hapsburgs had been long and difficult enough.

The unification of Germany therefore could not have been achieved without the war of 1870. And even after it had been achieved, France — or at least the French statesmen of the old school — could see no other aim for the foreign policy of the French Government than to smash to pieces this unwelcome growth in Central Europe. In other words, German policy, as Bismarck understood it, had always to reckon with French hostility as a given factor. The cardinal aim of German foreign policy after the foundation of the German Empire centered in the endeavor to make Germany as strong as possible by alliances with countries whose fundamental interests did not conflict with her own, and at the same time to make it as difficult as possible for France to conclude such alliances herself. This simple cardinal idea was to be realized in the complicated system of alliances which included the Triple Alliance and the Re-insurance Treaty with Russia side by side. As long as he remained in power, Bismarck succeeded in carrying his system of insurance into effect. It is an open question whether he would have been able to continue it after relations with Russia had changed in so many respects.

His successors completely misunderstood the cardinal idea of his policy. None of them was alive to the fact — and even today, there are probably not many who have an inkling of it — that the splendid façade of Bismarck's German Empire was the façade of an unfinished building, and that the most dangerous crisis had not yet been passed so long as there remained unsolved the question as to what was finally to become of the diverse peoples loosely joined together in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including several millions of Germans. Not until this problem had been solved could Bismarck's Germany be regarded as having definitely passed out of the danger zone; not until then could it be said to be consolidated and established.

People allowed themselves to be dazzled by the brilliant exterior, by the enormous progress made in all spheres of national

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life, by the bustle of the day. Fundamental problems were lost sight of in the excitement over ephemeral questions. There is no other explanation for the fact that Germany did not renew the Re-insurance Treaty, that St. Petersburg was goaded beyond endurance by the Baghdad railway as well as by the ever-increasing German activities in Turkey, and that the emphasis placed on the construction of the German battle squadrons forced England more and more into an attitude in which she could be counted upon as a powerful ally of a continental coalition against Germany. In this way the ground was prepared for the erection of the most awe-inspiring coalition which the world has ever seen. In this way the greatest war of history came to be fought, ending in the catastrophe of 1918–19.

It was perhaps a more terrible lesson than any other nation ever received, and its purport is that Germany, poor and bled white as she now is, has to find her way back to the principles regarded by Bismarck as absolutely indispensable even when she was strong and flourishing. In other words, she has to return to a policy of extreme caution, ruled perpetually by the one guiding principle: to prevent the formation of powerful new coalitions against herself.

Many things have been radically changed by the Peace of Versailles and by the foundation of the German Republic. In diagnosing the future development, one cannot afford to omit a glance at these changes. First of all, let us look at those in Germany herself.

Even under so gifted and frequently self-willed a ruler as William II, the personal direction of foreign policy by the monarch was largely fiction. It probably is safe to say, then, that the president of a republic can exercise only a general and superficial influence over relations with other countries. The leadership in this field today is in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and (since in a purely parliamentary system of government the latter is hardly ever a trained politician) to a large extent in the hands of the permanent chief official of the Foreign Office and his expert councilors. The conduct of foreign policy requires an immense amount of knowledge concerning factual and personal matters and a long personal experience. Thus it comes about that persons able to meet these requirements will again and again exert a decisive influence on the course of foreign policy, whether they occupy a prominent position or not. One need only think

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of the part which Holstein was able to play for a whole generation; nor are parallel cases wanting in other great countries.

A great deal of passion has been expended in declaiming in the press and in other places against secret diplomacy. It is held responsible for many calamities. But, however that may be, it will always remain a fact that the trained diplomatist will already have pulled the levers and set the switches this way and that long before the public is in a position to understand a given situation or to appraise its consequences. In a railway station the trains stand peacefully side by side a few yards apart; yet one of them runs to Paris and another to Moscow. It all depends on the setting of the switches.

There is a widespread and common belief that monarchs and their ministers are inclined to play with thoughts of war, and often even provoke war arbitrarily, whereas a democracy or a democratic régime offers a better guarantee for the maintenance of peace. It is not sure whether history justifies this conception. Any sound and healthy democracy is bound to be nationalistic to a certain degree, and perhaps more sensitive and irascible where questions of honor are concerned than an individual, who always is aware that, in the terrible gamble of war, he risks his crown, his dynasty and perhaps even his head. One can imagine a very great monarch having the courage to yield where aggression is not counseled by vital and material interests but only by considerations of prestige. A public opinion originating in the masses is hardly likely to have the same courage.

It goes without saying that in the new Germany, resting as it does on a democratic and parliamentary foundation, the Reichstag exerts a very strong influence on the conduct of foreign policy. But we know from manifold experience that the influence of a parliament on foreign policy is apt to be of a checking and controlling rather than of a guiding and directing nature — the more so as parliamentary parties often are composed of groups with conflicting aims in the domain of foreign policy. It is in the nature of things that a politician primarily interested in domestic affairs will let himself be guided even in his foreign sympathies by considerations connected with the internal sphere. The Social Democrats gave the German Republic its first President, and they were fortunate enough to possess in Mr. Ebert a man of tact, moderation and statesmanlike gifts. In this political party a belief has been evinced on several occasions that negotiations

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with adherents of the corresponding party in other countries would yield results that could not be achieved in the normal course of traditional diplomacy. This theory and hope were bound to be disappointed.

Judging by our past experience, the goal of all German efforts in the domain of foreign policy must be security. In the article to which I have already referred, M. Jules Cambon has given a masterly definition of the security of a state: "Security! The term signifies more indeed than the maintenance of a people's homeland, or even of their territories beyond the seas. It also means the maintenance of the world's respect for them, the maintenance of their economic interests, everything, in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself, of a nation." It will be the permanent endeavor of the German Government, supported by Parliament, to win and maintain this security.

Many people in other countries believe that there are wide sections of the German people who thirst for revenge. This idea is altogether erroneous. During the war it was a most remarkable psychological fact that not only was there no hatred against France, but rather that there existed very generally a feeling of respect which is due a brave adversary. This feeling continued undiminished until after the war, when it was reversed by measures such as the invasion of the Ruhr and blunders in the occupied territory.

At the present moment, in a time of severe economic depression, the reparation payments cause much irritation. Nevertheless, I am convinced of the truth of my statement when I say that the idea of a war of revenge against France does not enter the thoughts of the average German. On the contrary, in view of the close business relations obtaining today in many spheres of activity, in view also of the very lively cultural exchange and of the attitude adopted by some far-seeing French statesmen, it does not seem at all improbable that notwithstanding temporary resentment and bad feeling France and Germany will find the way to a full and sincere understanding. Such an event would give both states a maximum of security; indeed, it would place the peace of Europe on a new and permanent foundation.

Germany's relations with the Hapsburg Monarchy were always of a special nature. From the Napoleonic wars up to 1866 Austria-Hungary is to be regarded as forming part of Germany. In 1866, it is true, a short and sharp passage of arms was unavoidable in

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order to crowd Austria-Hungary out of Germany and to achieve the final unification under Prussian leadership. But so unparalleled and so intimate was the feeling of fellowship that, on the very battlefield of Königgrätz, Bismarck pondered on the possibilities of future coöperation. And indeed, not long afterwards, the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were united by an alliance of the very closest sort.

In a Europe in which all the important states were set up on a purely national basis, so heterogeneous a conglomeration as the Hapsburg Empire, with different parts which constantly betrayed centrifugal tendencies, could not exist permanently. The final dismemberment of this venerable but decrepit empire will probably be described by future historians as the true purport of the World War.

The peace treaties have left of that empire a torso which bears the name Austria. Each neighbor took whatever the treaties permitted or expediency counseled. What still remained forms the Austria of today. Whether a viable state can be made of this fragment is one of the outstanding problems which has worried European diplomatists ever since peace was concluded. The future alone can give an answer to this question. On racial and historical grounds Germany is so closely related to Austria that she will always feel for her a special warmth and cordiality. The relations of the two countries will be as close as times and circumstances permit. It is absolutely certain that this will remain one of the permanent principles of German foreign policy.

To the east, Germany borders on Czechoslovakia, one of the "Succession States" arisen out of the ruins of the former Hapsburg Empire. Instinctively, it seems, Czechoslovakia is ruled by a violent aversion to everything German. The historical explanation of this feeling is probably to be sought in the former hatred for Austria. Germany and Czechoslovakia are not separated by any acute territorial questions. Nor are there any serious conflicts of economic interest. Indeed, valuable as the French backing may be, it is not difficult to imagine a development of European affairs which would make it highly advantageous to the Czechoslovak Republic to cultivate good relations with Germany — an aim by no means unattainable from the standpoint of sound practical politics.

There are greater difficulties with Germany's more northerly neighbor, Poland. Not only is there the memory of former friction

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to overcome, not only is the pronounced nationalism and passionate temperament of this gifted nation to be reckoned with: above all stands the fact that the Peace of Versailles created most unfortunate frontiers between Germany and Poland. It must be stated quite frankly that these frontiers injure the vital interests of Germany so profoundly that the revision of them will remain a standing demand of German foreign policy, no matter who happens to be responsible for its conduct. There is no one in Germany, however, who thinks of war or of the employment of force in this connection. The conviction must gain ground in Poland itself that, in the long run, it will be impossible for her to live in open enmity with both her great neighbors, and that it is perfectly possible to work out readjustments which would take account of German national necessities without prejudicing any vital interests of Poland. I do not believe that there is a single responsible German who holds a different opinion.

As soon as the "western question" has been solved by a settlement of the Saar problem — and I am convinced that this is not impossible — then the problems relating to the Polish frontier will come to the fore. Whether or not Europe may look forward to a period of prosperous development will largely depend on how satisfactorily these Polish problems are dealt with.

As far as Soviet Russia is concerned, the student of foreign policy is beset with peculiar difficulties. For notwithstanding all denials, intelligent and experienced observers are quite correct in maintaining that the whole state machinery is completely dominated by a single political party, and that this party regulates even the conduct of foreign policy from the standpoint of party politics. Every sober student must conclude that world revolution is the cardinal and definite goal towards which the Soviets are working today with every means at their disposal. That is why it is extremely difficult for other countries to establish satisfactory diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, or to maintain them once they have been established.

Now good relations with Russia are one of the oldest traditions of Prussian and German policy. Frederick the Great recognized their paramount importance. From the Napoleonic wars until after 1866 and 1870, the successes achieved by Prussia and Germany would have been hardly conceivable without Russian backing. On his deathbed the Emperor William I enjoined his successors to cultivate friendly relations with Russia. If it had

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not been for internal changes in Russia, and undeniably also for grave blunders in German foreign policy — one need only think of the non-renewal of the Re-insurance Treaty and of over-zealous German political activity in Turkey and Western Asia — the old relationship could never have been destroyed so completely as to allow the idea of a Russo-French war against Germany and Austria to become prevalent in St. Petersburg.

Germany's plans in Turkey and Western Asia have been definitely destroyed by the Great War. Apart from the difficulties arising out of the peculiar political structure of the Soviet Republic, as referred to above, there is no conflict anywhere at present between German and Russian interests. Economically the two countries can be of great service to each other. Moreover, since (as has already been pointed out) the cultivation of good relations with Russia may be described as perhaps the oldest and strongest tradition of German politics, any political régime in Germany, whatever its name or character, will be strongly inclined to carry it along.

Germany's most important neighbor in the south is Italy, although her territory is nowhere directly contiguous. Italy's attitude during the war caused bitter disappointment in Germany. But as she had joined the Triple Alliance only after receiving England's blessing, and as the configuration of the Italian coasts made it impossible for her openly to antagonize England, one really had to be very short-sighted and optimistic to believe that Italy would fulfil her obligations as an ally in a coalition war in which England was among the opponents of the Triple Alliance.

At the present time, if we omit the difficulties connected with conditions in what was German South Tyrol, not only are there no conflicts of interest between Germany and Italy but rather quite a number of considerations which ought to make closer relations desirable to both. Under the astute and energetic leadership of a dominating personality, Italy has undoubtedly succeeded in improving her standing among the nations. Her relations with Hungary and Austria are intimate and confidential enough for us to presume that the influence of those two states combined with that of the Catholic Church will be sufficient to keep her from overplaying her hand in the South Tyrol. It is probably correct to say, too, that elements are not wanting in German political life which would favor an approach to Fascist Italy and to her continental friends just mentioned.

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Germany's relations with England, like those of Prussia before, had been friendly up to the Great War. The dynasties of the two countries were closely related. Aside from temporary friction caused by the expansion of Germany's commerce and shipping, and in part also by German colonial aspirations, England observed a benevolent attitude toward the foundation of the German Empire and toward the system of alliances by which Bismarck intended to safeguard it.

In the end, it was principally the accelerated construction of the German battle fleet which induced England to side with Germany's adversaries. This point of friction has been completely removed as a result of the war. The new Germany has no intention of building — nor would it be able to build — a navy that could be regarded as a menace to England.

During the years just before the war, the British Government had clearly shown by its attitude in the negotiations then under way that it was clever and far-sighted enough to allow Germany to take her share in the tasks of European civilization, especially in Africa. This field offers possibilities today no less than in former times for an understanding between the British and German governments. Bismarck had the good sense to make it possible for France, after her serious defeat in the war of 1870–1871, to enter upon extensive colonial activities. Obviously it would be equally sensible to open the same sort of a safety-valve for the vigorous and lively energies of post-war Germany.

Harmonious and friendly relations have existed between Germany and the United States ever since the time of Frederick the Great. Even the war was able to injure them only temporarily. America has coöperated more vigorously than any other country in the economic reconstruction of Germany, and the intensive exchange in the cultural field has now been taken up again with a will. Here again there are no vital antagonisms of any kind and, on natural as well as on historical grounds, further developments ought to be along friendly lines.

The history of Franco-German relations during the last few centuries is a history of continuous great wars. We have already seen how France, having attained unity at an early time, was able to deprive Germany, split up as she was into small discordant states, of important territories; how Germany was involved, if only as a minor partner, in the great struggles between England and France and between France and Austria; and how in the end

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she had to fight for her own unification in a brief but bitter war with France, whose traditional policy it was to prevent at all costs the formation of a strong state in Central Europe.

France fought her war of *revanche* for 1870–1871 during the years 1914–1918, and carried her success further by an adroit policy of alliances. But the purpose of this war as influential French statesmen saw it in those years — "*l'écrasement définitif et complet de l'Allemagne*" — has not been achieved. Out of the collapse Germany has saved the better part of Bismarck's work, *i.e.*, her unity as a state; and the further course of events, notwithstanding repeated checks and interruptions, makes it possible to predict with confidence that Germany will succeed in healing her grievous wounds and finally will emerge from the catastrophe as one of the Great European Powers.

As far as a German observer can judge, there is no unanimity today in leading French circles. Some French statesmen believe, with poor enough logic, that the *sécurité* which they regard as their highest political aim can be achieved only by confining and oppressing Germany. They are oblivious of the fact that such a policy is bound to conjure up the very dangers which they seek to avoid. A different opinion is held by a group of far-seeing and judicious men, who believe that the safest and wisest course would be to grant the former adversary conditions which make it possible for him to live, so that this inheritance of war, carried on through the centuries with changing fortunes, may be brought to an end once and for all.

This result is necessary if not alone the two countries but all the states of Europe are not to bleed helplessly to death. Public opinion in France is nervous just at present on account of what has been happening in the field of German domestic politics. It would be idle to prophesy about future developments. But one thing is certain. Transcending all fluctuations of variable elements, one of the strongest and most persistent endeavors of German policy will be to achieve relations with France which will make it possible for both peoples to devote themselves to their national tasks dignifiedly, prosperously and in perfect security. If this endeavor could become a permanent factor in the foreign policies of both these great nations, so close to each other in many respects, the forecast for the future of our continent might be drawn in hopeful terms, and peace with honor might at last become Europe's heritage.

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THE GOLD PROBLEM

By Edwin F. Gay

MONEY as a useful tool of civilization has been known for more than a score of centuries, but only during the last four centuries of more rapid economic expansion has its utilization demanded a marked development of technical skill and a refinement of theory. This modern period was ushered in with an intensified demand in Europe for gold and silver which was the result of an evident undersupply and which was sated by the voyages of discovery and the American mines. The precious metals poured into Europe through Spain, and as the flood swelled prices mounted until, from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth, there occurred a price revolution greater in volume and in its economic, social and political effects than any other which history records. Contemporary observers, casting about for the cause of the violent and general rise of prices, first discovered and roughly stated what came to be known as the quantity theory of money. They recognized from experience that prices tend to vary directly with the quantity of money in circulation. As gold and silver became more abundant and relatively less valuable, more coins of standard weight (*i.e.*, higher prices) had to be paid in exchange for practically all other commodities — most of all for food products.

The sixteenth century had also suffered severely from the continuation of the long mediæval evils of clipped, debased and multitudinous coinages. This developed another contemporary generalization, known as Gresham's law, that bad money drives out good. Equipped with this new insight the stronger governments answered the call from the growing commercial community for a stricter regulation of the standards of national money.

Meanwhile, the older money-exchangers and goldsmiths, becoming bankers, had been experimenting with credit instruments, their private notes, and, in the eighteenth century, state banks and state administrations seized upon the new device. The old problem, as to whether money gets its value from the stamp of the state, or from the commercial estimation of the commodity stamped, received a partial answer from the disastrous results of John Law's paper money early in the eighteenth century, from the American issues culminating in the Continental currency

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which financed the Revolutionary War, and from the ultimately even more worthless assignats of the French Revolution. Money in the form of banknotes or government notes was found feasible but dangerous — a valuable but keen-edged tool requiring sobriety and expertness in handling. The paper promise to pay must be redeemable in a precious metal — a solid commodity.

The nineteenth century set itself to work out the technique required to safeguard this new acquisition. The difficulties of adjustment between the fluctuating relative values of gold and silver led, before the end of the century, to a widespread adoption of the most esteemed metal, gold, as the single standard, with silver and other metals restricted by the rules of a subsidiary coinage. The issue of paper money was gradually confined, under rigid regulations as to amount and reserves, to the governments alone or to central banks. The banks, deprived of the privilege of note issue, found another ample opportunity for expansion in the use of deposits and checks. This new circulating medium, more flexibly responsive to the demands of business, found also an ultimate limit in the gold supply, for experience taught that its security was proportionate to the soundness of a banking policy which rested upon gold reserves. International trade and credit, expertly manipulated, involved settlements by transactions in goods and their paper representations, with a relatively small flow of gold on balance between countries. London as the world's central financial clearing-house, with a money market furnished with private gold supplies, controlled by the Bank of England's discount rate, had become so adept that the operations of international exchange seemed almost automatic. The immense world superstructure of government notes, banknotes, checks, and international commercial obligations was safely borne by a stock of gold, which, when twice it seemed to be failing, was replenished by the huge additions of the nineteenth century to the world's gold supply.

So interlocked were the chief national economic systems by international trade, and so delicately adjusted was the whole mechanism of monetary and credit exchanges, that Bloch, an eminent French economist, wrote a book to prove that a great European war was not only unthinkable but financially impossible. All the contestants would be ruined by the mere breaking of the wires which electrically controlled the world mechanism

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of business. A shrewd observer in 1913 (especially if he had access to the diplomatic reports) must have foreseen the war, though he would have been unable to guess its duration and vast extent. But he would have been regarded as a madman had he prophesied that within ten years, as a result of war, such a country as Germany — industrially strong, financially secure, and soundly trained in all that monetary and banking experience could teach — would lie prostrate, its money practically worthless and its prices soaring to astronomical quotations. Yet monetary ruin was unprecedentedly complete not only in Germany but throughout Central and Eastern Europe; and all the so-called civilized countries, victors as well as vanquished, neutrals as well as contestants, strong nations and weak, suffered in varying degrees from depreciated money and inflated prices.

For the rehabilitation of all those afflicted countries, monetary and fiscal reform was obviously the essential and prime concern of the immediate post-war years. Payments in gold had been generally suspended and gold exports had been embargoed. The state's stamp on paper, without the security of prompt gold redemption, had again been proved inadequate. It was inevitable, therefore, that as rapidly as economic recovery made it possible, all the countries of the world should seek to under-pin their currencies with a gold basis, if not at the pre-war rate of exchange then often at a new ratio, and if not on a straight gold standard then, with the blessing of the Genoa Conference, on a gold-exchange standard which replaced a gold reserve, in considerable part, by purchases of foreign exchange held on deposit account in gold centers. So far has the universal swing to gold progressed that now, even for China, immemorially on a silver basis, Mr. Kemmerer, the specialist in countries with sick monetary systems, has prescribed a gold-exchange standard. At the time of the Genoa Conference, it was supposed that the adoption of the gold-exchange standard would insure economy in the use of gold and a large measure of stability. As a temporary measure this device was clearly necessary, but it is beginning to be doubtful whether it can be regarded as a permanent solution, at any rate without additional restrictions and safeguards. The large exchange reserves held in London under the control of European central banks are often greater than the free gold at the disposal of the Bank of England. They are a menace as long as they may be withdrawn without regard to large international financial con-

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siderations. It is also becoming clear that this type of reserve does not preclude the building up of great actual gold reserves. The most notable case in point is the Bank of France, which has increased its gold holdings to nearly 2,000 million dollars, so that now, with the United States' gold stock of nearly 4,200 million dollars, fed by the extraordinary war and post-war flow, the two countries together hold about 60 percent of the world's monetary gold. But the post-war flow to the United States has been to a country on a free gold basis, while that to France, under gold-exchange regulations, has shown a rate of increase, compared with 1914, about equal to that of the United States.

Another factor affecting the monetary demand for gold is the disappearance, since the war, of gold from circulation. It is believed that in 1913 nearly 45 percent of the total gold monetary stock, exclusive of gold hoarded in India and China, was in general circulation or in commercial use, whereas in 1928 it is estimated that only about 8 percent remained outside the holdings of the central banks. This would seem to indicate an economy of almost 3,000 million dollars in one use of gold and an equivalent increase in the quantity available for central-bank reserves, with a corresponding enhancement of the influence and responsibility of the central banks. But the disappearance of free gold from the open market has removed a buffer which formerly shielded the central-bank reserve and has made the central banks more sensitive to the fluctuations of the world market and the operations of other central banks. This more exposed position, however, may be conducive to that growing coöperation between the central banks which has been marked by the recent practice of personal conferences between their heads and by their organized collaboration in the Bank of International Settlements.

Although it is difficult to evaluate the full effects of these factors of possible economy in the utilization of the world's monetary gold stocks, the facts both as to the central-bank reserves of gold and of foreign exchange and as to the withdrawal of gold from general circulation into the coffers of the central banks are measureable with a considerable degree of accuracy. Also fairly reliable seem to be the current figures of the new gold annually produced, of the long continuing but fluctuating absorption of gold by India, and of the bank-note issues of almost all countries. But other elements essential to the understanding of the monetary problem — such as the amount of gold annually used in industry and the

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arts, the rate of growth of the total world stock of gold, the variations in the quantity of deposit checks and other credit instruments, and the velocity of all the forms of monetary circulation — are measured only by estimates, some of which are exceedingly crude even for recent years and become even more undependable the further back into pre-war decades any comparison is pushed.

Last September appeared the most recent and also the most authoritative summary of the facts, estimates and forecasts concerning a number of the fundamental factors. This is the Interim Report of the Gold Delegation of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations and its annexes, particularly the critical review of the supply and demand statistics for gold prepared by Mr. Loveday, the head of the League's Economic Intelligence Service. According to this report, India's absorption of gold, after exceptionally heavy imports about 1924 to meet the depletion of the war years, has been at the annual rate of 87 million dollars during the five year period 1925–1929, whereas during 1909–13 it was 102 million dollars per annum. Banking and investment habits are doubtless slowly growing in India, but with the recent decline in the price of silver and the small likelihood of any rapid change in the hoarding proclivities of the vast mass of India's agricultural population, the conclusion of the report seems justified, namely that it would not be safe "to anticipate any material reduction in the Indian demand for many years to come." The statistics concerning the industrial demand are defective, since some countries do not report at all, others report only the amount of new gold used by industry or the total amount of new and old gold without distinguishing the source of the old gold. Mr. Loveday estimates the present net industrial world consumption of gold at about 100 million dollars per annum. The present total production of gold is about 400 million dollars per annum. The report estimates the total demand for non-monetary purposes, including the industrial uses and the demand of India, China and certain other Oriental countries, at from 180 to 200 million dollars per annum. In its final estimate of the future monetary situation, the report conservatively starts with the lower of these two figures, namely 180 million dollars, and assumes that the future non-monetary demand will increase at the rate of 1 percent per annum. At the present time the deduction for non-monetary uses leaves a little more than half of the new gold annually mined, or something a little over 200 million dollars, available for monetary purposes.

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In order to determine the monetary demand for gold, an inquiry was made covering nearly all the gold-using countries, and data were collected concerning note issues and sight liabilities together with actual gold held in reserve. Allowing for a margin of cover of 7 to 10 percent over the average legal reserve requirements, as interpreted in practice, of about 32 percent, or a round total reserve of 40 percent, the investigators found that the present total monetary gold stock only just suffices to meet the current monetary needs. If the growth of production and trade is to continue for the half century to come at anything like the same rate as for the last fifty years, demanding a corresponding increase in the aggregate of the circulating medium and the gold basis upon which it rests, then it is estimated that an annual average addition of 2 to 3 percent is required to the world's monetary gold stock in order to maintain stable prices.

The anxiety now spreading in regard to the gold problem arises from the fact or the well-founded fear that the present gold mines of the world are, or very soon will be, unable to meet this demand. Competent experts looking a decade ahead estimate the prospects of gold production from the Rand mines of South Africa, from Canada and from the United States — the leading gold-producing regions — as somewhat better than those furnished by responsible government officials. But even the most optimistic among the trustworthy authorities on this subject predict an imminent gold shortage. If, as a result of this shortage, prices of commodities other than gold decline far enough and long enough, gold mining will ultimately receive a stimulus. Known marginal deposits will be brought into production and the search for new mines will be prosecuted with intense vigor. Twice during the nineteenth century a long price decline has been arrested and turned to an upward movement by phenomenal gold discoveries, once at the mid-century by the finding and rapid working of great alluvial gold deposits in California and Australia, and again in the last decade of the century when the application of new technical processes to the deep reef mines of South Africa produced an unexampled gold output. After the gold rushes of the 'fifties had run their course, W. Stanley Jevons in 1863 prophesied that "centuries will probably pass without such another run of luck," although he qualified this bold assertion in a later passage by admitting that "by a very lucky chance or by a skilful and expensive search" gold might some day be found in deep "leads"

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or quartz reefs. Since he wrote, the great Rand workings have justified his admission, but "skilful and expensive" searches over almost all the possible gold formations on the earth's surface have as yet revealed no second Rand. The mining experts have no illusions on this score. Another such great discovery, they say, is barely possible but not likely, and such smaller increase of gold supply as may be stimulated by a considerable fall in the price level will prove insufficient if the world's gold requirement maintains its present height and recent rate of growth.

It is precisely, however, the fear of such a price decline which gives point and poignancy to the prevailing discussion of the gold problem — a fear strongly accentuated by the recent sharp decline in prices. Observation has shown a definite and close relationship between the supply of gold and those long upward and downward movements of the price-level which are named "secular trends." Complex and variable forces operate constantly in and upon the price structure, but, other than the gold supply, no factor or set of factors influencing widely the system of commodity prices or of price groups has been found adequate to explain the fact that these long-time fluctuations have coincided with marked changes in the growth of the stock of gold which provides the critical reserve for the mass of credit transactions. It was common during the 'fifties and 'sixties to explain the steady rise of prices by the extension of trade and manufactures, increasing the demand for commodities, yet it was equally common, when the long price decline set in (from 1865 in the United States and 1873 in England) to interpret the extension of trade and manufacture as increasing the supply of commodities. But when after 1895 the long downward swing gave way again to the upward trend of prices persisting to 1920, this double-faced explanation clearly was worn too thin. There were no sudden changes in the business of making, moving and selling commodities during these periods which were sufficient to account for the long price-movements in opposite directions.

Although it is fairly evident that changes in the gold supply predominantly mould the secular trends of prices, it is by no means so clear that to this factor should be ascribed a major influence upon the shorter price fluctuations which accompany business cycles. The slope of the long swing modifies in some degree the character of the shorter oscillations along its course. The studies of Mitchell and Thorp, for instance, have shown that

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during the declining secular trends, both in England and the United States, the duration of the depression phase of the business cycles is relatively long, while during the long upward trends the prosperity phase of the business cycles is longer and more pronounced. But an examination of price history shows no such close correspondence between business cycles and gold production as that which is in evidence between the secular trends of gold production and the secular trends of prices, as measured by the index numbers for wholesale prices stretching back in England and the United States for a century and a half. Business cycles seem to be fluctuations of a related but distinct species, operated by a complex of forces differently constituted from that which in the secular trend of prices places the gold output in a dominant position. So different, indeed, are these two species of fluctuation that it is very doubtful whether any stabilization of gold supply or control of the circulating medium could do more than to alleviate in some measure the sharpness and shorten the depression phase of business cycles. Monetary stabilization, however fundamentally desirable, is not a panacea for every ill. It is important at the present time to emphasize the difference in causation between the long, secular price movements and the shorter fluctuations. It seems probable that a long downward movement is beginning, but the recent severe depression in business is due primarily to other causes than a shortage in gold.

The business-cycle depression, apt to be sharply subversive and cataclysmic, is much in the foreground; indeed all the phases of the shorter fluctuations, seasonal and cyclical, always conceal the secular trend which Jevons described as "insidious, slow and imperceptible." It has been a matter of debate among economists whether, in the balance of advantages and disadvantages, the upward secular trend was to be preferred to the downward movement. Marshall thought that on the whole the upward trend was the better because it is marked by more resiliency and more incentive to enterprise. It is at least open to question, and deserving of much fuller investigation than has as yet been given, whether or not the sagging pressure of gradually falling prices, long and cumulatively applied, intensifies competitive effort, stimulates both "process and product invention" (to use Henry Dennison's phrase), compels fundamental reorganizations and readjustments both economic and social, to the ultimate though painful good of mankind. The school of adversity, how-

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ever, whatever its compulsory benefits, is dangerously experimental, and never willingly entered. The memory of the dismal 'forties and of the agitated 'nineties, the final terms of the previous two long price declines, is not inviting. But it should also be remembered that during those periods from 1815 to 1850, and from 1870 to 1895, two high plateaus of progress, in the 'thirties and 'eighties, jut out from the declivity of prices. The thrust of population over enormous areas, the expansion of the industrial revolution into new regions, huge strides in means of transportation — all these took place during these downward trends, accompanied by the development of new techniques of business enterprise. Those who had relatively fixed incomes steadily benefited, while those with variable incomes learned the necessary adjustments, such as increased speed in operation or the organization of larger productive and protective units, both of labor and capital, of consumers and producers.

The present depression phase of the current business cycle will give place to the succeeding phases of revival and prosperity, and meanwhile the longer price trend, "insidious and slow," will not be "imperceptible," for it will not escape the more refined methods of statistical observation which this generation possesses. We shall soon know with certainty whether a world gold shortage is impending, but we shall not know what to do about it. With its historical tradition and its affective attributes, gold does not seem likely in any near future to be displaced as the basis of monetary values, though ways and means can be found for greater economy in its use, by such devices as a greater world-wide functioning of credit instruments based on smaller reserves, or by a systematic development of central bank clearings. For the operation of such palliatives, close international coöperation will be essential. Research also, intensive and prolonged, requiring large resources and the collaboration of many minds, will be needed. As the Bank of International Settlements succeeds in bringing the central banks into effective concert — a coöperation from which the United States must find it impracticable to stand aloof — and as national distrusts and prejudices are allayed, an atmosphere will be created in which alone the gold problem can be adequately studied, with any hope of finding and applying those measures which may tend to stabilize the monetary factor in the secular trend of prices.

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REVOLUTION, RECOGNITION AND INTERVENTION

By Lawrence Dennis

REVOLUTIONS will happen. This truth is brought home to us by recent events in Santo Domingo, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina and Brazil, and by portents of similar developments elsewhere in Latin America. Revolutions challenge other nations to take notice and to take action. When a government is violently overthrown, it is immediately replaced by another. The first question for foreign governments is: "To recognize or not to recognize?" If recognition is denied or withheld, the question arises whether to have relations with the new government and, if so, under what conditions. On these subjects the United States has made notable contributions both of ideas and of precedents. They constitute one of our most vital and least static foreign policies.

The latest change in American policy as regards the granting of recognition is the complete abandonment of the Wilsonian doctrine of "constitutional legitimacy" so far as South America is concerned. The recognition of the recently formed governments in the five countries mentioned above marks a return to the Jeffersonian policy of prompt *de jure* recognition of *de facto* governments which are in undisputed control and disposed to fulfil their international obligations.

No adequate discussion of American policy in respect to revolutions and recognition can fail to open with a statement of the ideas which Thomas Jefferson, first as Secretary of State and later as President, expounded and forged into one of the earliest and most characteristically American foreign policies. Jefferson believed in revolution and made no bones about saying so. "I hold," he wrote, "that a little revolution now and then is a good thing and is as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical. . . . It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government." And again, referring to Shays's Rebellion: "God forbid that we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion."

These philosophical views were undoubtedly held with all disinterestedness by our third President, but it is well to remember that, so far as South American revolutions were concerned,

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Jefferson's views accorded exactly with the most obvious dictates of American self-interest, both political and commercial. The triumph of revolution in South America meant the elimination from this hemisphere of a potentially dangerous neighbor and, more important, the opening to American commerce of doors tightly closed by a mercantilistic Spanish colonial system.

Jefferson's policy was that, "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation substantially declared," and this without regard for the manner or means of its formation. His policy stood diametrically opposed to the doctrine of legitimacy espoused by the Holy Alliance of European nations. For Jefferson there was no such thing as a divine or a natural right, either of a monarchy or of a constitutional republican government, to be perpetuated and not to be overthrown by violence or otherwise. For him, the facts of political situations and not the postulates of political theories were normative. The development and application of this liberal principle was one of the noblest contributions of the United States to modern international law. It soon came to be generally accepted, probably as much because it suited the commercial interests of Great Britain and the United States as for any idealistic considerations. Anglo-Saxon ideals and interests seem to have a happy faculty of easy coalescence.

By the time of the Civil War, our prompt recognition of any *de facto* government following the violent overthrow of its predecessor was hardly more than a formality which the American diplomatic representative was promptly authorized to consummate as soon as he considered the new government in effective control of the country and acquiesced in by the people. Acquiescence was objectively determined by the fact that the people paid taxes, rendered military service and obeyed the new government.

It fell to Lincoln's Secretary of State, Seward, acting under the influence of the events of the Civil War, to modify the Jeffersonian policy to the extent of declaring that, "Revolutions ought not to be accepted until the people have adopted them by organic law with the *solemnities* which would seem sufficient to guarantee their stability and permanency"; adding, without conscious humor, "This is the result of reflection upon national trials of our own."

According to international law today the conditions of civil war require recognition by foreign nations of the insurgency and, in

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protracted conflicts, of the belligerency of the revolutionists, but full recognition as a *de jure* government should be withheld until the armed issue has been resolved conclusively in favor of the permanency of the new government. Only the *fact* of control and acceptance by the people is vital — not the *formalities* of establishment.

A few years after the Civil War American policy had got back to the Jeffersonian standards for recognition, or de factoism.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century our policy with regard to recognition has been marked by two important developments. The first has been a growing tendency, wherever recognition of a Latin American government is involved, to attempt to secure from the government seeking recognition its assent to a number of points specified by the United States. This assent is a sort of condition precedent (often intimated but not expressly stated) to extending recognition. The second development has been a revival of the defunct legitimacy doctrine of the equally extinct Holy Alliance, with its old regal robes replaced by the more up-to-date garments of republican constitutionality.

The first development — trading recognition for a consideration — has been very subtle in its growth. It may best be explained by referring to an excellent brief statement of the now accepted international law criteria for granting recognition to revolutionary governments. A paragraph in the Draft Convention prepared by the Pan American Juristical Conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1927 reads: "Every abnormally constituted government may be recognized if it is capable of maintaining order and tranquillity and is disposed to fulfil the international obligations of the nation." Up to near the end of the nineteenth century, the second of these conditions, the disposition to fulfil international obligations, was never mentioned in communications of the State Department; it was taken for granted. Expressed interest in this condition seems to be in direct ratio to the amount of American investments in the country. Thus, when we recognized King Peter of Serbia in 1903, following the assassination of his predecessor in a palace revolution, we asked no questions about an ability to fulfil international obligations; we had then no important investments in Serbia.

Interpreted liberally, the second condition should mean simply that the government to be recognized is disposed to fulfil its obligations as they may be defined and determined according to

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international law. Interpreted narrowly, as our government has shown a tendency to do in recent years when extending recognition to weak governments where our investments are considerable, this condition may mean, in effect, that the government soliciting recognition must agree to every demand of the recognizing government. Of course, the recognizing government reasons that everything it asks is only a part of the international obligations of the new government.

Two examples may be cited to illustrate this unfortunate development. When General Morales sought recognition in Santo Domingo after his *coup d'état* of 1904, he was told that he would be recognized if his government pledged itself to recognize all the engagements entered into between the American Legation and the Dominican Republic, engagements to which Mr. Roosevelt had not yet secured the assent of the American Senate. Morales signed on the dotted line and promptly received recognition. In another case, the United States chaffered with the Obregon government from November 19, 1921, to March 31, 1923, before recognizing it. The United States demanded as the price of recognition the acceptance by Mexico of what Mr. Hughes called a "proper treaty," drafted and submitted by the Department of State as embodying our views of what Mexico ought to do and ought not to do to "safeguard American property rights in Mexico." The deadlock caused by Mexico's refusal to sign on the dotted line was finally broken by a compromise arrangement fostered by a more conciliatory spirit on both sides, and so recognition came to Obregon.

This may be shrewd trading for private individuals, but from the point of view of international law and good relations between nations it is difficult to imagine a more regrettable procedure. The fairness of the claims has nothing to do with the propriety of making their satisfaction the price of recognition. International law, diplomacy and arbitration exist for the purpose of defining rights and settling claims between nations. Law is clearly a better basis than swapping, especially where the two parties have not equal bargaining power. Take a recent instance. The *de facto* government of Tinoco in Costa Rica (1917–1919), which was refused recognition by the United States, and by the European nations in deference to our wishes, made certain contracts with foreigners which the next government repudiated by law. The British Government had not exacted any agreements at the time

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it extended recognition, but, in an arbitral decision rendered by Chief Justice Taft, the Tinoco contracts were held binding on succeeding Costa Rican governments.

Whenever the American representative mentions to the head of a *de facto* government a number of things which the United States desires, and intimates that compliance with these wishes might help along recognition, the United States is using *Machtpolitik* or economic imperialism in a very overt manner. The United States is a nearly invincible world Power. The new government with which such tactics are employed is always weak and badly in need of recognition. The United States is under no legal obligation to extend recognition. We may gain a point by this sort of trading, but it is dearly bought in good will, as our relations with Mexico, for instance, eloquently testify.

The second development, or the masquerade of the reactionary Holy Alliance legitimacy doctrine in the garments of republican constitutionalism, is one of the most interesting features of American policy since 1913. The doctrine that a successful revolutionary régime should not be recognized until a constitutional reorganization of the country has taken place was first propounded about 1906 by Dr. Tobar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay. The idea was embodied in the Central American Treaty of 1907. It was made more drastic by Article 2 of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of February 1923, promoted by the State Department of the United States but signed only by the Central American representatives in conference at Washington. The Treaty was not allowed to come under the purview of the United States Senate; our announced adhesion to the principle of Article 2 of the Treaty was a piece of executive policy. This article added to the Tobar Doctrine that, even after the freely elected representatives of the people had constitutionally reorganized the government, if they should elect any leader of the revolution or his near relative by blood or marriage, such person could not be recognized as president.

Mr. Wilson made the first American application of the Tobar Doctrine in refusing recognition to the Huerta government of Mexico in 1913. Mr. Coolidge made the last application of the doctrine in South America in the denial of recognition to the Ayora régime, which came to power in Ecuador through a *coup d'état* in July 1925. Three years later Mr. Coolidge reversed our attitude towards the Ayora régime and recognized it, although

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Ayora was not constitutionally elected President until March 1929. In Central America the doctrine was last applied in the refusal of recognition to the Chamorro government, which came to power in Nicaragua in January 1926. For Central America the doctrine still governs our policy by virtue of our announced adherence to the rule of Article 2 of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923.

As formulated in Mr. Wilson's lofty prose, the doctrine seems hard to assail. "The Government of the United States will refuse to extend the hand of welcome to anyone who obtains power in a sister republic by treachery or violence." The policy has not been applied outside of the Americas. In Europe we make a practice of recognizing promptly and without legitimistic inquiries any régime that may shoot or otherwise make its way to power.

As described sympathetically by a supporter,[1] the doctrine seems less invulnerable than it does in Mr. Wilson's phraseology. Ambassador Page had been trying to get the British to withdraw recognition from Huerta in Mexico.

> I can't get away from the feeling that the English simply do not and will not believe in any unselfish public action, further than the keeping of order. They have a mania for order, sheer order, order for the sake of order. They can't see how anything can come in anyone's thought before order or how anything need come afterward. Even Sir Edward Grey jocularly ran me across our history with questions like this:
>
> "Suppose you have to intervene, what then?"
>
> "Make 'em vote and live by their decisions."[2]
>
> "But suppose they will not so live?"
>
> "We'll go in again and make 'em vote again."
>
> "And keep this up for two hundred years?" asked he.
>
> "Yes," said I. "The United States will be here two hundred years and it can continue to shoot men for that little space until they learn to vote and rule themselves."
>
> I have never seen him laugh so heartily. Shooting men into self-government! Shooting men into orderliness — he comprehends that; that's all right. . . . A nigger lynched in Mississippi offends them more than a tyrant in Mexico.

The non-recognition policy finally forced Huerta out, but recognition did not save Carranza from overthrow by revolution nor did recognition avert the recent Mexican revolution, although it doubtless did much to prevent its triumph.

In passing, it may be observed that a rigid policy which always

[1] "Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," edited by Burton J. Hendrick, Vol. I, p. 188.

[2] This is what we have been doing in Nicaragua since 1927.

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aids the government against revolution cannot invariably be considered a good policy unless one believes no government ought ever to be overthrown. It goes without saying that rulers and régimes overthrown by revolution cannot, in most instances, be ousted in any other way. There are three choices: putting up indefinitely with a bad government; change of government by revolution; or supervised elections with perpetual intervention by some strong nation. Americans should be prepared to admit that the world's last good revolution did not terminate when Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown. Mr. Roosevelt, for instance, thought the Panama Revolution of 1903 such a noble movement that he ordered the American Navy to prevent the Colombian Government from landing forces to suppress it. We should always gratefully recall that that revolution gave to the world the Panama Canal and to us the control of it — truly a noble gift from a Latin American revolution and another example of the happy harmony between Anglo-Saxon ideals and interests.

Our arms embargo policy for the Americas and China is an anti-revolution instrument developed since 1912. The first application below the Panama Canal of an embargo on arms for revolutionists was made on October 22, 1930, by virtue of discretionary authority vested in the President of the United States by the Joint Resolution of January 31, 1922, and in harmony with principles established in the Convention "On the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil War" between the United States and certain American republics. This Convention, a product of the Pan-American Congress of 1928, was ratified by the Senate, April 15, 1930. The policy accords with no generally accepted principles of international law. It is purely a regional policy which had the warm approval of many Latin American statesmen — recently in power, and now out.

By way of brief critical comment suffice it to observe that the first application of the arms embargo to a South American revolutionary situation proved with dramatic swiftness its utter futility. The Brazilian revolution triumphed just forty-eight hours after Mr. Hoover's proclamation of an embargo on arms to the revolutionists and of an authorization to ship arms to the government. Just what useful purpose the embargo gesture served remains to be explained, either by the champions of the general policy of always actively supporting all constituted governments against revolution, or by those responsible for a

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singularly unfortunate and entirely avoidable application of this policy. The United States should never have become a party to the above-mentioned Convention. It could then have watched events in the Brazilian contest without an obligation either to take sides with the government by an embargo on arms to the insurgents or to recognize the belligerency of the insurgents by a proclamation of neutrality. Once the United States was a party to the Convention, our government should have taken advantage of the right left to it by the Convention to recognize the belligerency of the Brazilian insurgents rather than to take sides with a visibly tottering government.

But let us return to the main thread of our article. It cannot be shown that the use of recognition and non-recognition as instruments of an American policy of interference with the internal political processes of Mexico and Central America has contributed to peace or stability in those countries.

Hardly was the ink dry on the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923 when the first test came in Honduras. It became apparent early in 1923 that the elections of the coming autumn in that country were going to be fraudulent and that revolution was inevitable. The State Department, animated as ever by good intentions and loyal to Article 2, broadcast a statement that we should not recognize any revolutionary government or leader, that we expected the other Central American republics to abide by Article 2, and that we confidently hoped the Hondurans would settle their electoral problem in an orderly, constitutional manner.

As usual, the inevitable happened. The elections were a farce. A coalition of four political leaders finally drove the old government from power after some months of fighting. In an unfortunate peace conference aboard an American warship at Amapala, Honduras, a hundred miles from the capital, a compromise arrangement, or so-called peace pact, was promoted by the Special Representative of the President of the United States sent to Honduras to bring peace by friendly agreement. It was signed by the delegates of the contending factions on the day of the triumphant entry of the revolutionists into the capital.[3]

The Peace of Amapala tied the hands of the victors and, to-

[3] An equally unfortunate and even more unfruitful peace conference aboard an American warship in Nicaraguan waters was presided over two years later by me, as American Chargé d'Affaires. Peace in Nicaragua was later proclaimed by Mr. Stimson and General Moncada at Tipitapa, but it took nearly five thousand marines several months of sanguinary fighting, in which a hundred of them lost their lives, to make it a reality.

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gether with the American policy of non-recognition which it was designed to uphold, prevented the immediate emergence of the strongest leader of the revolution at the head of a stable government. One of the four victors broke the peace pact and led a second revolution, which the other three leaders in charge of the provisional unrecognized government put down after some three months' fighting in which several hundreds lost their lives; thus peace finally came to Honduras. The American peacemaker had, in the meantime, returned to the United States. When the smoke of the last revolution had cleared away, the American policy of non-recognition for the first time began to show real effectiveness. It kept any leader of the revolution from being elected to the presidency. Washington pronounced the choice of the Honduran political leaders ineligible under Article 2. The Honduran leaders differed with Washington as to his ineligibility but, as was to be expected, the State Department won in an issue in which it had bargaining superiority — recognition to give or withhold. It devolved on me as American Chargé d'Affaires to extend recognition on February 1, 1925, to the eventually established, eligible, "constitutional" government as found satisfactory to Washington's legitimacy requirements.

Now, if one is not an academic idealist or a doctrinaire, one must appreciate that few things can be worse just after a successful revolution than to say: No Washington, Franklin or Hamilton of the revolution may head the new government; no new government may immediately consolidate its position by *de jure* recognition; the revolutionary disturbances must be followed by months of the uncertain vicissitudes of a constitutional convention, political manœuvers, campaigning, and finally by general elections held by the provisional government — all before the country can settle down to normal political life.

Furthermore, the quest after constitutional legitimacy, imposed by our policy under Article 2, involves the American State Department and especially its diplomatic representative in deplorable acts of interference in the political affairs of the country which is seeking recognition. My eleven months of service as American Chargé d'Affaires in Honduras and seven months in the same rôle in Nicaragua, in the course of which I extended recognition to the new government in each country, gave me experience which authorizes me to speak advisedly on this point.

When American policy makes the State Department broadcast

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to the world in advance what kind of government and what individual, by name, the United States will not recognize, the policy practically forces the American representative to say what government and what individual the United States will recognize. This actually happened in Nicaragua. The American (though not European) governmental way of doing things and then finding out later from the courts whether they were "legally" done, is clearly not feasible in setting up a government to obtain American recognition. The people in control insist on knowing in advance whether the legitimacy formula will be acceptable to Washington, since the only reason for going to all the trouble of working it out is to obtain American recognition. For us to say that our action will be determined by Article 2 and the facts of the case is begging the question. Laws and treaties involve nice questions of interpretation. The best lawyers in the United States cannot predict with assurance which way the interpreting authority will resolve a fine point of constitutional law or public policy. The State Department has, therefore, much to its dislike, been obliged to commit itself in advance to the recognition of a given man under certain specified conditions, as it did in connection with the choice of Diaz in Nicaragua. Local politicians are thereby made to curry favor with the State Department and the American Legation. The American representative, by holding the State Department's key to the legitimacy puzzle, becomes the essential party to the solution of the country's political problem, or to the selection of its president. No amount of sweetness and light from Washington can mitigate the fact that the State Department is minding another country's electoral business.

Utterly unimpressed by the precedent of American non-recognition in the Honduran difficulties of 1923–1924, General Chamorro in Nicaragua started a *coup d'état* against the constitutional government in 1925, just one month after we had withdrawn the marines. The State Department bombarded him with verbal and written broadsides about unconstitutionality, illegality, Article 2 and non-recognition, some of the later and stiffer ones of which it fell to my lot to deliver personally, much to the detriment of cordial relations between General Chamorro and myself. Chamorro, nevertheless, went ahead with his plans, first "illegally" assuming and then "illegally" exercising the presidency of Nicaragua until a revolution, materially aided by Mexico and morally stimulated by our non-recognition statements, forced him

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to turn over the government to a fellow-Conservative, Diaz, whom the State Department had indicated through me it would recognize.

Mexican support of the so-called constitutional movement of the constitutional Vice-President of Nicaragua against Chamorro drove us to seek hurriedly a government we could recognize and so checkmate Mexican interference. Continued Mexican support of the same movement against a government we had recognized for an obvious purpose was an assault on our national prestige amounting to a piece of international *lèse-majesté*. Thereafter, affronted dignity dictated largely our course of action and determined events.

Once nations get away from the objective criteria of the sound de factoism of international law and old American policy into the specious metaphysics of any system of legitimacy, be it constitutional or monarchical, irreconcilable differences of opinion will inevitably arise, making national honor, rather than reason and political expediency, the ultimate arbiter of policy. Dynastic wars used to be one of the results of arguments about legitimacy. It is hard enough to accommodate policy to situations of fact. It is quite impossible to adjust it to doctrinary systems of politics. This we learned in trying to rationalize our denial of recognition to Chamorro on account of his *coup d'état*, our forced recognition of Diaz, a partner in the *coup*, and our later recognition of the revolutionary leader, Moncada, after declaring we would not recognize Chamorro, even if fairly elected under our supervised elections. Mexico, Guatemala and Costa Rica challenged our verdict on the mystic issue of Diaz's constitutionality. Moreover, while we had given Chamorro a legalistic tongue-lashing, Mexico seemed determined to aid his Nicaraguan adversaries to administer a more corporal drubbing. After all, did not France once aid a revolution against Great Britain?

The upshot of it all was that we had to fight a small war to make peace in Nicaragua, to uphold our prestige, to carry out supervised elections, and to establish and maintain a constitutional legitimacy which we could recognize. If we would continue this artificial situation, we must keep the marines indefinitely in Nicaragua. They kept Nicaragua free of revolutions from 1912 to August 1925. One month after their departure revolution started.

One of the grim ironies of it all is that, while there was nothing for Mr. Stimson to do, if America's face was to be saved, but to

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have us intervene as we did, practically all our acts in Nicaragua since 1927 have been in violation of the Nicaraguan constitution. There are few written constitutions which do not clearly inhibit the legislative and executive branches from making such delegations of power to foreigners as were required for the carrying out of our program.

The fundamental error in our Central American recognition policy lies in a misapprehension of the true nature of political revolution. Jefferson and the fathers of the American Republic were too near to the American and French Revolutions and too critical in their political thinking to suffer from any such misapprehension. Revolutions, like bodily pain or fever, are not diseases but symptoms. They are nature's way of calling attention to, and reacting protectively against, something wrong in the body. Sound therapy aims at the eradication of causes, not of symptoms. Without symptoms we should not know when we are sick.

It is undoubtedly a noble dream, that of ridding Latin American republics of political disorders, but as it can be realized only by removing the causes, it is not the business of foreign countries. The policy of practical idealism and enlightened self-interest is to encourage the American republics, in ways approved by international law, to work out their own salvation without armed interventions. We should be tolerant of their shortcomings and patient with their slow progress, remembering that long decades of uninterrupted civil war and several great revolutions are a part of the political experience out of which the present political institutions of the English-speaking peoples have flowered.

In our pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of constitutionalism and in our apostolic fervor against revolution, we have founded recent American policy in Nicaragua on the naïve assumption that what Nicaragua mainly needs is fair elections and freedom from revolution. We have accordingly sent them first-class fighting men to supervise their elections and police their territory.

As a matter of fact, among the things Nicaragua most needs are not electoral and civil policing, but primary instruction, sanitation, means of communication and a better economic structure. Not merely policemen, but spiritual leaders, teachers, physicians, engineers, craftsmen and agricultural pioneers are required to prepare Nicaragua for successful self-government. These, however, are contributions which pass from one nation to another

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through the processes of colonization and racial amalgamation. They are not exported in the soldier's knapsack.

We are given to overvaluing constitutionalism and political tranquillity as factors of social progress. We seem to forget that many a people has flourished economically, produced great men, and enriched the human heritage with the fruits of a high civilization without either fair elections or political tranquillity. On the other hand, Nicaragua today furnishes the spectacle of a country spiritually and economically stagnant while to its illiterate and undernourished masses American marines vouchsafe that ultimate luxury of an advanced democracy — fair elections. One may even question whether the leader best suited to the needs of a country is as likely to emerge from elections supervised by American officials as from a less artificial course of events.

It is no disparagement of fair elections or the *pax americana* in Nicaragua to question whether these boons, by themselves, are worth to Nicaragua the life of one good American soldier. And it is no criticism of our gallant missionaries of order and fair elections to reiterate that self-government, like every other art, must be learned by practice, by trial and error — not absorbed from foreigners in control of certain vital governmental functions.

In defense of our interventionist activities the argument is invariably advanced that revolution cannot be allowed to run its course to the detriment of foreign interests. Foreign nations must, therefore, do something about it. This is the stock argument of academic idealists and certain equally uninformed practical men who are occasionally moved strangely by a vague sense of the notion known as "the white man's burden." Only a little clear thinking is needed to reveal the true character and limited application of this argument.

As a doctrine it is feasible only when applied to weak countries, easy of subjugation. It is a sort of *Machtpolitik*. It is not good international law. Unlike good law, it cannot be applied to large as well as to small, to strong as well as to weak. In nations like Russia or China, no matter what happens or how greatly foreign interests are menaced or injured, there can be no serious question of a foreign intervention to put things right. At most, a few punitive blows against frontier points or the seizure and administration of frontier customs may be resorted to by way of reprisal or indemnification. But even the most ardent would-be bearer of

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"the white man's burden" hesitates to urge a foreign intervention to give to Russia or China free elections, safety for foreign lives and property and the other good things some people feel we owe it to ourselves and to Nicaragua to bestow on this neighboring republic.

European and Asiatic aliens have been lynched in the United States, and the legally contracted debts of certain states of our Union to foreign bondholders have been repudiated by law. Yet a lack of security for foreign lives and property was not on this account alleged against us as a ground for foreign intervention. When, however, our Union was in jeopardy, Napoleon III favored an Anglo-French intervention to force a draw in our Civil War. He deemed two American republics more favorable to European interests than a united American nation.

Defenders of our interventions also find it convenient to exploit the bogey of possible European intervention were we to follow a hands-off policy. The truth about this bogey is simply that whenever the United States intervenes for the announced purpose of protecting American lives and property, European governments quite naturally interest themselves to see that their nationals share with ours any benefits of such measures. This does not indicate that if we did not take these measures other nations would.

Whatever may have been true twenty-five or more years ago, today no European nation will undertake measures on this hemisphere in the face of our expressed opposition. This will remain true whatever the situation may be in any one of the Latin American republics and however we may meet it. And it will be true primarily because of our relative economic might and military potentialities and not because of our handling of political situations in Latin America.

The fundamental basis of political interventions is force, not law, except in so far as might alone may be held to make right. The legislative and executive ratifications of our acts secured from officials installed and kept in power under the ægis of our arms and consequently, for all practical purposes, subservient to them, have little moral authority or normative value. The prerequisites of intervention are three: a strong intervener, a weak intervenee, and the absence of effective opposition by other strong nations to the intervention. These observations do not constitute a moral reproach but a factual analysis. The morality of intervention as a measure for the protection or advancement of the

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interests of a strong intervening nation does not admit of objective discussion. This phase of the question, therefore, has no proper place in this article.

With regard to the expediency of intervention, however, two points susceptible of demonstration may be stated with considerable emphasis. The first is that revolutions in Latin America are not so dangerous to foreign interests as is commonly believed in the United States. It may be remarked, in passing, that the only significant differences between revolutions in Central America and South America grow out of the fact that certain Central American countries are too weak to maintain an adequate professional army capable of promptly deciding the fate of any popular movement against the government, by either expeditiously suppressing it or going over to it. Three years' diplomatic service in Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua; intimate conversations with residents of many years; a quiet night's sleep through a revolutionary raid on the leading United Fruit port in Honduras; and the leisurely observation of street fighting in an interior Nicaraguan town with no near-by protecting marines — these afford me a basis for the observation that Americans greatly exaggerate the dangers to non-participants from Latin American revolutions. For the bystander they are less dangerous than a routine gangster fight in Chicago.

The second point is that injuries to foreign lives and property from occasional political disorders will be found less than the total costs in American lives, money and good will throughout South America, growing out of a prolonged intervention. A study of the records of adjudicated revolutionary claims in Nicaragua and Santo Domingo will reveal such losses to be trifling as compared with the far more frequent damages suffered in these countries, and equally in lands less affected by revolutions, from tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, fires, strikes, non-patriotic bandits and other things for protection against which people look to insurance rather than to United States marines. It should be stated also, to the credit of most really large American companies (the United Fruit Company, for instance), that they do not ask for American intervention to protect their interests. They are able, and usually prefer, to take care of themselves in their own ways.

It must not be forgotten that foreigners in these countries pay very small taxes and no income tax whatever. A 20 percent tax on

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the profits of a large corporation in a Central American republic would, in a good year, amount to more than the revolutionary damages suffered by this company in a decade. If foreign companies receive little protection, they pay for less. Savings on taxes may properly be regarded as generous premiums on self-insurance against revolutionary losses.

Until Mr. Stimson and General Moncada made peace in Nicaragua, American lives and property were scrupulously respected by both sides, such property losses as occurred being unintentionally caused. Thereafter, Sandino's followers made deliberate war on foreign property and destroyed an important American mine. Until peace was declared at Tipitapa, no American non-participant lost his life in the Nicaraguan revolution. Thereafter, a hundred good American lives were sacrificed in the Nicaraguan jungle waging a feckless warfare against a handful — now admitted never to have numbered at one time more than some two hundred and fifty — of ignorant, half-starved Nicaraguan peasants, inflamed by fanatical anti-American propaganda and hunger. So much then for the argument that active measures of intervention to promote order and constitutional government in Central America are at times essential to the safety of American lives and property.

England may allege a need to police and colonize the lands of the "lesser breeds without the law" in order to secure markets and raw materials. The validity of this argument, however, must be critically examined by weighing the profits of imperial trade against the costs in human lives, human welfare and economic goods growing out of imperial wars and imperial defense. And the final account of British imperialism cannot yet be rendered.

The United States, however, unlike England, is nearly self-sufficient and has no surplus population to export to colonies or to support by an unemployment dole. We may well stop and consider whether our highest destiny lies in assimilating the Mediterranean, Indian and Negro races and cultures found in the republics immediately to the south of us. History certainly does not warrant the hope that assimilation may be avoided if we persist in indefinitely prolonged interventions admittedly aimed at the modification of the political and cultural ways of these neighboring peoples. We should bear in mind that it is usually possible to trade with another people, exchanging one's manufactures and

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farm products for their bananas, sugar and coffee, without first forcing on them one's own standards of government.

The choice between intervention and non-intervention is not, as the defenders of intervention like to argue, a choice between peace, safety, constitutionality and trade on the one hand, and disorder, unconstitutionality and no trade on the other. It is a choice between one kind of war and peace and another. A Nicaraguan civil war in which American marines participate differs from a purely Nicaraguan civil war mainly in that the one costs us a hundred American lives and good will throughout South America while the other does not. The choice between a Nicaraguan-made peace and an American-made peace is a choice between Chamorro's way and our way of violating the Nicaraguan constitution.

With regard to Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti and Panama, it may be said, somewhat parenthetically in this discussion, that these countries are in reality American protectorates, each under a special type of what is known in international law as an international servitude to the United States, created by the respective treaties. In Cuba, Panama and Haiti the United States enjoys a treaty right of intervention to assure order and the fulfilment of international obligations. In the opinion of many this right carries with it a moral responsibility for the governments which we permit and which we protect from overthrow by revolution. If we are to believe many well-informed persons, we even protect certain governments from peaceful change by fair elections. Specifically, the charge is made that the governments of Cuba and Panama do not allow fair elections. Obviously, a full discussion of these peculiarly colonial problems of the American empire lies outside of the scope of this article.

As matters stand since our recognition of the latest *de facto* governments, we have thrown Wilsonian "legitimacy" into the discard for South America, but it remains to plague us in Central America, where we still profess adherence to it and still keep some marines to avoid future difficulties. A dignified exit from the perpetual occupation of Nicaragua and a guarantee against being jockeyed by circumstances into similar adventures in the future are to be found only in a return to the Jeffersonian recognition policy. Landing marines in an emergency for the temporary protection or evacuation of foreigners where there is actual danger to their lives is one thing; doubtless it is a defensible exer-

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cise of our President's power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Sending an army of five thousand soldiers to wage a war in a foreign country to carry out fair elections and secure a certain type of political procedure, however excellent, is something quite different and, in my opinion, outside the constitutional powers of the President of the United States. It is idle to disclaim a desire for intervention while pursuing policies which in certain likely situations make it inevitable. Legitimacy is one of these policies.

We can announce that our recognition policy for Central America will not hereafter be necessarily governed by Article 2 of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923. Better still, we can suggest another Central American conference to modify Article 2 to conform with the generally accepted international law doctrine on recognition. We have Chief Justice Taft's arbitral dictum that our Central American recognition policy, whatever its political merits as a regional policy, does not establish criteria generally recognized by international law. The agreement in the Treaty not to encourage revolution or otherwise interfere in the political affairs of other Central American states should remain and, if possible, be strengthened. Political non-interference is the best kind of international law.

In the future, the United States Government should not be tied by any doctrinary system of "legitimacy" in its policy with regard to recognition, in Central America or anywhere else. We must be free to make decisions in the light of the facts of the given situation and as nearly in harmony with the principles of international law and common justice as the demands of sound political expediency will allow.

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FRANCE AND ITALY

By Louis Aubert

FOR six months, now, there have been signs of growing tension in Franco-Italian relations, with special evidences of irritation on the part of Italy. Before entering upon a discussion of the points at issue, I might make one or two remarks upon the general situation from the French point of view.

Negotiations between Paris and Rome have been in progress for some eleven years. They have as yet been brought to no satisfactory conclusion, though neither country has felt any lack of interest or encouragement on the part of other Powers. It is abundantly realized, indeed, that the differences between France and Italy must be settled before a general conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments can profitably be held.

Now there are those who think that with a little good will on the part of France an agreement could easily be reached.

France does not share this optimism, for she has a precise knowledge of what is being asked of her. The fact is that her statesmen have been working under exceptionally unfavorable circumstances. On the one hand, the negotiations themselves have been conducted in strict secrecy. On the other hand, newspapers have been left free to conduct futile debates and to give the widest publicity to insults and rhetoric calculated to inflame public passions.

The responsibility for this lack of moderation France is disposed to place squarely with the Italian Government. The campaign waged against France in Italy has had, in virtue of the Fascist censorship, a semi-official character. So true is this, that on at least two occasions, as a result of representations from the French Government, the campaign has been hushed. Why, then, has it not been permanently ended?

The situation of the French Government in a matter of this sort is very different. There is no censorship in France, and there are opposition parties. The government cannot compel all French newspapers to say the same things; nor can it so limit constitutional rights of asylum as to prevent Italian newspapers published in France from saying all the same things. The most it can do is to urge French newspapers not to report or republish the more offensive of the insults that are being hurled

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at France from south of the Alps. Let impartial judges abroad say on which side moderation lies.

In any event, it is clear that the discussion, as it has been conducted in the newspapers, has produced nothing but fever and bewilderment. We must escape from that atmosphere and go straight to the basic problems. These problems are numerous, and they have changed in relative importance in the course of the eleven years mentioned. At the present moment, nevertheless, they may be reduced to three: colonial questions; the Slav question; and the question of parity in armaments.

II

The Italians say: "The promises made to us at the time we entered the war and afterwards have not been kept."

This reproach causes some surprise in France. Did not victory give Italy her natural frontiers? Has not her traditional enemy been swept from the map of Europe?

France has not reaped any such advantages from the war, though she realizes that the two countries did not enter the war in the same circumstances and in the same spirit. France was taken unawares by an attack and an invasion, and was hurled into the conflict at a moment's warning. Italy took several months to make her choice between war and neutrality, and in virtue of a treaty negotiated in advance with her allies, and signed by them, she knew exactly the territories which she was setting out to conquer. With the coming of the armistice, France found plenty of occasion for rejoicing in the fact that her soil was again free of the enemy. Italy, on the other hand, may well have been disappointed at not being able to annex all the territory she had counted on.

But the question arises as to whether France alone can be held responsible for this disappointment.

Article 13 of the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) stipulated: "In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favor of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighboring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain."

In execution of this article, the Franco-Italian agreement of

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September 12, 1919, granted Italy a rectification of the western frontier of Libya whereby the Oases of Ghadames and Ghat passed under Italian sovereignty.

Was this "equitable compensation"? France says yes. Italy says no.

France points to the precedent of England's settlement with Italy. England in 1924 ceded Jubaland, a territory bordering on Italian Somaliland, and made a further readjustment of frontiers in 1926, whereby Koufza became part of Libya. Italy regarded this as "equitable compensation" on the part of England. It represented a transfer to Italy of 90,000 square kilometers, approximately 35,000 square miles, of territory.

The French cession gave Italy some 46,000 square miles of territory. Furthermore, in 1928 the French Government suggested that in case Italy accepted certain proposals concerning affairs in Tunis, France would cede her the Djado Oasis to the south of Tummo (already an Italian possession), an addition of about 16,000 square miles of territory.

This offer seemed satisfactory to the Italian Government at that time. It is far from seeming so today. Italian residents in the colonies have been aroused, and the reoccupation of Mourzouk by General Graziani, last January, has only whetted their appetites. They now want Bilma, Tibesti and northern Borkou, a territory some twelve times as large as the offer they had previously found reasonable. They are even demanding access to Lake Chad, though this would cut all the lines of communication which France has been establishing with such great effort between the two parts of her African empire — West Africa and Equatorial Africa.

But this is not all. From 1927 on, Italy has been making a claim that since she inherited all the rights of Turkey in Tripolitania and the "hinterland" of Tripolitania, any concession France might make in the direction of Tibesti and Borkou could not be considered as "equitable compensation." It is true that in 1890 the Ottoman Government put forward a claim that the "hinterland" of Tripolitania extended as far as the frontiers of the Cameroon. But this absurd stretching of the "hinterland" theory was never justified by any important or durable occupation and was never recognized by France or England. The zone of French influence was delimited by an agreement with England on March 21, 1899. The boundaries indicated on the

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map annexed to that accord were accepted by Italy in letters exchanged between M. Barrère and Count Visconti-Venosta on December 14 and December 16, 1900, and between M. Barrère and Count Prinetti on November 1, 1902. France, accordingly, cannot consent to the reopening of that question now.[1]

So far, then, as the execution of Article 13 of the Treaty of London is concerned, the French position is clear: to the original cession of Ghadames and Ghat, France is willing to add the Oasis of Djado, provided all mortgages weighing upon Tunis are once and for all canceled. Moreover, though this supplementary cession of Djado, as consideration in a Tunisian settlement, was judged reasonable by Italy in 1928, France would be willing to consider looking for some new basis of agreement to the east of Tummo, if Djado were no longer acceptable.

The status of Italians in Tunis is regulated by Franco-Italian agreements of 1896. Article 13 of the "Agreement for the Establishment of Consulates" provides that: "Italy will regard as Tunisians and Tunis will regard as Italians, such individuals as shall have retained Tunisian or Italian nationality in accordance with the laws of their respective countries." Notice of the repudiation of this Article was served on Italy by France in 1918, but the article has been left in force by quarter-annual renewals since that time. Italians, therefore, have been escaping application of a French decree of November 8, 1921, which stipulates that "all individuals born in the Regency of Tunis of parents one of whom was born in the Regency are French." This decree was modified December 20, 1923, so that any individual in the category mentioned has a right to decline French citizenship, provided he does so within a year of majority; though children born of an individual who has exercised this privilege are French.

What is France aiming at in this whole matter? Simply to apply her common law, but making transitions for individuals affected as little troublesome as possible. England has accepted this arrangement for her own subjects and for her Maltese dependents, a point I mention just to show that the French demands, as regards Italy, are normal and reasonable.

[1] By agreements reached by France and Italy in 1901, Italy abandoned all rights of interference in Moroccan affairs. However, in 1928 Italy refused to endorse the "Constitution of Tangiers" save on the following conditions: that an Italian magistrate sit in the courts of the zone; that an officer attached to the Italian Consulate General have the right to see that the neutrality of the zone be not violated; that, in case of need, the Italian navy coöperate in the repression of contraband traffic in arms and munitions along the shores of the Straits. Fundamentally, these demands involved nothing but a recognition of prestige, which France was most happy to accord.

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However, this is not the end. In connection with Article 13 of the London Treaty, Italy has raised the question of mandates. If the distribution of mandates were reconsidered, would the French Government be opposed to Italy's receiving one, as against all other candidates? And the Italian press has often asserted that France and the British Empire have wronged Italy in keeping all colonial mandates for themselves.

In this connection it is important to remember just how the mandates in question arose and the conditions under which they might come to an end. The mandates of Types A, B, and C were assigned to France, Japan, Great Britain and certain of the British Dominions by unanimous decision of the "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" (Italy among these, and concurring in the decision). There were two reasons for the assignments: the territories under mandate had been conquered during the war by the respective mandatories, and they bounded on territories already held by those Powers. Italy made no objection to the assignments at the time. Furthermore, France, Great Britain and the Dominions were granted administrative responsibilities, not property rights. By taking over these mandates they did not "augment their colonial possessions." And how might a mandate terminate? In two ways, and only two. In the first place, a population under mandate might be judged capable of self-government. This case can arise, in any immediate future, only for A mandates — Irak, Syria, Palestine; and in such event, no new mandatory need be designated. (Mandates of types B and C relate mostly to Africa and the Pacific Islands, where the populations affected are very, very backward.) In the second place, a mandate might become vacant through resignation by the mandatory power; in which case, a new assignment would have to be made by unanimous consent of the Powers. It is clear that under such circumstances no eventual candidacy can be negotiated with a single Power, nor could any single Power assume contractual obligations apart from all the other Powers, especially when at least one of the Powers has already given notice of opposition to the candidacy of Italy.

We have said that the negotiations have lasted eleven years. And small wonder, if we think back over the course they have followed. There is one essential point of departure — the fulfillment by France of Article 13 of the Treaty of London. France, following the precedent of the Anglo-Italian accord under the

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same article, believes that she has satisfied the obligation undertaken in 1915 (Italy thought so too, down to 1928). But with this as a starting point, the Italians have reared a most complicated structure of dreams and contradictions: demands for territories twelve times as large; then for an approach to Lake Chad; finally for the whole "inheritance of the Turks." The French inclination to tie up any further cession of territory with some settlement as to the status of Italians in Tunisia has been disputed, after having been accepted. Vague concessions "in principle" have been asked for: France should recognize "in principle" further modification of the frontiers of Libya; she should promise "in principle" to support Italian aspirations to a mandate. Finally, all sorts of questions, entirely foreign to the colonial settlement, have been dragged in: the *Anschluss*, relations with Jugoslavia, and so on.

As a matter of fact, nothing would be simpler than to come to an accord as to the execution of the Treaty of London by France. Italy, however, has chosen to keep the question open, until Italian views on more general, and as Italy thinks, more important, issues have been accepted.

III

To crown her concessions in the colonial field, France suggested a treaty of arbitration and friendship with Italy. Two years ago, at the request of the Italian Government, France submitted (but so far without results) a scheme for such a treaty, which would revive certain provisions in the Treaty which Italy concluded in 1924 with the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. To be sure, this latter Treaty has not been renewed, and that is why our friendship for the Jugoslavs comes to play a part in our relations with Italy.

The peace treaties failed to satisfy all of Italy's Adriatic aspirations. Of the Dalmatian coast, accorded to her under the Treaty of London, Italy came into possession only of Zara.

Is France to blame for that? During the negotiations in 1919, though Italy had washed her hands completely of French interests (the left bank of the Rhine, the Sarre, etc.), France declared herself ready to fulfil her promises. But the application of the Treaty of London had by that time become impossible to such a degree that Italy herself never requested France to assist her in sticking to it.

One may ask why. The answer is clear. Because, in placing

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Fiume in the forefront of her demands, Italy made the Treaty of London a back number. According to that Treaty, Fiume went not to Italy, but to the Jugoslavs, and the good reasons (put forward by Italy, as well) for that disposition of the town in 1915 were all the more valid in 1919, as a result of the events that had taken place in the meantime: principal among these, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary before the armistice; the formation of a Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 1, 1918; and the entrance of the United States into the crusade in support of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves. President Wilson declared that he would never assent to the Italian claims upon Fiume and Dalmatia. France and Great Britain took the position that they could not apply the Treaty of London in so far as it was favorable to Italy, and repudiate it in so far as it was favorable to the Jugoslavs. Some compromise was obviously necessary whereby Italy could garner as many profits as possible from the Treaty, with Fiume to boot. At the instance of Signor Orlando, in April–May, 1919, and of Signor Tittoni in August of the same year, M. Tardieu did his best to work out a plan. It went aground on Mr. Wilson's refusal. But toward the end of 1920 the United States withdrew from coöperation in the European settlement. Thereupon, Great Britain and France, and particularly France, urgently begged Belgrade to come to a direct understanding with Italy. The Treaty of Rapallo (1920) was the result. That Treaty was modified, at the request of Italy (and to her advantage), by the agreements reached at Santa Margherita in 1923, supplemented by the agreements of Belgrade and Nettuno, and finally crowned by a Treaty of Friendship in 1924.

In the course of those two hectic years, it was natural that the Italian people, always more or less uneasy, should not always have found France active enough in furthering Italian designs. But the line of our policy never varied. France worked steadily to facilitate an accord which would procure for Italy such portions of Italian ambitions as were actually realizable.[2]

[2] The Treaty of London (1915) and of Saint Jean de Maurienne (1917) provided that in case of a partition of Turkey or of the establishment of spheres of influence in Turkey, Italy would have a share, notably in the region of Adalia. The hypothesis then held in view never materialized. But was that the fault of France? It would seem to have been the fault of the Turks! So, at any rate, the Italians thought, when, early in May 1919, without informing their Allies and Associates, they were planning to debark at Smyrna. Signor Orlando finally went over to the view of Messrs. Lloyd George, Wilson and Clemenceau that the landing should be left to Greece. It was to the Greeks, not to the Italians, that the Allies and Associates gave very bad advice that day.

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But two years after this Italo-Jugoslav settlement, which was designed to promote friendly coöperation between the two countries, Italy signed the Treaty of Tirana (1926) with Albania. That was the end of Italy's policy of concord with Jugoslavia. The Franco-Jugoslav Treaty came in 1927. Italy opined that this treaty was aimed at her, and tightened her hold on Albania. She did not renew the Treaty of Friendship with Jugoslavia.

It is apparent, therefore, that tension between Italy and Jugoslavia existed before the conclusion of the Franco-Jugoslav treaty; and a study of the conditions under which the latter treaty was negotiated will make clear whether it was ever conceived as against Italy. I shall quote, on this point, from an article by Count Sforza:[3]

> I cannot see how the French Government can be criticized in this particular episode. The idea, and the first suggestion, of a three-cornered treaty between France, Italy and Jugoslavia, came from Rome in 1923, when Fascism was already in power. The suggestion was never reduced to definite terms. It was brought forward again, toward the close of 1925, at the instance of M. Nintchitch, then Minister of Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, and a warm partisan, among the Serbs, of that policy of diplomatic friendship and collaboration with Italy which I had inaugurated in 1920 and 1921 with the Treaty of Rapallo and the anti-Hapsburg agreement. This time the initiative was taken by Paris. But the Fascist Government, which had not seemed hostile at first, shortly began making objections and ended by proposing to Belgrade a formal alliance which would exclude all other Powers. The result might readily have been foreseen: fearing that she was being "isolated," Jugoslavia began negotiating with Paris and Rome simultaneously. She found easy going at Paris, though the formal signing of a treaty was delayed by M. Briand out of a courteous desire to await developments at Rome. When an Italo-Jugoslav agreement seemed imminent, M. Briand simply initialed his documents, that the Fascist Government might be the first to conclude and sign a formal treaty. The informal signing of the treaty in France was repeated three times during the years 1926 and 1927 to permit the cabinet in Rome to smooth out the difficulties that constantly arose in the path of its entente with Belgrade. In September 1927 M. Briand thought it unwise to delay any longer. He informed the cabinet in Rome six weeks in advance that he intended to sign the treaty, and he explained at the same time the conditions under which it had been negotiated. The Treaty was formally concluded on November 11, 1927.

So then: Messrs. Briand and Nintchitch wanted either a single three-cornered treaty, or else two symmetrical treaties — it mattered little which. Italy, however, refused to consider anything except a friendly agreement with Jugoslavia from

[3] "Italy and France," *Revue de Paris*, August, 1930.

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which France would be excluded. Furthermore, she made any agreement with France dependent on a recognition by France of Italy's unlimited freedom of action east of the Adriatic.

Friendship between France and the Slavs was a matter of tradition before 1914, and the war strengthened it. It did not arise out of hostility to Italy. Furthermore it is by no means a matter of destiny that the friendship in question should make enemies of Italy and France. There is the tradition of Mazzini, who preached "alliance with the Slavic family." Italy encouraged Serbia when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia, and at the time of the Balkan Wars. It was at Rome, in 1918, that the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities was held, and at that congress the Italians and the Jugoslavs "resolved that the unity and independence of the Jugoslav nation are of vital importance to Italy, just as the integrity and unity of the Italian nation are of vital importance to the Jugoslav nation," both of them "pledging themselves to a common effort during the war and at the moment of peace." Finally, one has only to think of the policy of accord between Italy and Jugoslavia which was followed down to 1924.

In contrast with this policy — anti-Hapsburg, Slavophile, and favorable to inter-Balkan concord — there have been other Italian policies: the policy of Sonnino; the policy of alliance with Hungary; the policy of protectorate over Albania; the policy of disruption in the Balkans, in the Hapsburg tradition. Are these the best policies for Italy to follow? Italy must answer that question. That they are not the only policies that Italy is free to follow is evident, since even Fascist Italy once sketched a policy of friendship with the Slavs; and France asked nothing better than the chance to collaborate with it. This privilege was denied her. But she can easily be given another chance!

Meantime, how can the Italians talk of any "encircling" of Italy as a consequence of the Franco-Jugoslav Treaty? What does the Treaty stipulate in its essential provisions — Articles 3, 4 and 5?

In the three cases covered in those articles — threats to national security, aggression, revision of treaties — priority of action is reserved to the Council, or the Assembly, of the League of Nations. So long as matters are under consideration by the League (including demands for revision of treaties, in virtue of Article XIX of the Pact), there can be no question of

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separate action on the part of the contracting Powers. Only after failure on the part of the League, or the withdrawal of the dispute from the jurisdiction of the League, will the two nations have a free hand to make common cause in defense of their interests, their territory, their independence! This Franco-Jugoslav treaty, then, gives positive exemplification of the central idea of the Covenant — coöperation with a view to peace. It is in harmony, also, with Resolution 14 of the Assembly (1922), with the Protocol of 1924, and with the labors of the Committee on Arbitration and Security. Like Locarno, it is a regional application of the system of the Protocol. It is aimed at nobody. The name of the aggressor is left blank, and since Signor Mussolini has just proclaimed from Rome (October 27, 1930) that "Fascist Italy will never begin a war," the treaty can never be invoked against her. The treaty, furthermore, is open to all countries desirous of endorsing it. Italy is free at any moment to return to the idea of a three-cornered treaty, or to the idea of two parallel treaties.

Friendship between the French and the Jugoslavs, accordingly, is a cause of Franco-Italian misunderstanding only by the choice of Italy in refusing to share in that friendship. In asking for a formal alliance with Belgrade to the exclusion of all other Powers; in establishing herself in Albania; in concluding alliances with Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria, and (since Hitler's large vote) in talking of a *rapprochement* with Germany, Italy has launched forth on a policy of expansion toward the East, a policy that does not foster warm relations on her part either with Jugoslavia, or with the Little Entente, or with France.

Recently the darling of international capitalism (in virtue of the security it seemed to offer to investments in Italy), Fascism is bringing that country more and more to look like a proletarian nation which consents to postpone a general revolution in Europe only at the price of a general revision of treaties, and a general disarmament of the victors in the war in favor of all the dissatisfied nations — in other words of the conquered nations, plus Soviet Russia and Italy.

Such a plan, grounded apparently on the assumption of a world triumph of Fascism (now advertised as an exportable article), does not greatly encourage France in the belief that an agreement may be easily reached with Italy, especially if such an agreement must be based on parity in armaments.

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IV

Minister Grandi spoke before the Italian Senate on June 3, 1930, on the subject of parity. After summarizing the minutes of the Washington Conference of 1921–22, he concluded: "Italy went to London . . . asking for nothing save the recognition of a right which had been acquired by Italy, and conceded to Italy, as early as 1922."

It is true that even before the advent of Fascism Italy asked for equality in naval forces with France. It is also true that the French representatives at the Washington Conference, while reserving for their own country a right to fix the strength of their naval forces according to actual needs, filed no objections to Italy's demand. What better proof that the one idea of France was to come to an agreement with Italy? But there can be no talk of "a right acquired by Italy" as regards a general principle of parity applying to all her military and naval forces. The agreement signed by the representatives of France recognizes such a "right" as bearing only on dreadnoughts. It was ratified by the French Parliament with the explicit reservation that it applied only to dreadnoughts. Italy's policy toward France during the past eight years has demonstrated that to have generalized any such "right" would have been one of the most dangerous of engagements that France could possibly have undertaken.

The London Conference, provoked by an agreement as to parity between Great Britain and the United States, supplied Italy with an unusual opportunity for forcing her claim to general parity. But the word parity does not cover the same facts in the two cases.

For England and the United States, parity is the expression of a state of political equilibrium in which war between the two countries is "unthinkable." Neither of the two nations has its eye on possessions of the other. Public opinion in the two countries would be horrified at the mere suggestion of a resort to force in the settlement of any difficulty that might arise between them. Parity, with them, is the culminating point of a long history of mutual confidence.

Contrast that situation with one which includes Italy — an Italy where the censored and controlled press, day in, day out, is specifying just which portions of the home and colonial domain

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of France are indispensable to the Kingdom of Italy if the latter is to complete its unity or even if it is to survive; an Italy which is exerting all possible diplomatic pressure to weaken French influence in every quarter in Europe; an Italy which is striving to maintain the Italian loyalty of the immigrants she has sent to Tunis and even to France; an Italy which continually is putting her people on edge with talk of "imminent tests of strength along the national frontiers," and is comparing her prolific and concentrated exuberance with the scattered population and declining birth rate in France. This is the Italy that would make parity in armaments the basis of negotiations with France!

In the case of England and America, besides, the theory of parity recognizes a balance both in resources and in good will. Great Britain conceded parity with the United States because, if parity had not been conceded, the Americans could (and would) have built a fleet superior to the British fleet; whereas, once parity is granted, the Americans can be depended on to build a fleet of equal power.

Now the Italians, doubtless, are free to rush into naval construction with the idea that some day the Italian fleet will be equal or superior to the French fleet — each nation is master of its resources and of its pipe-dreams. But the Italians say to the French: "Concede us parity, and lower the strength of your armament, in order that it may cost us less to catch up with you. So long as the level you fix is a high one, we shall not try to build as much as you. What we want is your recognition of our right to do so, in the way we wish and at our own good leisure."

This attenuation would seem to be advantageous to France. In reality it is a danger. What four nations out of five went to London to find was *temporary* security from the superior armaments of their rivals. Italy wants parity, without giving any undertaking that she will realize it. She wants the chance to take advantage of the latest technical inventions before starting a building program in her shipyards (shipyards where she is filling more foreign orders than England herself, by virtue of the low costs made possible by state subsidies). We should be disarmed if we gave Italy *carte blanche* to do what she pleases, without warning, before she has attained parity.

It was on the principle of common programs — based on actual possibilities and actual intentions in building over a five-year period, and with safeguards for the signatories from surprises

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— that four out of the five Powers came to agreement at London. But clinging to her idea of parity as a natural right (in which case, parity with the strongest Powers should be insisted on), Italy refused to take part in the general discussion, thus emphasizing the absurdity of a position which did not admit of her participation in any of the negotiations of the Conference.

Naturally each navy insists on limitation of total tonnage when it thinks of a navy stronger than itself, and on limitation by classes of vessels when it considers a navy that is its equal or inferior in gross tonnage. For in the first case, it seeks to obviate the consequences of inferiority by reserving the tonnage which can cause the superior navy greatest annoyance, and which — since special superiorities can always be manipulated within the gross figures — offers chances of surprises at a given moment: while, in the second case, limitation by categories protects it against just such risks from inferior navies. After long conversations behind closed doors, Great Britain and the United States came to an agreement as to the categories they desired to have accepted by other Powers. Japan and France entered objections of detail as to the definition of the categories and as to possibilities of transfer from one category to another; but they did not dispute the incontestable advantages, along the line of security, which the Anglo-American system provided. Italy stuck out for total tonnage, with the opportunities for surprises which it affords.

"I am indifferent," said Italy further, "as to the level of armaments. I hope it will be as low as possible. But, whatever it is, it must assure me parity with France."

The thesis of relativity has an element of soundness; for if all armaments drop together, relative differences being preserved, there has been no substantial change as regards power.

But if the present ratio in tonnage between the Italian and French fleets (expressed in the approximate proportions of 4 to 6 to 8) be altered to equality, then everything is changed.

Furthermore, Article VIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations sets limits to the thesis of relativity. For one thing, it takes account of needs varying according to "the geographical situation and the special circumstances of each state." For another, it considers "national security and the fulfilment of international obligations imposed by common action." Indeed, it is the problem of defining the peculiar position of each nation

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that the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference has been working over for the past six years, sending out questionnaires in the hope that the answers received will make real needs apparent. To answer, therefore, that "I am indifferent to armament totals, provided I am left equal to this or that neighbor," is to ignore Article VIII and to cripple the League method.

Italy was so well aware of the weakness of her position that she was careful, at the meetings where Great Britain and the United States explained their needs, not to state the bases of her own needs. In the course of the Conference, to be sure, she could not help giving some inkling of them: her virtually insular position; the inadequacy of her raw materials; the large numbers of her emigrants living abroad; and the like. But they were only passing allusions, and they were not pressed, for she knew perfectly well that her needs in such regards could not compare with the requirements of France, a country fronting on three seas and governing a colonial empire of sixty millions of inhabitants.

As for subordinating the question of disarmament to the previous attainment of organized security, Great Britain, the United States and Japan could well display indifference. In view of the great oceans which separate those countries, simultaneous reduction of armaments does not cause any great alarm as regards security. An American ton, far off in Europe, away from its base, would probably not be equal to a British ton, fighting in home waters. Similarly, any American fleet crossing the Pacific would suffer a percentage of weakening which, joined to the advantages Japan might derive from her naval aviation bases, might compensate Japan for her inferiority in tonnage. Any one of the three navies is strong enough to guarantee complete security to its own country, in home waters. But as between European Powers, separated by minutes rather than by hours of navigation, the process of equalization by distance does not operate. England, and indirectly America, were aware of this difference, and along toward the close of the Conference a long discussion took place between England and France, near neighbors one to the other, as to Article XVI of the Pact, an article fundamental to French security, since it deals with sanctions.

Italy refused to take part in this discussion.

Furthermore, as for the connections to be made between security and disarmament, there was a contradiction between

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the position taken by Signor Grandi at London and the point of view he later expounded in his speech of June 3, not to mention the thesis which had all along been pressed by the Italian delegation at Geneva. Whereas Signor Grandi today holds that "security is not a means but an end, an end that is to be reached by disarmament," Signor Mussolini twice signified to the Secretariat of the League of Nations (once in 1923 and again in 1925) his formal approval of the principles underlying Resolution 14 and the "Outline of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance." Thereafter the Italian delegation to the League of Nations had, to be sure, evinced some reticence in collaborating on the text of the Protocol of Geneva and in the investigations which have been prosecuted since the rejection of that Protocol. But such hesitation betrayed a concern in Italy to see security grounded not on a system which would guarantee the state of things resulting from the peace treaties, but rather on a "political evolution" which would remove causes of conflict. "War," declared Signor Scialoja, "may be a crime, but it is surely a disease. In curing a disease the first step is to master the causes." Far, then, from insisting that disarmament precede "organization for peace," the Italian delegation has always held that it can be only the consequence of a thoroughgoing political preparation, consisting not so much in "making war on war," as in eliminating the deep-lying causes of war. If disarmament now creates security, it will follow, in accord with the Italian thesis, that the security of France will depend on her reducing armaments to the lowest possible limit, a limit which, in any case, will deprive France of all advantage over Italy, on land as well as on the sea. Nations which are such close neighbors as Italy and France do not defend themselves, or attack, only with their navies!

Between the two countries, therefore, a question of the interdependence of armaments arises.

In the year 1930, France has been maintaining a regular army (French and colonial troops, both white and colored, and including officers) of 522,000 men, of whom 317,000 are kept in France and 205,000 in the colonies abroad. Add to these her police and her customs guards ("groups organized in military fashion"), 36,000 of the former, 18,000 of the latter. According to the "Handbook" of the League of Nations, Italy has a regular permanent army of 303,000 men, of whom 251,000 are in Italy and 52,000 in the colonies abroad. Her "groups organized in

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military fashion" comprise 50,000 police (*carabinieri*), 25,000 customs guards, and 35,000 men belonging to the permanent force of the Fascist militia (in case of war these last would constitute two battalions of "shock troops" per army division).

All in all, France is maintaining at home a total armed force of 371,000 men, a reduction of about a half from the figures of 1913–14; Italy, at home, has a total armed force of 361,000, an increase of about a third as compared with 1913–14. The two figures are almost equal. The very considerable reduction which France has made in her military forces stands in contrast with the increases in the budget of Italian national defense made since the advent of Fascism: 30 percent for the army, 70 percent for the air-force, 15 percent for the navy. To the 361,000 soldiers in the regular armed forces of Italy should be added the 353,000 men in the Fascist volunteer militia. These latter participate in the manœuvers of the regular army, and are specially trained in "surprise attacks" (for example, pontoon manœuvers on the seacoast in preparation for debarkations in force). They are distinct from the army and reënforce it. There come, finally, a million children and young men who receive military training between the ages of 10 and 21, after which they are enrolled in the Fascist militia.

These figures show whether "militarism" is in France or in Italy, and whether the doctrine that "disarmament creates security" is valid for Italy or only for other countries.

Signor Mussolini is keeping close watch on French defenses along the Alps. I might remark that after the war France completely neglected them, to such an extent that she did not even mention them in her report on the state of her national defenses made to the League of Nations in 1922 (basing her military demands at that time on the requirements of another frontier exclusively). During the crises in Morocco and Syria we reduced our Alpine forces to a single battalion. But beginning with the year 1926, a memorable date in the history of Franco-Italian relations, Italy began building military roads converging on the French frontier, multiplying practice manœuvers in that neighborhood and in general giving every evidence of contemplating a surprise attack. The result has been that we have restored prewar garrisons and repaired defenses along a frontier which France would very gladly have left as unprotected as her front along the Pyrenees.

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However, as regards regular standing armies at home, France and Italy have about the same number of men in barracks. At Geneva, before the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference Italy asked for parity between her army and ours, including in the French figures all troops stationed abroad, or at least including the principal French contingent abroad — that used as a garrison in North Africa. This force, in case of war, the Italian navy would try to cut off from service in France. On the question of land forces, as on the question of naval forces, no account is being taken of our different requirements, which at present result in a superiority on our part of 219,000 men for the army and of 240,000 tons for the navy. France is invited to sacrifice this excess so that, by virtue of the scattering of her forces along different fronts (she does not regard the Italian front as the most important), she shall be left in a position of inferiority along the Alps and the Mediterranean.

In view of all this, it is evident that the Italian thesis favoring parity with France has not derived any great strength from the precedent of Anglo-American parity. Geography, history, and present policy may justify the one. They prove the other something impractical. The wisest policy, therefore, would be not to force the matter. In stating the theme of the London Conference as a five-year building program, four Powers out of five hoped that that formula would enable Italy to avoid both asking for parity and abandoning the right to do so; and France, for her part, would not be placed in the predicament of refusing parity or insisting as a prerequisite that Italy yield on the point.

Unfortunately, in the few direct conversations they had with the French during the Conference, the Italian representatives, while not denying that the requirements of France were greater than those of Italy, nevertheless asserted that they bore formal instructions to obtain French recognition of parity. A matter of prestige, they said, for Italy, a Great Power. A matter of prestige for the Fascist régime, which could not return home from London with less than the representatives of the doddering old régime which was supplanted by Fascism, had obtained at Washington! Holding aloof, therefore, from the general conference, they rested content with the assertion that as regards the light surface fleet of vessels actually serviceable, virtual parity was already a fact.

That was the drift of the Italian memorandum of February 19. In that document — by taking no account of the seventh French

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cruiser of the *Washington* type already building, or of the superiority of the fifth French cruiser already afloat and of the sixth about to be launched, over the fifth and sixth Italian cruisers of the same type; by fixing the minimum age of the vessels at a figure most favorable to Italian statistics; and by overlooking submarines altogether — it was pointed out that, as regards cruisers and destroyers in actual service, on the ways, or ordered, Italian tonnage could be put at 227,846 tons and French tonnage at 231,305 tons.

Assuming that Italy would build as much tonnage as France between 1930 and 1936, Italy claimed that, by 1936, the French fleet's advantage to the extent of something like 240,000 tons (excluding submarines) would be accounted for in superannuated battleships and cruisers.

This was just a manœuver. Italy aimed to show a temporary and actual superiority on the part of France in those classes of vessels for which parity had been accepted in principle at Washington; and, by concentrating her building program so as to strike the rhythm in gross tonnage of the French program in other categories, to obtain actual parity in the classes where parity had not been recognized in principle.

It was evident that France would not tie her own hands in respect to French and Italian building programs which did not reflect the proportions prevailing in the actual tonnage of the two navies as at present constituted.

However keen the eagerness of England and the United States to reduce the tonnage of the French and Italian fleets to the lowest possible level, that they might effect their own parity at a better bargain, they never lent support to the Italian claim of parity in any representations made to France; nor did they ever refer to Anglo-American parity as a precedent. England and America both understood that the present advantage of the French navy more or less approximated the special needs of France. The Conference ended therefore in a four Power accord, Italy availing herself of the safeguarding clause to retain freedom in her own building program. But France elected to hold temporarily aloof from the treaty in order to make another effort to come to an agreement with Rome through direct negotiations in which England would be sympathetically interested.

These parleys, delayed by Signor Mussolini's speaking tour in May, did not begin till July 23.

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The two governments then agreed that "the laying down of vessels to be built in execution of their respective programs for the current year would not take place earlier than the coming December." France was willing to resume negotiations for a naval program of six years, and to give that discussion priority over other questions at issue. But the Italian order of procedure placed recognition of parity in the foreground and suggested a program whereby, in 1936, the two countries would have the same number of new or recently built vessels, though France would be left with superiority in gross naval tonnage (100,000 tons, as against the present 240,000, and accounted for in superannuated units).

This numerical equality again represented actual inferiority for France in the Mediterranean, since she cannot concentrate her forces there, while Italy can.

The French expert, speaking privately, replied that the only agreement which France could consider between now and 1936 would be a building program providing for vessels equal in number if not in tonnage, the margin of tonnage not to be modified without adequate warning. This proposition Italy rejected toward the end of September. The Fascist Grand Council voted on October 9 to demand French recognition of the principle of parity. That is where we stand today.

V

In forcing the naval question to the foreground of the diplomatic question, and the question of parity to the foreground of the naval question, Italy is subordinating everything to a satisfaction of prestige, leaving no room for compromising on realities. We are confined willy-nilly to the domain of sentiment and passion.

Very considerable concessions to Italian vanities, such as we made at Washington (parity in battleships) and at Locarno (endorsement of the Treaty by Italy on a par with England), lent no help to the solution of other difficulties. Indeed, our earlier concessions have so fanned Italian ambitions as to make it a question today of all or nothing. Unless France surrenders, unless she abandons her superiority in arms, her freedom to choose her alliances and define her own policies, unless she does something to increase Italy's confidence in herself and the confidence of other nations in Italy, her motive can only be that she

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designs to block Italy's path, deny her a natural right to equality and to a living, treat her, in short, as a second-rate Power!

Now such a surrender as Italy desires can be procured from a nation in only two ways. Either you force it by a great war followed by a crushing victory, or you prepare it by a century of friendly relations. The campaign of discouragement and intimidation which Italy has been waging against France — asserting that France is depopulated, incapable of exploiting her colonial and home possessions, and that her salvation depends on an alliance with Italy to form a Latin coalition of eighty million souls (led by whom, and directed against whom?) — has not had the effect of reconciling France to the notion of parity. But the very exaggeration of the instrumentalities Italy has called into play has brought France to understand the importance which Italy attaches to an entente with us, and to realize that she has not been underestimating our resistance.

This fact ought to be sufficient to bring the two countries back to a sense of realities.

France would like nothing better than an understanding with Italy. Italy is our neighbor. She has forty millions of inhabitants. A million Italians are living and working in France, her colonies and protectorates. Commercial interchange between us is very considerable and very well balanced, and the surprising stability in our economic relations contrasts with the instability prevailing in our diplomatic relations. French investments in Italian business have materially increased since the war and now amount to several billions of lire.

France has no designs on anything that Italy possesses. Why then should we "encircle" her in order to attack her? For a century past Frenchmen have fought for Italians and as allies of Italians. After the late war we discontinued fortifications along our common frontier. In the diplomatic field we have no sacrifices to ask of Italy. We do understand that it would be to our mutual interest to regulate better the status of Italian labor in France, and the status of French financial and commercial interests in Italy. In the colonial sphere, we should definitely fix the frontiers of Libya and bring Italians living in Tunis under French common law. In international relations, particularly with the Slav world and in the Balkans, we should like to return to the policy of collaboration with Italy which was expressed in our project for the three-cornered treaty. As for naval power,

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we should like to agree, in line with the Treaty of London, on a building program to hold good down to 1936.

These are all specific questions and require frank discussion between one nation and the other in order that they may find their answers at the earliest possible moment.

But if it be a question of creating a number of "little Italys" on French territory or in our colonies or protectorates, of redrawing the map of North Africa, of redistributing colonial mandates; if it be a question of checkmating the Slavs in their effort to resist Italian expansion toward the East, of reviving the Triple Alliance, of revising treaties, of disarming conquerors in the interests of the conquered; if it be a question of recognizing numerical parities which in substance mean French inferiority in power; and if, in all this dance, France, and incidentally her friends, are to pay the whole salary of the piper, then it is useless to expect from France that "little evidence of good will" which will once and for all remove the causes of Italy's dissatisfaction.

It is not that France is indisposed to discuss these questions in pacific terms; but she refuses to be taken as the butt of the ambitions of other nations and to be held responsible for Italian exaggerations in this regard. Most of Italy's demands overreach the scope of any possible Franco-Italian negotiation.

France is not the only country to show a declining birth rate. The burdens of excess fertility in Italy are not exceptionally oppressive. They do not give Italy a right to a redistribution, to her exclusive profit, of the lands and raw materials in Europe and outside of Europe. Those problems are not Franco-Italian problems merely. They are world problems.

Causes for the "war disease" there surely are. But they must be treated in public. For ten years past, in all international negotiations, Italy has acted as the sole dissident, the one Power who refuses to "join in." She recently announced an intention to resume in the League of Nations that great and important place she has hitherto scorned to occupy. Italy should, in fact, go to Geneva, place herself there at the head of the discontented Powers, and proceed to turn the world topsy-turvy — but by pacific means and for the good of everybody!

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LESSONS OF THE WORLD DEPRESSION

By Gustav Stolper

THE reference of M. Briand's European Plan to a special committee of the League of Nations has been called an "honorable burial." As the event will prove, the description does not go very wide of the mark. Its one defect is that it says nothing as to the intrinsic merits of the proposal.

There can be no doubt that the demand for a "United States of Europe" rests on a misunderstanding, or, if one prefers, on a false analogy. As the European looks across the ocean to the United States of America, he sees a tremendous continent constituting a single economic unit without customs barriers and functioning with a uniform system of transportation, with uniform markets and business methods, and with a highly specialized production of uniform commodities. Hasty and hazy thinking at once leads to the conclusion that the same type of organization can and should be transported to Europe. For some decades past this slogan has been playing its rôle in the literature of the peace movement. Now M. Briand has tried to bring it for the first time within the scope of practical politics, and its real character at once stands revealed: it is a phrase, a slogan — and nothing more.

The states of Europe and the states of the American Union, in all that relates to constitution and inner structure, have little in common with each other except the name "state." The American states are not states in the European sense of the term. In the European sense they are "provinces" with an unusually high degree of local self-government. That this autonomy extends to spheres of legislation which in European federations are, as a rule, reserved to federal governments, does not in any way invalidate the distinction here drawn. The vital point is that in the case of the American Union there is a federal legislature and a federal executive to which the legislatures and the executives of the individual states are, in certain capital regards, subordinated. They all take for granted that questions touching the specific predicates of sovereignty belong within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government: diplomacy, armaments, regulation of foreign commerce, regulation of interstate commerce. Actual developments are forcing the Americans to a wider and wider extension of federal control over the domains of business

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and finance at large — now it is a question of taxation, now of transportation, now of trusts or monopolies, and so on.

There is, and can be, nothing of this kind in Europe. In calling for a European customs union we must realize that what we are actually calling for is a revision of modern concepts of state and nation, concepts which, in their essential presumptions, are as well established in America as in Europe. We are demanding, no less, that the European nations voluntarily divest themselves of their status as nations and consider themselves self-governing provinces of a common super-state — a European federation. To recognize the Utopian character of such a notion, one should consider the political argument and not only the economic one. If all economic interests were unanimous in favor of a European customs union, the scheme would none the less meet shipwreck on Europe's political boundaries.

All proposals of free "trade" presuppose that governments — the state — shall refrain from any interference in economic matters. The World War and the years following have found Europe moving in a precisely opposite direction. The war revolutionized the relations of state and economic life from the ground up, and especially in those countries which lay within the blockaded zone of Central Europe. Just as the war for the first time in history established the principle of universal military service, so for the first time in history it brought national economic life in all its branches and activities to the support and service of state policies — made it effectively subordinate to the state. For the first time the laws of capitalistic economics were, or at least seemed to be, superseded. Not supply and demand, but the dictatorial fiat of the state determined economic relationships — production, consumption, wages, costs of living. People for the most part fail to realize that this fact is today determining, and in any visible future will continue to determine, the course of events in Europe. But for the same fact Bolshevism would be as unthinkable as an open or underground economic war between the European countries is unthinkable, or a weakening of liberal forces in the British Empire.

Pray let us just remember this: during the war, the state (at least in Central Europe) commandeered all food supplies, all raw materials, all manufactures and accessories to manufacture. The state regulated production; it regulated buying and selling; it regulated and rationed consumption. The state took over all

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railroads and all shipping; it forbade investments of capital save in state enterprises; it ruled as master over currency and media of exchange. But, at the same time, and for the first time, the state made itself responsible for the physical welfare of its citizens: it guaranteed food and clothing not only to the army in the field but to the civil population. As the economic freedom of the individual is gradually and comprehensively extinguished, it follows as a matter of course that all economic, social and political initiatives and complaints must be addressed to the state, as the one collective personality capable of buying, selling and acting.

So much for the war. And since the war? Let us consider developments in two stages.

After the armistice we see maintained all the restrictions laid upon economic life during the war. Russia refuses of her own accord to "fit in with" the scheme of world free trade. Furthermore, the blockaded zone in Central Europe is cut off from world markets by impassable barriers. The first remedies for the economic crisis are sought not by the freed initiative of business men but by negotiations between government and government. The first importations of food-stuffs and raw materials, along with the first credits, are arranged through governmental channels. Demobilization forces the labor market under state control. Restrictions on imports and exports allow national boundaries to acquire an economic significance hitherto unknown to the business world. The depreciation and collapse of currencies, and countless other unsolved problems of finance, establish the omnipotence of the state over business, at a time when the emergency of military defense has long since passed.

Now for the second stage. Many new states have come into being in virtue of the principle of nationality. These new states have first to organize themselves as economic and political powers, and to create their political, military and economic apparatus. Meantime a social readjustment is taking place in all of them whereby relatively new interests come into dictatorial control of the governments. With the new bureaucracies a new national bourgeoisie steps forward, and in ways quite unforeseen takes advantage of the remodeling of the governments to gain control, overnight, of positions of business leadership which in those countries had formerly been held by people of a different nationality. Such is the sociological significance of that "nationalization" of industries and banks which took place in all the countries in

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question. It is only a natural consequence of all this that these same countries should continue to manifest dictatorial tendencies in their economic life; and that, from the organization and strengthening of armaments, they should go on to the completion of their industrial equipment and to the founding of industries which are the direct or indirect basis of national security.

Bolshevik Russia, Fascist Italy, the whole swarm of new-born countries that spread from the Baltic to the Ægean, all without exception live as states on the principle that state and nation are one and the same thing, and that as against that "oneness" neither personal freedom nor economic freedom has any force whatever. In all this complex of nations, which embraces the larger portion of Europe, the principle of economic liberalism stands in irreconcilable conflict with the principle to which these nations, as actually organized, owe their origin and present existence.

But even if the inner texture of the various European states did not make their external unification impossible; even if the irrational (and in the long run untenable) boundaries erected by the peace treaties, not only between victors and vanquished but even between victorious Powers, did not constitute barriers for the moment insuperable, there would still remain a decisive obstacle arising from the historic map of Europe. Here we have dozens of nations differing one from the other in history, language, law, manners and customs, concepts of life. Americans can scarcely imagine what this means for Europe. The Americans are a colonial people, with their traditions still to create. They have not yet come to look upon every tree, every stone of their land, as something eternally sacred. Whereas the European is bound in every fibre of his spirit to every inch of his home soil. Suppose it were possible to overthrow customs barriers and tariff walls. Suppose the European governments could be restrained or excluded altogether from interference with business and commerce. Even then Europe would be infinitely far distant from any possibility of union in the sense in which union is understood in America. The free interchange of material values would in no wise correspond to a free intercourse of peoples. The linguistic and cultural walls between the European nations would remain undisturbed.

II

M. Briand's *démarche*, whatever its diplomatic motivation from the French point of view, is at any rate a frank recognition

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that the present situation in Europe can be regarded only with uneasiness; and it further indicates that Europe is becoming aware of a rapidly widening divergence between her own course of development and that of the Americas.

Before the war there was a definite world-wide tendency toward an equalization of standards of living among the civilized nations. Even then states and nations sometimes developed with amazing speed; but counter-forces, working toward a general leveling, were tremendously strong as compared with anything we see today. Specially noteworthy among such counter-forces were the migrations of capital and labor. Differences in interest rates could not become too great, for variations of one percent, or even of half of one percent, were sufficient to set large amounts of capital in motion. Interest regulated the flow of capital. England and France, as the two great sources of supply of world capital, but even Germany to a certain extent during the first decades of the century, fertilized the whole world with their surpluses. Russia, the Balkan states, the Near East, not to mention Austria-Hungary and Italy, all profited by this flow of wealth. Governmental influences did, to be sure, play their part in giving direction to the flow, but they were not the decisive factor. And a flow of commodities always followed the flow of capital. Countries which received loans used them to buy the commodities which the lending nations supplied to them for their development. Just as interest rates could not fall off-balance in this free movement of capital, so standards of living could not vary too greatly. The safety valve was the United States of America, where rising wages and an increasing demand for labor attracted the great body of emigrants. This checked the fall of standards of living in the home countries of the emigrants, by taking up the surplus of labor. At the same time it checked any exaggerated rise in standards of living in the United States, since the influx of immigrants set limits to the rise in wages.

All this has changed since the war. The free movement of capital has ceased. So has the free movement of emigration. Men and money both lie shackled under the might of the state. And the result has been that the automatic tendency toward equalization of standards of living among the nations has been replaced by a rapidly accelerating tendency toward differentiation in standards of living. The fact is crudely apparent in the relations between the United States and Europe; but it is appar-

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ent, even if in more moderate degrees, in the relations between one European country and another.

The United States has enforced its restrictions on immigration with great severity. Protected from an undesirable competition of European man power by these governmental barriers, American labor has sought to give itself, as it were, a "scarcity value" (at least as compared with European conditions). On the other hand, great providers of emigrants, such as Russia and Italy, have withheld passports of emigration from their citizens, now become serfs of the state. As a result, the flow of labor and the flow of capital are now determined, not by strictly economic pressures, but by political pressures. Memories of war experiences are still fresh in all minds — depreciation of currencies, confiscations of private property, national bankruptcies. While the devastation incident to the war has left behind it an unprecedented need of capital, political misgivings are still strong enough to paralyze the allurements of the dizziest interest rates. Quite aside from Russia, almost all of Central and Eastern Europe is excluded from the capital markets of the world. For Poland, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, and not only for these — for Italy, and now, for a year past, for Germany, the negotiation of a foreign loan is a long and painful process. Most of these countries are admitted to the sources of capital only in exceptional circumstances; and France, the most important purveyor of capital in Europe, the country evidently with the greatest surplus of ready money, is still refraining from foreign loans almost altogether. Yet, as every one must see, the measure in which such exceptions to the rule are allowed determines the measure of differentiation in international standards of living and the rapidity of world recovery from the war.

The choking of free movement in man power and capital is being intensified by the choking of free movement in commodities. One symptom of this situation is that there are today ten thousand miles of new customs barriers in Europe; a second symptom is that tariff walls the world over are now being raised far above their former high points; a third, and most decisive one, is that protectionist policies are being supplemented and, in fact, far surpassed in importance, by administrative safeguards to domestic commerce. The possibilities of such "administrative protectionism" and the instruments available for practicing it are virtually unlimited. Only during these recent years has general

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attention been drawn to such devices. They comprise, among other things: taxes, railroad rates, shipping subsidies, importation quotas, regulations of public sales, building regulations, regulations on the nationality of directors and majority stockholders in corporations and important industries, passports, and especially the control of labor supply. For countries of unstable finance, we must add currency control and the like.

This complication of economic disturbances to world business is intensified to the highest degree by gigantic "political payments" between country and country. I am thinking, for instance, of the German reparation obligations and the inter-Allied debts. However one may judge the legal and political bases of such payments, from the purely economic point of view they are all on a par. The inter-Allied payments of interest and amortization are themselves, from that point of view, payments without consideration. It is true that the United States at one time actually loaned the Allies the amounts now under interest and amortization, either in money or in goods. But the American war credits accorded to the Allies differ from the normal loans that formerly passed between country and country in this respect: that they were purely consumption credits. The foreign loans made by European financiers before the war, now to South America, now to Russia, now to the Balkans, usually had productive purposes in view. They served to build railroads and electrical plants, to open up natural resources, to finance new industries. They could be paid, both in capital and in interest, out of the profits of the investments. The goods made available through war credits had an entirely different purpose: they were virtually all devoted to positive destruction of values. That fact alone makes such payments today a disturbing element in world commerce which the old-time payments could never be. This applies all the more seriously to the reparations payments, since they exceed the inter-Allied payments in amount and must be made by a single country, where, in consequence, capital resources must be more and more compromised and the standard of living further depressed. What the reparation debts actually mean may be grasped by remembering that they correspond to more than half of the entire private capital investment of the United States on long term loans and investments abroad (from 13 to 15 billions of dollars, according to the computations of the United States Department of Commerce in 1929). However, I cannot go very

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deeply into the question of international debts just here, though, under pressure of the world crisis in business, the discussion of them has flared up anew during the months just past. I will note simply that the debts in question hold the key to many of the riddles which the current depression has been propounding for a year or more.

III

So, of late, there has appeared in the political relations of the different countries a new element that was unknown before the war: we may call it a *class struggle of nations*. The peoples as yet are not really conscious of it. It is none the less real on that account.

In spite of everything, the general trend in international relations before the war was toward democracy. The war was fought, ostensibly, to "make the world safe for democracy." Its actual effect has been to create antagonisms of class as between nation and nation which would have been thought impossible twenty years ago.

There is nothing surprising about this, really. It is the natural consequence of the shifting of power between nations and continents brought on by the war, and the logical fruit also of the establishment by the peace treaties of the principle of brute force in international relations. The treaties divided the nations of Europe into two groups with differing privileges: victors and vanquished, fully sovereign Powers and half-sovereign Powers. Such a situation could survive for long only in that same atmosphere which has deprived men and capital of all freedom and roused unquenchable antagonisms between those with different degrees of wealth and different standards of living. Just as the treaties have engendered increasingly bitter and increasingly dangerous tensions in the political relations of states, so also differences in wealth and prosperity are inducing increasingly dangerous tensions in the economic sphere. No nation can allow too great and too irritating differences in wealth and in the opportunities for enjoying life between the different classes in its population. So the world cannot tolerate for any great length of time too violent distinctions of class between its component countries. It revolts against such a thing — a moral revolt, but also an economic revolt.

To this, at bottom, the economic crisis which is today shaking the world bears eloquent witness. It is a crisis brought on by the

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redistribution of political, social and economic power resulting from the war. In this sense, the crisis of democracy, which almost all European countries are experiencing, is a super-national crisis. The question which America must ask herself before all other questions is whether a single people, a single country, however great and powerful it may be, can isolate itself from, immunize itself against, the radiations of such a crisis. I need hardly say that the whole problem of American destinies is involved in such a question.

Certainly it is not for me, a European and a German, to supply — especially in an American review — an answer which Americans must make for themselves. I may, however, indicate certain elements which in my judgment the true answer must take into account.

There are no miracles in the domain of economics. Even the "American miracle" in business, the occasion of so much astonishment and worship not so long ago, proves not to have been a miracle. American prosperity did not set the laws of economics aside, as it seemed to be doing (down to the autumn of 1929). Far from suspending the so-called "monetary wave theory," the panic on Wall Street has exemplified the working of that law. Quotations rose and rose so long as production and selling could keep on rising, so long as earnings continued to provide capital and enthusiasm for industrial expansion. But there is a limit to such a merry-go-round, and the index of an approach to that limit is furnished by the rates of interest. The American "rise" found its limit in a tightness of money on Wall Street and in a continued raising of discount rates by the Reserve Banks. A wholly normal phenomenon, which rectified itself in wholly normal ways. As earnings fall off or turn into losses, production slows down and then halts, and this means unemployment and lowered wages, just as scarcity of capital means a drop in prices. From these developments comes a relaxation in the credit market which drives interest so low that eventually it encourages new investments and the new "rise" begins. So far, therefore, the American crisis is running entirely true to economic theory.

However, the same American crisis has called attention to two facts which were commonly lost sight of during the period of American prosperity and which are quite generally being overlooked today.

One is the intimate dependence of the world outside the

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boundaries of the United States on what takes place in America. Whether American consumption rises or falls is equally important (in its bearing on conditions of living) for countries offering raw materials and for industrial countries which are affected by movements in the prices of raw materials and come to feel stronger or weaker competition from the United States in the markets which buy their manufacturing products. The distress which has been affecting South America and the British and Dutch colonies during these past months is, at bottom, a reflex of the set-back which American business has been undergoing since the autumn of 1929.

The other fact is America's dependence on the economic vicissitudes of the world at large. The drop in raw materials could never have gone so devastatingly far if the greater part of Europe had not been economically disorganized and therefore suffering from greatly reduced powers of consumption. The American worker is paying the price of this dependence today in increased unemployment and in a decline in wages. The trend toward an equalization of standards of living which people thought could be avoided is slowly asserting itself in spite of everything. Before the war, however, it was a trend upwards, whereby the so-called backward nations were lifting themselves to the standards of the better developed countries. Now it is a leveling downwards, with the standards of the wealthier nations threatening to fall.

American statesmanship seems to be of the opinion that it can halt this decline by tariff measures. It seems to think that by raising the customs barrier still higher it can stabilize an American price level corresponding to an American wage level, just as it has for a long time believed it could maintain a wage level by checking over-supply of labor through restrictions on immigration. I believe both of these policies mistaken. The consequence of them only can be that the effects of American depression on the rest of the world will be intensified, and that there will be a similar intensification of the counter-effects of world depression upon America. When one is creditor to the rest of the world and the world can, in the last analysis, pay interest and amortization only in goods or in labor, one cannot adopt the exclusion of man power and the exclusion of commodities at the same time. Sooner or later the circle reveals itself as vicious — sooner rather than later, would be my present opinion!

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The discrepancy in standards of living between America and Europe is not by any means the only such discrepancy that is causing international tension, but it is certainly the most important. I have already indicated the inherent difficulties that thwart any project for the unification of Europe. They would serve just as well to thwart any common policy on the part of the European nations against the United States. Americans have no reason to fear that. The danger from the discrepancy in living standards arises from the working of the economic law. America cannot avoid this danger so long as she clings to her isolation and believes she can regulate her economic life all by herself. Tendencies toward class struggles within a nation can be exorcised only by one remedy: democracy. Democracy would seem to be the only remedy available for softening and moderating class differences between nations.

But democracy in this sense can mean only coöperation, a readiness to seek mutual understandings on principles of equal rights. Democracy in international relations can mean only common effort, in a spirit of mutual helpfulness, for the solution of mutual economic and psychological problems. It would be stupid for Europe to combine against America; and such a policy would inevitably fail, since the inner conflicts of interest in Europe are greater and more bitter than the conflict of interest between America and Europe. But that does not obviate the need of international coöperation for the relief of international distress. Such coöperation would be in vain unless it were to include the United States. The world has grown too small to be set off in compartments. To try (as the Pan-European Plan would try) to organize the European continent without Russia, without the British Empire, and without the United States, is to toy with an idle day-dream. America and Europe are meeting today in Russia and in China — meeting there today as competitors, tomorrow, probably, as partners. Nowhere is it any longer possible to delimit a "sphere" of action for one continent as against a "sphere" of action for another continent. The era of isolations, which only war made still possible, is past. In future the nations of the world must stand or fall together.

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JAPAN IN THE MODERN WORLD

By Yusuke Tsurumi

JAPAN'S ratification of the London Naval Treaty shows not only that the majority of the Japanese people are thinking along the same lines as the peoples of England and America, but also that her vital interests are forcing her to adopt a definite policy in regard to world problems. Why was limitation of armament so popular in Japan, and why did her newly emancipated democracy support so strongly the policy of concert with England and America? The reasons are political, economic and intellectual. I propose to take up briefly these three phases of Japanese national life and then to consider how far and how long Japanese democracy will follow this line of foreign policy. These are questions of international interest, for they have a direct bearing upon the future peace of the Western Pacific and eventually of the whole world.

I

Politically, Japan can be said to be entering upon a second period of modernization. The constitution of 1889 did not have such far-reaching effects as were expected, owing to the absence of a strong, awakened democracy to support the spokesmen of the masses, and also owing to the efficiency and integrity of the bureaucratic rulers of those days. Party government did not make much headway in the first period of constitutional government. But with the promulgation of the universal manhood suffrage law in April 1925, Japan entered upon the second period of her political life. The voting population jumped from three to thirteen millions. The sheer increase in the number of voters, however, was not so important as the change that had come over the economic fabric of the nation through its industrial revolution and the new intellectual currents that had followed closely on industrialization and the introduction of Occidental thought.

When the first general election under the new law was held, in February 1928, the whole nation was naturally agog with excitement. The election resulted in a stalemate between the two major parties and, contrary to expectations, very little new blood was infused into the legislature. The people's major interest was centered upon the first appearance of labor representatives in the

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political arena. But as there were only eight laborites, they were too small a contingent to make a profound impression. The election had some bright aspects, such as the greater freedom of speech, the increased influence of the press, and the large number of votes cast — 81 percent of the total voting population. However, the nation as a whole was disappointed, for it had expected that the new voters would work a miracle and break the strength of the old machine politics. The result was just the reverse. The party machines succeeded in electing a greater percentage of former members than in previous elections. Contrary to the hopes of the enthusiasts, election expenses, the curse of Japanese politics, showed an unmistakable increase. There is no way of obtaining accurate figures, but it is safe to say that the average cost per member was around 50,000 yen (or $25,000). Undeniably, too, some portion of this was spent in buying votes. Another disappointment was that universal suffrage, instead of decreasing the average age of the members, increased it. The record of the House was not a happy one, and popular feeling turned against it as well as against the Tanaka Cabinet.

Therefore, when the present Hamaguchi Cabinet came into existence on July 2, 1928, supported by the second strongest party in the House, the Minseito, there arose at once a demand for a new general election. It came in February 1930, and resulted in a complete victory of Minseito, which obtained 272 members out of the total of 466 and outdistanced the party of Baron Tanaka, the Seiyukai, by 98. The previous election had given Seiyukai 218 seats and the opposition party (Minseito) 216, leaving the balance of power with the small blocs outside of the two major parties. In a way the election of 1930 meant a repudiation of the election of 1928.

The outstanding feature of the 1930 election seems to me the manifestation of Japan's political-mindedness. After two years of experiment the people realized that without a substantial majority behind it no party cabinet can function well, and so it wanted to give the Hamaguchi Cabinet a safe working majority. Issues of policies there were, but they did not figure so largely in the mind of the people as its desire to give a lesson to Seiyukai by a great defeat. In order to attain this end, it had to give the government party a substantial majority and not split the political power by giving votes to labor candidates or independents. Accordingly, not only Seiyukai but labor candidates as well as

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independents lost heavily. Labor dropped from eight to five, and the independents from seventeen to six. Mr. Muto's Business Men's Party returned six and the Reform Party three.

Some outsiders concluded from this that Japan had reverted to the two-party system of government. But this is too sweeping a statement and needs a careful examination of facts, which I propose to undertake at the end of this article. The second general election was a more wholesome one than the first, and we notice many signs of progress on the part of the new democracy of Japan. There was a great deal more freedom of speech. The election issues were clearer than before. People knew that their votes would directly and immediately affect the life of the cabinet, because it was quite obvious that Premier Hamaguchi would resign if he did not get the people's mandate. The actual amount of votes cast increased from 81 to 84 percent of the electorate.

There is one peculiar feature in Japanese elections and politics in general: the influence of the press. Very few people outside of Japan realize the unique position of the Japanese press. Some of the papers have enormous circulations; for example, there are two papers in Osaka whose daily circulation is around one and a half millions each, and there are a number of dailies in Tokyo with circulations between half a million and a million. And these are all independent newspapers. They derive the major portion of their revenue not from advertisements but from the sale of papers. Therefore they have to cater to the interest of the subscribers, who are the common people. Any paper that had party affiliations or was a government organ always has lost its circulation. Sheer business needs, therefore, have made the leading Japanese papers independent of all political and economic connections. They are very free in their criticisms. Then, again, there is another Japanese trait: our love of unity, which makes us look up to leadership and makes the people willing to follow leaders. This leadership is gradually passing to the press. It was plain in the election of 1928, and was truly remarkable in 1930. The popularity of the present cabinet with the press was one of the chief reasons for its phenomenal victory this year.

However, there were some disappointments in this election. One was a further increase of election expenses. Another was a further increase of the age of the members returned.

In 1930 Minseito made a masterly bid for the conservative, liberal and moderate radical votes, and succeeded. It skilfully

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juggled up a comprehensive platform to include liberal policies as well as some new-fangled radical planks. It made an appeal to liberals who previously had supported the independents, as well as to moderate radicals who would support social democrats, the right wing of labor. The united press support completed the sweeping victory. Hence the cabinet is in a very strong position, with the people, the press and the majority party behind it. It was with the support of these three elements that the cabinet fought the Privy Council, the naval general staff and Seiyukai in the matter of the ratification of the London Naval Treaty.

But how long will these conditions last? For an answer we must turn to a more basic discussion of the economic life of the Japanese nation and its intellectual currents.

II

The forces that ushered in political democracy in Japan were twofold, economic and intellectual. The downfall of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1867 had three causes: (1) The inefficiency of the Shogunate itself, which was built upon a strict hereditary system and excluded abler men from the seats of power in government; this resulted in an utter failure to promote the economic welfare of the people and called forth the revolt of young men who belonged to the lowest stratum of the Samurai class and were excluded from power. (2) The growth of a new economic system based on nation-wide commerce, challenging the old economic system of feudalism based on the agriculture of self-supporting villages. (3) The impact of the capitalistic nations of the West. Therefore, when the new Meiji government was organized by these young enthusiasts, it had to face an acute economic situation. It had to organize a national system of economy in place of a village system and prepare the nation for an international economic competition. It was a sudden contact of an agricultural nation, which had lived a self-contained and self-contented life of seclusion for over two centuries, with the highly industrialized nations of the world. The only way the country could be saved was to make it, too, go through an industrial revolution. So almost frantically the young leaders plunged into the new venture of industrializing the country. They imported new machines from the West, created factories of all kinds, educated the people in the new machine arts and encouraged all branches of industry. It was a paternalistic industrial revolu-

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tion. It was the rear guard of feudalism serving as the vanguard of industrialism. It arose, not from the people, as in the West, but from the top. Begun in the early 'seventies, the industrial revolution of Japan was completed by the end of the nineteenth century. The agricultural Japan of 1868 with an annual export of fifteen million yen, 95 percent of it raw materials and silk, emerged in 1900 as an industrial nation with an export of over two hundred million yen. The export of raw materials fell in these years from 54 percent to 23 percent, and that of manufactured goods rose from ½ percent to 18 percent.

Thus the years that followed the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 found Japan a very prosperous industrial nation, flushed with successes in the political, economic and military fields. This was the heyday of modern Japan. The economic prosperity and political expansion quickened the intellectual blood of the nation and, as in England in the days of Queen Elizabeth, art and literature began to bloom in all their glory. In the number of great poets, novelists, painters and men of letters, no previous era in the history of Japan was richer. The compulsory system of education diminished illiteracy to less than 5 percent of the population and created a great market for imaginative literature and science.

The rapid progress of the industrial revolution in Japan may be attributed to: (1) Facilities for importing scientific knowledge and machines from the West. (2) The existence of undeveloped natural resources at home. (3) Low wages. (4) Propinquity to the vast markets of China, the South Seas and India, which had no industries of their own. The industrial prosperity and military success, which synchronized with the ascendency of the bureaucratic system of government, were due to the endeavors of bureaucratic rulers. The idea of party government could not make much progress in those days, for the people liked the efficiency and integrity of the bureaucratic rulers who gave economic prosperity at home and political security abroad.

However, when the twentieth century rolled into its second decade, symptoms of a great change began to loom on the horizon. One was the rising power of the moneyed class, bankers and industrialists. Symptoms of the same old fight of bourgeoisie with feudalism began to appear. The weapons in the hands of the bourgeoisie were money and political parties. Engaged in ambitious ventures on the Asiatic continent, the bureaucratic rulers were very often in need of money. They had to go for this to the

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industrial and banking world, which was not slow to avail itself of the situation and push its way forward. After the Russo-Japanese War the political prestige and social position of the captains of industry and financial magnates began to rise very fast. The boom of the World War bestowed upon them unmistakable power in the public affairs of the country. Then a new affiliation began to take form between the moneyed class and the political parties. Or it can be said that the allegiance of money was gradually turned from bureaucratic rulers to party politicians. The power of political parties kept on increasing, and even the iron hand of the late Prince Yamagata, the head of Genro, with all his aversion for the political party, could not stem the tide. The Terauchi Cabinet of 1916–18 was perhaps the last stand of the bureaucracy of Japan, and when it was succeeded by Hara's Seiyukai Cabinet the glorious days of bureaucracy were gone from Japan, never to return.

Another cause that accelerated the rising power of political parties in Japan was the growing influence of the press. With the spread of education and the arrival of prosperous and independent middle and labor classes during the business prosperity of the World War, papers began to improve their financial positions and increase their power. In the fight between the bureaucracy and party government, the weight of the press was thrown on the side of the latter. Hara's Seiyukai Cabinet (later under Takahashi) was followed in 1922 by three short-lived cabinets of non-party complexion. When, therefore, Count Kato's Coalition Cabinet of three political parties was organized in 1924, it confirmed the notion conceived at the time of the Hara Cabinet that party government had arrived in Japan to stay. Party leaders have been heading cabinets ever since and apparently they are going to continue to do so. The election of 1930 was particularly convincing in this respect and the alliance of the political party, the moneyed class and the press seems to be firmly in the saddle.

One of the very significant features in Japan at present is the precipitate entrance of the abler brains, which used to serve bureaucracy, into the political parties. The whole country is more and more divided along party lines. It was this new régime that changed the election law and invited the ever-growing forces of the middle and labor classes to its side in the final struggle with bureaucracy. No wonder that the House of Peers, the stronghold of bureaucracy, held out to the last moment against the passing

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of the new election law. The party leaders began to share honors with business men and to show greater consideration to newspaper men. It was this new régime that accepted the Versailles Treaty, the Washington agreements and the London Naval Treaty, lessening the burden of the people by cutting down military expenses. Intent less on political designs and more on the expansion of trade, it changed its policies toward China. In the days of imperialism, at the time she entered world politics late in the nineteenth century, Japan tried to play the game in the imperialistic spirit. Similarly, in the changed world where trade and international banking are ascendent, she is now trying to play the new rôle. Is it the same old apish mimicry of a soulless Japan, or is it the decision of wise statesmanship to accept the reality of things ungrudgingly and to try to protect and promote the interest and heritage of the Japanese people in harmony with the will of the majority of humanity?

There were and still are people in Japan who are fighting a rear-guard action against the so-called undoing of the work of the glorious leaders of the Restoration. But they are borne away in the new tide of surging democracy whose interests and desires are fast changing. But does this mean that Japanese politics has found a new equilibrium of forces to continue its path of undisturbed progress? Does it mean, again, that party government as it exists at the moment will probably satisfy the new desires and new ambitions of the emancipated millions? In short, is party government to stay in Japan in its present form?

Here we enter upon the discussion of the third phase of the country's national life.

III

There are two outstanding issues now before the nation — the business depression and its attendant unemployment. The solution of these, I think, is the test by which the party politicians newly installed in power will stand or fall. Will they succeed as did their predecessors, the bureaucrats, in giving the people two things it needed, economic prosperity and political integrity? The future of party government in Japan will be decided as they succeed or fail. For the new democracy is restive. Under the unruffled surface flows a social current of unknown designs and unmeasured strength with ever-increasing speed and volume.

Critics may say that depression and unemployment are world

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phenomena and are not peculiar to Japan. That is true. However, there are peculiar situations that brought about these things in Japan and there are also peculiar reactions of the Japanese people to these universal phenomena. In the first place, the depression has been chronic in Japan since the business panic in the spring of 1920. In the second place, the unemployment is more due to the increase in population than to the sudden disorganization of business. In the third place, the unemployment hit the educated people especially hard and is augmenting radicalism in intellectual circles.

When the World War ended, the temporary business prosperity of Japan came to a sudden end. People thought, at first, that it was one of the ordinary economic cycles of prosperity and depression. But as good times did not return they began to realize that the roots of the depression were deep in the economic structure of the country itself.

In the first place, the conditions that had made the Japanese industrial revolution smooth and easy in the 'eighties and 'nineties were gone. The natural resources had all been used up. There was a limit to the importation and imitation of foreign machines. The rise of industries brought in its train the rise of wages and deprived Japan of her best condition for competing with Western nations. In the second place, the necessity of maintaining a large army and navy began to be a handicap to the economic progress of the country. In the third place, the rise of new industries on the continent of Asia began to cut into Japanese trade with China very seriously. The only alternative for a nation in such a situation lay in developing different kinds of industries, needing more skill and organization. This would bring Japan at once in direct competition with the more industrialized Western nations. And in this she was faced by fundamental difficulties because it touched the tap-root of economic imperialism and economic nationalism of the present-day world.

Japan lacked raw materials to create new industries that were immune from Chinese competition. Even if she had to purchase these raw materials from foreign countries, how could she find markets for the products in countries which raise their tariff walls every year? And who can tell that China will not raise her tariff wall now that she has tariff autonomy?

At this very moment another danger beset Japan — the rise in the rate of increase in her population. In 1918 it was 6 per 1000,

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in 1919 it rose to 10, in 1920 to 12, in 1921 to 13.5 and in 1925 almost reached 16. It has come down ever since, but the annual increase is over eight hundred thousand and, taking 12 as an average, the population will exceed the hundred million mark in 1965. The area of Japan proper is smaller than that of California, and only 15 percent of the land is arable. Gradually birth control will meet the situation, but it cannot solve the immediate problem.

Thus Japan was caught unawares within three unsurmountable walls: the tariff wall, the emigration wall and the peace wall. The first wall excludes Japan's manufactured goods from other countries. The second cuts off the migration of her people. And the third prohibits the readjustment of the unequal distribution of territories among nations with different density of population.

To far-seeing Japanese the precarious situation of their own country is becoming clearer every day. The spread of education is making people more ambitious to raise their standard of living and the political emancipation is making them articulate. The pinch is felt by the whole nation, but the burden of life is falling heaviest on two classes of people: the farmers and the middle class. The limitation of the arable land makes the farmer's remuneration so meagre that the average income of a Japanese farmer for a day is only 97 sen (48 cents). As for the middle class, only a very small proportion of the college graduates can get forty dollars a month nowadays. Japan's strength has lain in the sturdy character of the farmers and the intelligence of the middle class. The present economic predicament of these classes will inevitably react on their votes at future elections.

In the election of 1930 these people voted mainly for Minseito in the hope that it would relieve the burden of their life by its liberal and progressive policies. But can Minseito live up to its election pledges? How can it? Can a party which was supported by contributions from big business and finance dare to touch seriously the grave problem of the distribution of wealth by taxation or regulation? The opposition party, Seiyukai, is attacking Minseito vigorously for its failure to alleviate the sufferings of the masses by a courageous handling of the situation. But can Seiyukai touch the economic structure of a modern industrial nation without destroying the foundation on which the party stands?

Is it after all the wisdom or stupidity of this or that individual public servant, or does the cause of all evils lie much deeper, in

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the system itself? Here lies a serious challenge to the present rulers of Japan. It must be giving them a number of sleepless nights. Look at the intellectual currents among some industrial workers, farmers, and young college graduates. Through the press, periodicals and books, as well as from platforms, they have been fed with biting criticisms of the economic system of modern capitalism. Are there many countries in the world where two complete translations of Marx's "Capital" are selling by hundreds of thousands of copies? Are there many countries where young newspaper reporters have such freedom to write sympathetically about radical labor movements? Are there many countries where novels and plays are so profoundly influenced by the new school of proletarian writers? Those who do not read the Japanese language cannot appreciate the place that the modern literature of Japan occupies in her national life. The novelists, poets and playwrights are the people who think ahead of their times, and by their pens the future destiny of a nation is directed. And some of them certainly are thinking in a new mood. In spite of rigorous suppression of the so-called "dangerous thoughts," these new leaders are being read and heard by hundreds of thousands of subtle and sensitive minds. In 1921 I asked a group of some fifty students of the Tokyo Imperial University in what foreign literature they were most keenly interested. None of them said English or American; all were for Continental literature, and over 90 percent for Russian. I then asked them in what foreign country they were most interested, and over 50 percent said Germany, because, they explained, it was there that an educated people were experimenting with socialism. These undercurrents do not appear yet on the surface, simply because these boys and girls are all young, and in a country where age is revered it takes time for a new element to become an actual force in politics. Also, these radical intellectual ideas could not influence the majority of the mature minds, who have not yet lost confidence in the ability of the present rulers and still think that the progress of Japan can best be secured by the normal process of constitutional government along liberal lines. And this was ably capitalized by Minseito in the last election.

However, there is one concrete difficulty of a serious nature. That is the undeniable tendency to concentrate wealth in a comparatively few hands. A parallel development is the gradual defeat of the middle class. On the one hand, 48 percent of all the

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bank deposits, trust company deposits and reserve funds of insurance companies, totaling 11,743,570,000 yen, is possessed by six great financial concerns, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Kawasaki and the First Bank; on the other, the status of the middle class is being depressed to that of the labor class, which is under socialistic leaders. The question is, how long can the party politicians who wrested power from the bureaucrats retain it. It all depends upon whether or not they can maintain prosperity as the bureaucrats did. If they cannot, then a new alignment of social forces will gradually work itself out and the present majority of Minseito will vanish into thin air. We thus cannot accept the results of the election of 1930 as a substantial and final verdict of the people for the two-party system of government.

IV

Now let us briefly summarize the political situation of Japan and cast a glance into the future.

During the first fifty years of political life in modern Japan, the people supported bureaucratic rulers because they gave them economic prosperity and political independence, by promoting a paternalistic industrial revolution at home and following vigorous foreign policies abroad. But the industrial revolution was their ultimate undoing. The newly arisen industrialists and financiers threw their weight on the side of political parties and the people demanded through the press a greater share in government and less burden from armaments. This resulted in the establishment of party government on the model of the liberal countries of the West. And Japan's foreign policies began to approach those of England and America, as the interests as well as the sympathies of these three nations became closer. But the economic situation of Japan was becoming so difficult for the common people that radicalism began to become a power in the intellectual field. Radicalism could not make any headway in the election of 1930 because people pinned such hope on Minseito's liberalism. Now the test is coming not only to Minseito but to all the political parties. Can they continue to give prosperity to the people through the policies of liberalism?

Constitutional government along liberal lines can function only when it is supported by an economically independent middle class and moderate labor. But in a country where the standards of the middle class are fast being pressed down to those of labor

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the gospel of "sweetness and light" will scarcely make a strong appeal. If the rescue does not come in time the middle class votes will gradually turn away from the liberal and conservative parties and go over to socialistic labor. And how can the rescue come? To my mind it will come only through one of two alternative developments. One is the gradual toning down of economic imperialism and economic nationalism at present practiced by the leading nations of the world and the adoption of more liberal policies by these countries in tariff and emigration matters. If this is not yet possible in the world as it is, then the alternative will be the serious consideration by the leading Powers of the world of a peaceful readjustment of territories so that nations with orderly governments and a high state of civilization can be given a chance to pursue the course of normal development along liberal lines. If these two alternate courses do not get serious consideration from nations with greater territories and proportionately small populations, then the motives of their so-called peace movement will be seriously questioned by the economically harassed nations and there will gradually be created in these countries a psychology which will challenge the present *status quo* of the world. In other words, the world will gradually be split into two camps of "haves" and "have-nots," one tending to be highly capitalistic and the other more and more socialistic.

It will take a long time for Japan to turn to a new orientation of policies, as the Japanese by nature and tradition are very cautious and moderate in the matter of government and diplomacy. The present position she enjoys in the world is the result of hard and painstaking endeavors. She will not risk losing it in exchange for fine theories and political and economic logic. In times of crisis it has always been our innate love of solidarity that has saved the situation, and we have not yet lost that trait. If a transformation ever comes over Japan, it will come not in a breakdown of the political and economic system, but in a complete change of national policies accepted by the majority of the people. Japan as a nation realizes her responsibility as a stabilizing factor in the Western Pacific and will try to continue her present policy of coördination with the liberal nations of the West. But the economic and psychological development of her national life has been such that she might be forced to evolve new policies, both internally and internationally, if the present liberal policies are found inadequate to solve her vital problems.

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THE PROS AND CONS OF SOVIET RECOGNITION

By Paul D. Cravath

THE question of the recognition of the Soviet Government of Russia by the United States is one of the most vital international problems confronting the American people. The discussion of this problem should be based upon a sound appraisal of the principles involved and a clear understanding of the purposes and results of the recognition of one government by another. In the public discussion of this question there has been a great deal of loose thought and speech.

There seems to be a widespread impression that when the United States Government recognizes a new government in another country it is actuated primarily by motives of good will, and that the result of recognition is to fasten upon the new government the seal of approval of the United States. Nothing could be further from the truth. Usually the primary motive of a government in recognizing the government of another state is self-interest. It simply seeks to establish relations which will enable it to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens and to promote their interests, and reciprocally to establish a basis for dealing with the other country and its citizens. The recognition of a newly established government by the United States Government does not remotely carry with it the implication that the aims and practices of the new government meet with our approval or inspire our admiration.

Our government was the first of the Great Powers to support the *de facto* theory of recognition as contrasted with the legitimacy theory. The American State Department has consistently adhered to the *de facto* theory for more than a century, except for occasional departures by Secretary Seward due to the exigencies of the Civil War and by other Secretaries of State in connection with the recognition of revolutionary governments in Latin America in the exercise of the somewhat paternal responsibilities imposed upon our government by the Monroe Doctrine. The theory and practice of our State Department were admirably summarized in a memorandum of Mr. A. A. Adee, Assistant Secretary of State, on March 28, 1913, as follows:

> It will, I think, simplify the matter to keep in mind the distinction between the

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recognition necessary to the conduct of international business between two countries and the recognition of the form of government professed by a foreign country.

In the former case, ever since the American Revolution, entrance upon diplomatic intercourse with foreign states has been *de facto*, dependent upon the existence of three conditions of fact: The control of the administrative machinery of the state; the general acquiescence of its people; and the ability and willingness of their government to discharge international and conventional obligations. The form of government has not been a conditional factor in such recognition; in other words, the *de jure* element of legitimacy of title has been left aside, probably because liable to involve dynastic or constitutional questions hardly within our competency to adjudicate, especially so when the organic form of government has been changed, as by revolution, from a monarchy to a commonwealth or vice versa. The general practice in such cases has been to satisfy ourselves that the change was effective and to enter into relation with the authority in *de facto* possession.[1]

Our government has frequently established cordial diplomatic relations with governments that were notoriously autocratic and vicious. Usually the sole test that our government seeks to apply is whether the new government is sufficiently entrenched in power effectively to govern within its own borders and to perform its international obligations. After that test has been met, our government in the recognition of governments in the eastern hemisphere does not usually concern itself with the morals or motives of the government seeking recognition.

If we bear these principles in mind, a brief review of the attitude of our government toward the recognition of the Soviet Government as compared with the policy pursued by other governments will go far to explain the present popular misapprehension in this country regarding the consequences of recognition of Soviet Russia.

The Soviet Revolution occurred in November 1917, a year before the armistice that ended the European War. During that year and for some time thereafter, certain of the Allied and Associated Powers acting in concert with White armies were engaged in hostilities against Soviet Russia. Those hostilities did not end until early in 1920. At first the Allied Powers were disposed to boycott the Soviet Government. This was the natural result of the irritation caused by Russia's desertion of the cause of the Allies at a critical period of the war, of the aversion felt in capitalistic countries for the principles and practices of the Soviet Revolutionary Government and of the widespread doubt regarding its permanence.

[1] "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1913, p. 100.

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As soon as it became apparent that the Soviet Government was the sole constituted authority in Russia and was likely to remain in power indefinitely, the principal European governments, recognizing the practical necessity of having dealings with Russia, began opening diplomatic relations. Estonia and Finland, having the greatest need of relations with their powerful neighbor, extended *de jure* recognition before the end of 1920. Poland followed in 1921 and Germany in 1922.

In the spring of 1922 occurred the Genoa Conference, instigated by Lloyd George, in the course of which the statesmen of Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Germany met with Soviet statesmen in an effort to work out a formula under which Russia might be admitted to the European family of nations. This conference failed, but while it was in progress the representatives of Germany and Russia negotiated the Rapallo Agreement, which practically wiped the slate clean as between the two nations and confirmed the recognition of the Soviet Government by Germany which had already been granted by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Great Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Norway and Greece recognized the Soviet Republic in 1924, and by 1927 all the governments of Europe except Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Spain, Hungary, Portugal, Holland and Belgium had extended *de jure* recognition. France expelled the Soviet representative in 1927, but his successor was appointed shortly thereafter. Great Britain withdrew its Ambassador to Russia the same year, but resumed diplomatic relations in 1929, upon the advent of the present Labor Government.

There can be no doubt that these European nations, in recognizing the Soviet Government, were actuated primarily by considerations of self-interest. It was natural that Estonia, Finland, Persia and Poland — all of which border on Russia — should be among the first to establish diplomatic relations. Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan established relations as soon as economic conditions in Russia showed signs of becoming sufficiently stable to justify the hope of commercial intercourse with the rest of the world on a substantial scale. It certainly did not occur to any of the European governments that in recognizing the Soviet Government they were placing the stamp of their approval on the methods used in establishing its power or on the policies it was pursuing in the exercise of that power.

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Uninfluenced by the policy pursued by European governments, the United States Government has consistently pursued the policy of non-recognition. The first official statement of that policy was contained in a note which Secretary of State Colby addressed to the Italian Ambassador on October 10, 1920. Mr. Colby, while referring to the communistic doctrines and practices of the Soviet Government which were at variance with those of other civilized nations, emphasized as the principal ground of his policy of non-recognition what was clearly the soundest ground. It was that the Soviet Government by its own declarations could not be trusted to carry out its international obligations. He said:

> The responsible leaders of the régime have frequently and openly boasted that they are willing to sign agreements and undertakings with foreign Powers while not having the slightest intention of observing such undertakings or carrying out such agreements. This attitude of disregard of obligations voluntarily entered into, they base upon the theory that no compact or agreement made with a non-Bolshevist government can have any moral force for them. They have not only avowed this as a doctrine, but they have amplified it in practice.

In a note transmitted to the American Consul at Reval on March 25, 1921, Secretary Hughes announced that relations would not be opened with Soviet Russia until convincing provision had been made for: 1, the safety of life; 2, the recognition of firm guarantees of private property; 3, the sanctity of contracts; and 4, the rights of free labor. In a letter to Samuel Gompers dated July 19, 1923, Secretary Hughes at greater length reiterated the same requisites of recognition, emphasizing the Soviet Government's "persistent attempts to subvert the institutions of democracy as maintained in this country."

In his message to Congress of December 6, 1923, President Coolidge somewhat liberalized the government's attitude toward trade by American nationals with Russia; but he added:

> Our government does not propose, however, to enter into relations with another régime which refuses to recognize the sanctity of international obligations. I do not propose to barter away for the privilege of trade any of the cherished rights of humanity. I do not propose to make merchandise of any American principles. These rights and principles must go wherever the sanctions of our government go.
>
> But while the favor of America is not for sale, I am willing to make very large concessions for the purpose of rescuing the people of Russia. Already encouraging evidences of returning to the ancient ways of society can be detected. But

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more are needed. Whenever there appears any disposition to compensate our citizens who were despoiled, and to recognize that debt contracted with our government, not by the Czar, but by the newly formed Republic of Russia; whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever there appear works meet for repentence, our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia.

Mr. Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, thought, or professed to think, that he discovered an encouraging note in this pronouncement and promptly sent President Coolidge a despatch in which he expressed the Soviet Government's readiness to discuss with the United States Government all of the problems mentioned in the President's message, these negotiations to be based on "the principle of mutual non-intervention in internal affairs," and added that:

As to the questions of claims mentioned in your message, the Soviet Government is fully prepared to do all in its power, so far as the dignity and interests of its country permit, to bring about the desired end of renewal of friendship with the United States of America.

President Coolidge referred the Chicherin note to Secretary Hughes, who promptly made public the following statement:

There would seem to be at this time no reason for negotiations. The American Government, as the President said in his message to the Congress, is not proposing to barter away its principles. If the Soviet authorities are ready to restore the confiscated property of American citizens or make effective compensation, they can do so. If the Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decrees repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and appropriately recognize them, they can do so. It requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish these results, which can and should be achieved at Moscow as evidence of good faith. The American Government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or repudiated obligations. Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country. This Government can enter into no negotiations until these efforts directed from Moscow are abandoned.

In the light of subsequent events it is perhaps to be regretted that the Soviet offer of an attempt to negotiate a basis for recognition was not accepted, although it should be remembered that at that time none of the Great Powers except Germany had recognized the Soviet Government, and the failure of the Genoa Conference of the previous year was still fresh in the memory of statesmen.

The official utterances of the President and Secretary of State were sympathetically received by American public opinion, al-

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ready aroused to distrust of the communistic régime in Russia and all its works. The note thus given to public discussion of American recognition of Soviet Russia goes far to account for the popular impression that recognition might involve a surrender of "cherished rights of humanity" or of "American principles."

Let us now turn the discussion to the sound utilitarian basis where it belongs. It must be recognized that the United States Government cannot be expected to enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government except upon reasonable conditions. From the pronouncements of the State Department it is apparent that the "works meet for repentance" reasonably to be expected of the Soviet Government as a condition of recognition include satisfactory assurances upon the following questions: 1, recognition of the sanctity of international engagements; 2, the return of, or adequate compensation for, the property of American nationals confiscated by the Soviet Government after the revolution in 1917; 3, recognition of the debts contracted with our government and our nationals by the Kerensky Government; and 4, the cessation of subversive activities directed from Moscow against our institutions.

The soundness of the first of these conditions no one will question, for it is axiomatic that no government is entitled to recognition by other governments unless it is willing and able to perform its international obligations. It is probable that the Soviet Government would accept that condition without debate, for in spite of declarations to the contrary by Lenin and other communist leaders, the Soviet Government has repeatedly professed a determination to perform its own obligations, even in its dealings with nations of the capitalistic world.

The second and third conditions present more serious difficulties. The abolition of private property and the transfer to the state of all property except purely personal belongings lies at the very foundation of the entire Soviet economic and political structure. The Soviet authorities profess to see no reason in principle why an exception in the application of that doctrine should be made in favor of foreigners. While the condition laid down by our State Department is confined to property owned by, and debts owing to, our government and our nationals, any concession made to Americans would doubtless have to be extended to other nations. Indeed, the Rapallo Agreement, which provides for the mutual cancellation of debts and claims as between

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Russia and Germany, expressly provides that in case the Soviet Government should at any time recognize claims held by nationals of other nations, the same recognition must be granted to German nationals. There is a similar agreement with Japan.

Another complication involved in the discussion of foreign claims against Russia is the insistence of the Soviet Government upon the simultaneous consideration of Russia's claims against certain of the Allied and Associated Powers, doubtless including the United States, for damages resulting from their support of the various campaigns waged against the Soviet Government by White armies during the three years following the outbreak of the Soviet Revolution. The contention of the Russian Government is that the support by foreign governments of counter-revolutionary warfare resulted in claims by Russia against those governments similar to the claims that were sustained by the Geneva award in favor of the United States against Great Britain for the depredations to American shipping caused by the *Alabama* and other privateers fitted out in British ports during our Civil War. This is no place for a discussion of the validity of the Russian counter-claims. It is enough to say that they are not so frivolous that they can be dismissed without consideration. Professor Schuman, of the University of Chicago, in his book "American Policy toward Russia since 1917," after a review of the facts and the law, reaches the conclusion that these counter-claims are valid in substantial amounts. However this may be, it is difficult to see how the United States can refuse at least to give its reasons for not recognizing them.

The aggregate amount of the American claims against Russia has never been ascertained. It is estimated that at their face value they may amount to as much as $750,000,000. Still more uncertain is the amount of Russia's claims against the United States. At the Genoa Conference, the Soviet representative submitted fantastic claims against the Allied Governments, far in excess of their aggregate claims against Russia. If they are ever admitted in principle, the Russian claims against the Allied and Associated Governments that supported the White armies will involve not only the determination of their aggregate amount but also their apportionment between the Allied nations and the United States, whose part in supporting the White armies in Russia was different from that of Great Britain and France. The United States might even escape liability entirely.

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Enough has been said to show that it would be impossible to reach an agreement upon the reciprocal claims between the American and Soviet Governments without an extended inquiry. Even if there be ground for hope that an agreement might ultimately be reached, is it wise diplomacy to insist upon a definitive agreement as a condition of recognition? Would it not be wiser to pursue the course that was adopted by the United States Government in dealing with somewhat similar problems in its relations with the present revolutionary government in Mexico, which had assumed an attitude toward American property rights not dissimilar in principle to that of the Soviet Government? Instead of insisting upon a definitive settlement of the American claims as a condition of recognition, the United States Government sent a diplomatic mission to Mexico to ascertain by negotiation with the Mexican Government whether there could be found a promising basis for the ultimate recognition and determination of those claims. Upon receiving a satisfactory report from its mission, the American Government entered into diplomatic relations with the revolutionary government in Mexico and after prolonged negotiations the American Ambassador brought about a settlement of most of the questions at issue between the two nations. Would not a similar course in dealing with the Soviet Government be more likely to be effective than our continued insistence on unconditional recognition of the American claims as a prerequisite to recognition?

The fourth condition, that the Soviet Government shall give satisfactory assurance of the cessation of subversive activities against our institutions, may prove the most difficult of all. The Soviet Government insists that neither it nor any of its agents in this country has engaged in subversive activities within our borders directed against our institutions. This may be literally true. It seems highly improbable that the Russian Government trading companies and their affiliated organizations have committed the fruitless folly of participating in subversive activities within our borders. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the Russian Communist Party and the Third International have been and are likely to continue to be active in communistic propaganda all over the world. It is hard to accept the distinction that the Soviet spokesmen draw between the Soviet Government on the one hand and the Communist Party and the Third International on the other, inasmuch as in the last analysis the Soviet Government and the Third International are both creatures of the central organi-

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zation of the Communist Party. Stalin, although holding no office in the Soviet Government, is the dominating figure in the Communist Party. One day he speaks for the Soviet Government as the exponent of the doctrines of his party, and the next he may openly support the plans of the Third International looking toward world revolution. He would doubtless say that the Soviet Government is no more responsible for the activities of the Third International and the Communist Party than our government is for the activities of the Republican Party or the Methodist Board of Foreign Missions. The obvious answer to this attempted parallel is that the Communist Party is the only recognized political party in Russia and the Soviet Government is its creature.

Considering that the communist leaders are devoted to communism with all the fervor of religious zealots, it is probably too much to expect, whatever may be their professions, that they will surrender the right of the Third International to continue communistic propaganda. In the face of the present open unfriendliness of our government and the American nation toward the Soviet Government, it would not be surprising if under existing conditions the leaders of the Communist Party felt justified in going the limit in their subversive propaganda in this country, provided the official Russian agents within our borders held aloof. On the other hand, in spite of the bad record of the Soviet Government in carrying out its promises to other governments to refrain from propaganda, it may well be that, when recognition has removed the principal cause of irritation in Russia against the United States, the communist leaders will deem it to their interest to terminate their subversive activities in this country, which they must have found by experience to be futile in promoting the cause of communism within our borders.

On the assumption that the question of our recognition of the Soviet Government is to be dealt with primarily on the basis of our self-interest, it may be asked what advantage would recognition bring to us. The reverse of the question is more easily answered. How does the United States profit by the government's policy of non-recognition? To many the obvious answer would be that we preserve our self-respect by not recognizing a government whose principles and practices are so abhorrent to us and so widely at variance with those on which our civilization is based. But as already pointed out, our self-respect is not involved, as recognition does not remotely involve approval of Soviet prin-

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ciples and methods. In the first years following the Soviet Revolution in 1917 the principal Allied nations of Europe and the United States by withholding recognition undoubtedly intended to discredit and weaken the Soviet Government in the hope that it would soon fall and be succeeded by some form of government based on principles more in harmony with those which actuate the other governments of the civilized world. That quite legitimate gesture failed. It certainly has ceased to be of value to the United States now that most other governments have adopted the policy of recognition. It may be said that it is against the interests of our government to encourage a government professing principles which, if they triumph, would be subversive of our social and political institutions. It is a question whether the attitude of our government in respect of recognition would have an appreciable influence on the ultimate fate of the Soviet Government. Our government is so fully committed to the policy of non-interference with the internal affairs of European nations that it would not be influenced by the factor which, for a time, undoubtedly influenced European governments, that by the policy of non-recognition they preserved their freedom to support counter-revolutionary movements in an attempt to overthrow the Soviet Government and bring about the substitution in its stead of one with which enlightened governments could more effectively coöperate.

The obvious advantages of a policy of recognition are those upon which the whole system of diplomatic relations between civilized nations is based. Our government would be in a position through its diplomatic representatives to protect the life, liberty and property of Americans visiting, or sojourning in, Russia, of whom there are already several thousand annually, who are now dependent upon the good offices of the diplomatic representatives of other governments. Our government would be able by the usual diplomatic methods to encourage and protect American trade with Russia. There is much force in the view that when in 1923 our government by presidential proclamation encouraged American merchants and manufacturers to engage in trade with Russia it owed our citizens the duty of protecting this trade by the usual diplomatic machinery. Only by the establishment of diplomatic relations can outstanding differences between the United States and Russia, such as those in relation to dumping and convict labor, be dealt with adequately. With an Ambassador at Moscow and consuls in the principal trading centers of Russia our gov-

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ernment would be able to assemble reliable information for the guidance of our merchants, manufacturers and bankers, who are now dependent upon the casual and often prejudiced reports of unofficial observers.

Finally, it seems a great pity that the United States should be the only one of the Great Powers which has deliberately excluded itself from exercising any influence through the usual diplomatic channels in the development of the institutions of the most populous nation in Europe, whose return to economic, social and political stability is essential for the peace and prosperity of the civilized world.

An attempt by the United States to negotiate a satisfactory basis for the recognition of the Soviet Government of Russia would be full of difficulties, and diplomatic relations, if established, might prove hard to maintain, for the Soviet statesmen have not shown an aptitude for coöperation. But is not the stake sufficient to make the attempt worth while?

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REVOLUTION IN SOUTH AMERICA

By Clarence H. Haring

A WAVE of revolutions has during the past six months swept over the Latin-American world, from the Pacific to the Atlantic and from the Peruvian highlands to the prairies of Buenos Aires. The backwash has been felt in Cuba, Chile and Ecuador, and even from Uruguay have come reports of threatened upheaval. It is a curious phenomenon, this epidemic of political violence. It has infected nations widely separated in the scale of political and social progress, states which are still semi-Indian in racial complexion and political deportment, and others where change of government by revolution has long been believed to be an anachronism. The contagion, after an early outbreak in the Dominican Republic, spread with startling celerity from Bolivia to Peru, to Argentina, and to Brazil. It has affected over three-fourths of the area of South America, and almost as great a proportion of its population — fifty-eight million people in an expanse of five and a half million square miles.

To more than one observer it has recalled that distant revolutionary year of 1848 on the continent of Europe, or the toppling of monarchies at the close of the World War. The liberal revolutions of '48 had a common origin in the system of political repression which, after the overthrow of Napoleon, became the policy of the legitimist monarchies under the inspiration of the Austrian chancellor, Metternich. They reflected a common aspiration toward democracy and nationalism. The revolutions of 1917–18 in Germany, Austria, and Russia were the result of a crisis in world affairs too recent to require elucidation. And so it is natural to seek for some explanation which will fit all these South American upheavals, to try and discover some factor by which all are divisible or some general moral to be drawn. Newspaper reports have sometimes stressed the element of student agitation in the several countries concerned; and the revolutionary leaders themselves have invariably represented the uprisings as a liberal protest against the selfishness and egotism, the corruption and arbitrary rule, of those in power. Such protestations of high motive, however, are no novelty in the history of Latin-American revolutions. No matter how personal and sordid may be its impelling causes, each is always a crusade for lib-

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erty, "legalism," the constitution, or the sacred rights of the people!

The rôle played by students in recent events in Bolivia, Peru and Argentina is at least a sign that the governments overthrown had become generally unpopular. University students in Latin-American countries are much more politically minded than those in the United States. Interest in politics is for them a major extra-curricular activity, and they do not hesitate to express themselves as a group upon public questions, national or international. Fired with the crusading ardor of youth, they are inclined to radicalism, and it is to be expected that they would be impatient of arbitrary government and the machinations of the "hard-boiled" politician.

To attribute these recent revolts to the supposed instability of the Latin temperament is an explanation too simple and naïve. Latin Americans are a peace-loving and law-abiding people, to at least the same degree as are the people of the United States. When they are weighed down under the burden of a corrupt administration which completely controls the ballot box, they are apt to remove or alter it by swift and passionate methods. Sometimes a real step forward on the road to democratic control is achieved; sometimes the people discover that the only result has been to put another equally corrupt cabal in power, and that the weary process must be repeated. In the long run, however, progress has been achieved, in every one of the Latin-American republics.

Another matter is clear at the outset: the common denominator in such revolutions is not to be found in the relations of these countries with the United States, whether political or economic. If there is a moral to be drawn, it does not concern the attitude of Latin America toward the northern "colossus." The president overthrown in Peru in August was strongly pro-American — indeed that was one of the reproaches hurled at him (for local, popular effect) by his enemies. But the president overthrown in September in Argentina was held to be just as pronounceably anti-American, and one of the first public acts of the military leader of the revolution was a gesture of friendliness toward the United States. Revolution in each instance had its origin in political and economic circumstances of a purely domestic sort. In no case were elements of a social revolution involved, although, as in this country, the word "communist" was frequently bandied about

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by the vested interests to disparage the violence of their adversaries. And if, in the course of the argument, these adversaries retorted with charges of collusion with the Yankee capitalist or "imperialist," it was to be taken about as seriously as mutual party recriminations in political campaigns in the United States.

In Bolivia the government of ex-President Siles more than once sought credit with the nation by the "exposure" of alleged secret plans of the Third International at Moscow to organize a communist revolution in the country. And when in the middle of June 1930 a small group of Bolivian political exiles crossed the frontier from Argentina and seized a customhouse, it was reported as the work of a few extreme radicals supported by "Indian farmers and communists." Yet Dr. Abdon Saavedra, the exiled Vice-President, and his associates had about as much in common with Moscow as have most of the readers of this article.

President Siles, on the other hand, was often accused by his opponents of selling the country to North American capital, and there was bitter criticism of the steps taken in 1929 to put into effect the scheme of a Central Bank recommended by the Kemmerer Commission in the previous year. Yet, although it was the Saavedra faction which supplied most of the opposition, it was in the administration of Siles's predecessor, Bautista Saavedra, that the program of large foreign loans to finance public improvements was inaugurated.[1] Only then the rôles had been reversed. And the Opposition throughout was ably seconded by the press of Chile; for Chile has well-defined designs upon Bolivia as a field for economic penetration and a market for her products, and the intrusion of American capital was not wholly to her liking. It is also interesting to observe that although Colonel Sánchez Cerro, the revolutionary leader in Peru, played upon the chauvinism of the people by accusing President Leguía of having given over the country to the foreign banker and monopolist, once in power he made it clear that acquired foreign rights would be scrupulously respected.

[1] The foreign debt of Bolivia, slightly over $4,000,000 in 1920, was increased by the Saavedra administration (1921–25) to over $32,000,000, the major part being a loan of $29,000,000 obtained in 1922 from a consortium headed by Stifel, Nicolaus and Company, and secured by the proceeds of various taxes. And it was in connection with this loan that a Permanent Fiscal Commission (of two Americans nominated by the bankers, and a Bolivian) was created to protect the interests of the bondholders. The government of President Siles negotiated two loans with Dillon, Read and Company for $13,000,000 and $23,000,000 respectively, used in part to refund outstanding obligations, in part earmarked for road and railway construction.

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If relations with the United States, then, were not a factor of importance in the Latin-American revolutions of 1930, are there common elements to be discovered elsewhere as an explanation of this general impulse to insurrection? The answer that springs at once to mind is economic depression, with its resultant suffering and discontent. But economic depression is universal, and it has happened before. It is very severe in Colombia and Chile, to name only two important countries, and these are not threatened by political upheaval. Mexico too is hard hit, but Mexico, mother of revolutions, seems at this moment to be unusually quiescent.

Certainly the prevailing crisis in world production and distribution figures in the diagnosis. Unemployment, reduction of the national income, decline in the price of staple exports, have developed a physical and psychological temper favorable to political disorders. The body politic is in a run-down condition, below par, and as would be the case in physical bodies, the situation is fraught with danger. The normal lines of defense, the usual restraints and inhibitions, are lowered, and signs of latent derangements come to the surface. Economic depression is only a contributory cause, the real infirmity must be sought for elsewhere; and in the nations recently afflicted the infirmity is not in every case the same.

Bolivia and Peru are semi-Indian countries. Of Peru's estimated population of nearly five millions, over 50 percent are aborigines, perhaps 2 percent are white, and 30 percent are a mixture of the two, the *mestizos*. The rest are Asiatics, negroes, or crosses other than *mestizo*. The population of Bolivia is divided between Indian, white and *mestizos* in about the same general proportions; there are virtually no Asiatics and few negroes. In both countries the Indians are by law citizens, but they have no share in the political life of the nation except the doubtful privilege of providing cannon fodder. They are ignorant, exploited, the hewers of wood and drawers of water. The dominant, ruling class has been a numerically small, white, landowning aristocracy, inheriting from Spanish times pride of birth and breeding, but little political experience. In the early days of independence they and their natural allies, the educated professional class, were versed in current political literature, held high resolves for the future of their country, and aimed to give it an ideally perfect government based upon principles of democ-

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racy and equality. But in actual practice they frequently fell short of early promise. Motives of altruism and public service, which are the fruit of long exercise of self-government and without which no popular régime can survive, were too often notable for their absence. The spirit of compromise, willingness to submit as a minority to the majority's decisions, or as a majority to respect the rights of a minority, had not been learned. The separation from Spain involved a political revolution, but the old social order survived. Intolerance and personalism obtruded themselves to the exclusion of a genuine patriotism. In the new-found equality, each leader was as good as his fellow, and convinced of his special capacity to run the embryo state. In Spanish and Portuguese times, the public service had been notoriously and prevailingly corrupt. Officials high and low, generally underpaid, looked upon office as a heaven-sent opportunity to provide for their future at public expense. Not that this was peculiar to the Indo-Latin communities of America. A right to the "perquisites" of office was taken for granted in most of the countries of Europe. But in the new Latin-American states the tradition too long survived. Rival political groups have been largely actuated by one aim — to control and dispose of the public funds.

Under such circumstances the military came to play a dominant rôle in national politics. The struggle for independence a century ago covered a period of a decade and a half. During that time these countries were completely militarized; they fell under the power of chiefs who were cast up to the surface by the stress and turmoil of civil conflict, and who exercised in their respective communities a despotic authority. For the struggle for freedom was essentially a civil war, like our own Revolutionary War; and with a house divided against itself a policy of Jacobin ruthlessness was often the only recourse. When victory was achieved, the generals were unwilling to forego the sweets of power and aspired to the control of the entire nation; and the people at large, accustomed to despotism, whether that of a distant Spanish sovereign or of these upstart usurpers, knowing nothing of the ways of democratic government, easily acquiesced. The early presidents of Bolivia and Peru were all of them generals. While submitting to the forms of constitutional procedure, they controlled elections in their own interest and remained in power until a rival snatched it away by means of a *cuartelazo*, or barrack uprising. Behind the generals were the political factions into which the dominant social

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caste was divided, but which inevitably depended upon the military for support.

Not that all dictators have been mere selfish tyrants. Many of them doubtless have pursued personal ends, or have thirsted for the pomp and circumstance of power; but, given the turbulent epoch in which dictatorship developed, it is difficult to see how even the best-intentioned leaders could avoid the appearance of arbitrary power. And some of them were men of fine intellect and splendid energy who in a real democracy would likewise have been leaders, statesmen, public benefactors. Given their short terms of office and their lack of resources in money and trained subordinates, some of them accomplished wonders in administrative and economic organization, in educational and legal reforms. And by the institutions they created, and by their spectacular appeals to "fellow citizens" against foreign perils, they frequently helped to create a national consciousness in what had been a backward and disunited people. They forged them into a nation.

These general considerations have applied at one time or another in the nineteenth century to all the states of Latin America. And they are in some degree applicable to a number of them today, especially to the semi-Indian states of the Andes. In Bolivia and Peru the presidents since the beginning of the present century have been civilians, and militarism of the earlier, cruder sort has been eliminated. But as yet there is no broad basis of an intelligent popular electorate. Little or no effort has been made to raise the living standard and provide educational facilities for that submerged part of the nation, the Indians. True, the social order is not static. The older aristocracy everywhere finds its political monopoly slipping — such was in part the significance of the Leguía régime in Peru. A white and *mestizo* middle class is increasing in numbers, wealth and education, and demands political and social recognition. It far outnumbers the "old families," tends to become identified with them, and even, in some countries, to supplant them. Standards of academic education are slowly rising; and political education has come with enlarged experience in self-government. With the growth of foreign contacts and increased participation in international affairs has appeared a greater moderation and a sense of social responsibility, a desire to figure well in the public opinion of the world at large.

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Yet in Bolivia and Peru government remains government by oligarchy. Political control continues in the hands of a relatively few men, and free elections are rare. In one way or another they are manipulated by local henchmen in the interest of a central executive; and arbitrary use of administrative power to suppress opposition and stifle any appeal to the country is the rule. Occasional revolution is therefore inevitable, when the exasperation of the Opposition rises to the boiling point. But whatever may be true of past generations, revolution in South America today is rarely a bloody affair. It is "simply a short cut to the same results that are arrived at in less volatile and more patient communities by election." And it becomes so because of "the conceded uselessness, or hopelessness, of the electoral machinery in expressing the will of actual or probable majorities." It is an accepted, extra-legal procedure, and it has come to be exercised with increasing efficiency, and with a minimum of bloodshed and disorder.

In these two mountain states one serious obstacle to the early attainment of national and social solidarity has been the difficult topography, with a consequent inadequacy of communication. Distances are great (Peru is nearly twice the size of Texas and seven times as large as New England) and railways are few and far between. From the Peruvian capital, Lima, there is no direct railway connection with Arequipa and Cuzco, the principal cities of the south, and none with the centers of population in the north. To reach Arequipa one must travel a day by sea and climb another day by rail to an oasis high in the Andean desert; thence the line continues to the Bolivian border on Lake Titicaca, and north to Cuzco, the ancient Inca capital. From Lima a railway rises over fifteen thousand feet to tap a great silver mine of Cerro de Pasco. But that is practically all. With the north communication is also by sea, or through the Andes by mule and in river launches. Under President Leguía's patronage, service by air was being rapidly developed. Indeed the airplane in the future will be a factor of incalculable importance in binding together these disjointed countries. But even airplanes cannot transport armies, and the quick suppression of disorder or disaffection in distant areas has always been a difficult problem.

In Bolivia the situation is much the same. Railways climb to the high plateau in three directions, from Argentina, Chile, and Peru; but some of the oldest cities, such as Santa Cruz, Potosí and

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Sucre, have as yet no rail connection with the capital. Lines are being constructed, and loans have been negotiated abroad for their completion; but there is many a slip between promise and fulfilment. Today the airplane, and in some directions the motor car, serve as the readiest means of communication.

But these geographical factors are of more fundamental significance. They have served to perpetuate an inherited and deep-seated provincialism. Ancient towns in Bolivia and Peru, and in the other Andean republics, widely separated by mountains and deserts, retain a local and particularistic sentiment that is scarcely transcended by the newer and super-imposed nationalism. The feeling is in part a legacy from old Spain, where regionalism has always stood in the way of a genuine national unity, and survives in the perennial Catalan question today. But it has been reënforced by generations of isolation in the heart of the Andean highlands. During President Leguía's long rule of eleven years in Peru, it was Arequipa which was usually the danger spot. Mistress of the south, and jealous of the political group which dominated in the capital, she lent a readier ear to the seductions of the malcontents; and it was there that the recent uprising had its source and inspiration.

To know all the circumstances which were the immediate occasion for the revolutions of 1930 is of course at this distance impossible. The general political situation which preceded them, however, is not so obscure.

In Bolivia the so-called Republican Party had been in power since 1920, when by means of a bloodless revolution it replaced an older Liberal Party which had dominated the country for several decades. The two groups differed little in political principle; but the new party in its origins represented especially the interests of the important town of Cochabamba. Both were progressive and civilian, in contrast to earlier régimes. The victors, however, split into two factions when in 1921 Dr. Bautista Saavedra used his interest in Congress to capture the presidency, against the wishes of the party's founder and leader, Dr. Daniel Salamanca. President Saavedra was accused of being a dictator, resorting to strong-arm methods, and corrupting the public service in the interest of his own following. By negotiating the Nicolaus loan he vastly increased the public debt, but he introduced many public improvements in La Paz and Cochabamba, in the way of paved streets, water systems, boulevards and public

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buildings. In 1925 he secured the election of J. C. Villanueva, but when the president-elect showed signs of independence, had Congress quash the elections. He then made a deal with a former Liberal, Dr. Hernando Siles, whose choice as president he procured in the following year. But Siles also proved a disappointment. He recalled Villanueva from abroad, invited Liberals and Legitimists into his government and soon revealed that he intended to be master in his own house. Bautista Saavedra went into honorable exile as minister to Paris.

What proved to be President Siles's undoing was his scheming to continue as the head of the state — "continuism" has been the nemesis of numberless Latin-American presidents. The Fort Vanguardia incident and consequent crisis in Bolivia's relations with Paraguay at the close of 1928 was for a time a godsend. It stirred up the latent jingoism of the people, the youth organized for defense of the *patria*, and the President was able to pose as the champion of the nation's sovereignty. In January 1929, although the quarrel had been submitted to a commission of neutrals at Washington, Siles assumed dictatorial powers, asserting that force rather than law was needed to preserve order and safeguard the country's interest. When the final recommendations of the neutral commission were made in the following autumn this artificial war scare collapsed, and the Opposition began preparations to oppose Siles in the next national elections. Agitation for the return of ex-President Saavedra was used by the President as an excuse for continuing the dictatorship. Ismael Montes, a former Liberal president and one of the country's most distinguished citizens, was forced to seek refuge in the Chilean legation on account of his outspoken frankness. The Vice-President, Abdon Saavedra, brother of Don Bautista, had for over a year been in exile, along with a number of other prominent Bolivians. In October 1929 it was freely predicted that there would be a movement to overthrow the President if he refused to permit a regular election.

It was the political comedy of last spring which drove the Opposition to extreme measures. In April Dr. Siles announced that the presidential election, due in May, would be postponed for reasons of national welfare. On May 28, meeting resistance from a large group of army officers,[2] he unexpectedly resigned and

[2] The National Defense League, organized during the Chaco war scare to arouse patriotic sentiment and obtain subscriptions for the purchase of armaments, also issued a manifesto informing President Siles that it would not tolerate his efforts to remain in office after the expiration of his legal term.

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instructed the newly appointed cabinet, which assumed charge of the government, to call elections for a national convention to reform the constitution. It was interpreted as a *coup d'état* designed to provide means of escaping the legal provision which forbids a president immediately to succeed himself in office. Bolivian political exiles declared that the provisional government by a council of ministers was illegal, and the deported Vice-President announced his intention of returning to La Paz to complete Dr. Siles's term.

Complicating these purely political manœuvres was a serious economic crisis induced by the steady decline for over a year in the price of tin, the country's principal export and chief source of revenue. The result had been a slump in trade and a steady rise in commodity prices. Mines were closed down, labor agitation increased, and there were threats of a general strike. President Siles had resorted to the necessary but unpopular measure of reducing government salaries and increasing taxes. Under such conditions, the government bore most of the blame for the impoverishment of the country, and the people were ready to welcome with enthusiasm new rulers who promised improved conditions and an easier standard of living.

Events came to a head in June 1930. Demonstrations by students and workmen in La Paz were suppressed by force, and some scores were reported to have been killed or wounded. The garrison of the important mining and railway center, Oruro, declared for revolution,[3] other cities followed suit, and Dr. Siles sought asylum in a foreign legation. By June 25 the movement was in full swing, and within forty-eight hours the revolutionaries were in possession of the capital. The military junta which assumed control has made promises of free elections, an independent judiciary, the autonomy of the municipalities: in short, a speedy return to constitutionality. A coalition ticket has been reported, including the leaders of the three principal political parties, and its election

[3] The military movement was also directed in part against General Hans Kundt, the Chief of Staff. General Kundt had been a German instructor in the Bolivian army before the World War, returned to Germany during the conflict to become a major-general, and after the accession to power of President Saavedra was recalled to Bolivia, naturalized by presidential decree, and appointed first, Minister of War, and later Chief of Staff. His name was associated with many of the arbitrary acts of Saavedra's administration, and at its end his contract was not renewed. After the severance of diplomatic relations with Paraguay, and with war threatening, Dr. Siles cabled General Kundt to return again to La Paz to his old post as Chief of Staff. The dissatisfaction among army officers caused by his return helped to undermine the Siles régime. After the revolution General Kundt sought refuge in the German Legation, and was later allowed to retire to Europe.

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in January 1931 is assured. Whether the new group in power can make much headway against the economic depression which helped to undermine the position of Siles is, however, another question.

In Bolivia the army, students, and financial interests revolted, for one reason or another, against a threatened presidential despotism. In Peru similar elements combined to end a despotism long established.

The election of Augusto Leguía to the Peruvian presidency in 1919 represented in a measure a victory of middle-class interests over the Civilista Party of the *hacendados*, or landed proprietors, who inherited from colonial days the tradition of social and political leadership. Leguía felt it necessary to seize the government by a military *coup d'état*, lest his predecessor prevent his inauguration by having Congress throw out the election. And to maintain himself against the powerful interests which he had supplanted, he instituted a frankly dictatorial régime. The forms of the constitution were observed, but individual guarantees were suspended, and those who raised a voice against him were arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned or deported. As there was no secret ballot, and chairmen of local electoral boards were appointed by the government, Congress became merely the rubber stamp of the President's wishes. He created a special mounted constabulary trained by Spanish officers — a sort of prætorian guard — which was dissociated from the army and the police. Espionage was ubiquitous.

"Dictatorship," Leguía said, "is more popular than anarchy." The old factions put personal and class interests before the pressing problems of the nation. So Leguía suppressed all parties except his own following, the Democratic Reform Party, and devoted himself to national reconstruction.

A new constitution was put into force, with the sanction of the National Assembly, which provided among other things for three regional legislatures with limited powers, a number of "social guarantees" for labor similar to those in the Mexican constitution of 1917, and (for the first time in Peruvian history) liberty of public worship. The President's program included large irrigation projects, road building, aviation, municipal improvements, and education for the Indian. Water and sewage systems were introduced in Cuzco and Arequipa, at the expense of the national

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government; and Lima was transformed with new boulevards and suburbs into a capital worthy of a modern Peru. A more intelligently conceived penal code was issued, and the navy was effectively reorganized with the aid of a Naval Commission lent by the United States.

Reconstruction, however, was chiefly of a material nature. It was carried out by means of foreign concessions and large loans placed with New York bankers. Most of the contracts were let to one or two American construction companies, and the President was accused of selling the country to American capital. To what extent the mass of the population benefited by these public improvements, by labor legislation and by better educational facilities, is a debatable question. The constitution was amended to permit Leguía's reëlection in 1924 and again in 1929, and on each occasion there was considerable popular unrest. The dictatorship, however well-intentioned — and that Leguía is a man of great ability, patriotism, and unimpeachable moral and physical courage few will deny — like most dictatorships, made no real provision for the political future of the nation. It could not, in the very nature of things, become a school of citizenship and train the people in the practice of that popular control which was the common ideal. Moreover, as time passed it became more rather than less arbitrary, which was almost necessary if it was to escape the accumulating wrath of its enemies.

That there was some connection between the revolution in Bolivia and the military uprising two months later in southern Peru is not improbable. Peruvian political refugees made their way to La Paz, and Bolivians deported by President Siles frequently found an asylum in Arequipa. Relations between individuals of the two malcontent groups must have been close, and the rapid success of the Bolivian movement would naturally bring to a head plans of a similar nature in the neighbor republic. After the June revolution the Bolivian press was reported to be agitating so vigorously against the Leguía dictatorship that the Peruvian consul at La Paz made an official protest. And a revolutionary committee in La Paz was said to be active in allying Bolivian students with their Peruvian confrères. The university students at Lima for years had quarreled with Leguía over his summary treatment of some of the intellectuals opposed to him, and over his encroachments upon the university's autonomy. And they were doubtless moved by the example of the students in

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La Paz to declare for the Arequipa rebels and strike a blow for freedom.

The elimination of Leguía probably means the return of the old Civilista Party to power. Whether that spells reform of a genuine or lasting nature the future alone can show. Meantime a Revolutionary Tribunal has been set up, before which anyone may denounce those believed guilty of malversions in connection with the fallen government — a gesture of political revenge from which the Bolivian revolution has been free. And the economic depression, which helped to swing the revolt, continues. Its ultimate causes lie outside Peru, in world prices for cotton, sugar, wool, copper and other minerals. The slackening of discipline has been reflected in anti-American demonstrations in various parts of the country and in newspaper attacks on American corporations. Confidence in government credit has not been restored; and in the face of declining revenues the new administration, like the old, resorts to the foreign banker.

Within less than a fortnight of the fall of President Leguía, a revolution in the city of Buenos Aires had added another to the toll of South America's deposed presidents. It came as a jolt to many, who fancied Argentina in a different category from other, more temperamental, nations.

Argentina *is* in a different category, which makes the September revolution the more remarkable. Education is widely diffused, modern communications by air and rail are highly developed, and democratic government is a reality. The introduction of the secret ballot a decade and a half ago brought into power a middle-class, popular party, and into the presidency the picturesque figure of Hipólito Irigoyen. The party aspired to be a progressive party of "reform." But in its political methods it showed no improvement over the old Conservative Party of the "interests" which it displaced. It devoted most of its energies to securing control, by dubious methods, of the various provincial administrations, and gave little to effective and maturely considered legislation. Under its ægis there entered into political life a new lot of men, inexperienced and lacking a tradition of public service. Popular government in a raw democracy does not necessarily mean good, or honest, government; and it was so in Argentina. In the administration of President Alvear, from 1922 to 1928, the party split into two factions — the followers of the

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President and the followers of the party chief Irigoyen — and all legislative action was paralyzed. Irigoyen was returned to the presidency two years ago by an overwhelming majority. This represented partly the working of a loyal and effectively organized political machine, partly a general popular acclaim. There was no doubt, however, that Irigoyen had received a mandate from the people such as has been vouchsafed to few presidents in Latin America. Yet within a year his prestige was gone, and within two he had been repudiated outright.

As in Bolivia and Peru, the issue revolved chiefly about the personality and methods of the president himself. Hipólito Irigoyen, one of the founders and the "platform, whip and standard bearer" of his party, was a man of mystery for the masses, over whom he exerted an extraordinary fascination. He rarely appeared in public, virtually never made a public address; even photographs of him were scarce. To his enemies he was *El Peludo*, the mole, to his followers *El Hombre*, the paladin of the people. Abhorring luxury, he lived for years in a simple second-story flat in the lower, unfashionable side of town. Although not wealthy, he gave over all his presidential salary to charity, and devoted his time and energy without stint to the country's service. But Irigoyen's leadership was always a domineering and personal one. He was called the last of the *caudillos*, those military chieftains who were a product of the *gaucho* civilization of the pampas, and whose rivalry and ambitions explain so much of the early history of the republic.

Cabinet ministers under Irigoyen were largely figureheads or mere bureau chiefs. The strong-willed president absorbed all of the executive and some of the legislative functions of the government. Most of the shortcomings of his second administration were probably traceable to the fact that, disillusioned by the irregularities of government officials he had trusted in his former term, he tried to concentrate even more closely in his own hands all political and administrative decisions. But he was well along in years, over seventy-five, and he had never been outside his own country. The narrowness of his experience had not fitted him to cope with the pressing national and international problems.

In consequence a slow paralysis crept through all the Argentine national administration. Numerous federal judgeships and other important posts, including embassies abroad, remained vacant,

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largely because pressure of routine work prevented Irigoyen from giving personal attention to these matters. And thousands of office seekers promised jobs by local bosses were left without their expected reward. Government bills remained unpaid, and contractors were seriously embarrassed, because the President insisted upon reading every authorization to pay out public funds. Yet he was charged with dispersing millions without legal warrant. In the general economic depression caused by decreasing exports of the country's staples, agrarian and industrial organizations called upon the national government for assistance in their difficulties, but Congress devoted its time to playing petty politics, and to reviewing and rejecting election certificates of new deputies unfavorable to Irigoyen. In December 1929 the President took the ill-advised step of closing the Conversion Office to stop the outflow of gold. It temporarily aided the exporter, but depressed the peso below par and raised domestic prices.

Had business conditions been prosperous, the administration might have survived. But, justly or unjustly, all the country's difficulties were charged against the President and his immediate entourage. The situation became intolerable, and early in September 1930, following the apparent success of liberal movements in Bolivia and Peru, the lid blew off. It seems that when the *coup* occurred in Lima, the cabinet in Buenos Aires already believed that the army was wavering, and on August 28 the first precautionary measures were taken. The following week some of Irigoyen's own ministers tried to persuade him to resign. On Thursday evening, September 4, there was a demonstration of university students against the Casa Rosada (Government House) in the Plaza de Mayo, in which one student was killed and several were wounded by the police. Public sentiment was deeply shocked, and the next morning thousands of students marched in solemn, funereal procession through the streets carrying white flags stained with the blood of the victims. Feeling was so tense that at six in the evening the President was prevailed upon to delegate his power to Vice-President Martínez. But the public expected resignation; Martínez was but a screen behind which remained the dominating figure of Irigoyen. Friday night prominent civilians went outside the city to persuade the armed forces and the military school to join them. The navy concentrated in the harbor refused to defend the government. On Saturday morn-

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ing General José Uriburu delivered an ultimatum demanding the President's retirement. Troops from the suburban barracks started toward the center; cadets from the military academy were joined in Palermo by students of the university; with the rector and professors at its head, the gigantic demonstration moved through the principal avenues down to the central Plaza, and the government unfurled the white flag of surrender. A few casualties occurred at the Plaza del Congreso and before the offices of a semi-official newspaper where the crowd was fired upon. But it was virtually a bloodless revolution, and in every sense a popular and democratic one. It was no barrack uprising, but a spontaneous movement by the people at large. It is probably the only urban revolution in which the street-car service functioned and the taxis ran as in normal times.

Irigoyen's was a one-man government, but not a dictatorship in the accepted Latin-American sense of the term. He leaves the stage an aged and disillusioned idealist, in large measure the victim of politicians who kept from him the growing estrangement of the nation. The new government is composed almost exclusively of men whose names carry aristocratic connotations. It has the support of a coalition of anti-Personalists, moderate Socialists and members of the old Conservative Party. But the revolution will doubtless mark the beginning of a new era in the party history of the republic.

In Brazil, the social and political conditions lying behind the most recent and involved of these South American revolutions are not so dissimilar from those in the Andean republics. The country is vast, the topography along much of the seaboard is very broken, and there is a marked inadequacy of interior communications. Between one section of the republic and another, the sea and the Amazon remain the most important highways. Indeed, the defensive strategy of the Brazilian navy is based upon the principle that the country constitutes a group of islands between which water communications must be maintained intact. The climate of the southern states is temperate, that of the northern decidedly tropical. The south is the region of cattle and coffee, with a future as an industrial area; the north will always be a plantation country. Geographical factors of distance, isolation and climate have made sectionalism a serious problem since Brazil's early days as a Portuguese colony. It has been increased

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by racial divergences and by the processes of political decentralization.

As in Bolivia and Peru, Brazil's population contains a large admixture of non-European blood. Whites predominate in the south, but mixed races prevail in the center and north, with the negro strain most evident in Bahia and Pernambuco, the Indian elsewhere. Primary education is free but in most states not compulsory, educational facilities are very inadequate, and it is estimated that three-fourths of the population is illiterate. The government in form is republican and federal; but popular control in a democratic sense exists in only a few of the more progressive states.

The two most important states in population, wealth and enterprise, have been São Paulo and Minas Geraes. They played a prominent rôle in the overthrow of the empire in 1889, and they have generally dominated the national government since. All the presidents of the republic except two have been either Paulistas or Mineiros. Of the two exceptions, one came from Rio Grande do Sul, and the other from Parahyba, in the north. This means that Minas Geraes and São Paulo have worked together for political control, and the smaller states have either found it convenient to play with them or have been unable to unite against them.

Since the establishment of the republic, organized national parties as we understand them can scarcely be said to exist. Their place is occupied by the rivalries of various state organizations. Public affairs in most of the states are controlled by an aristocracy of wealth, or by a political oligarchy, which dictates the local administration and chooses the representatives to the national Congress. The candidate for the presidency is selected in a caucus or convention composed chiefly of members of Congress, who are the supporters or the creatures of the state administration. Nomination therefore "resolves itself into an understanding between the controlling political forces of the more important states." If an opposition candidate is put forward, he generally represents the dissatisfaction of some of the minor units; but these have never been able to unite in sufficient numbers to defeat the "official" candidate.

During the past decade there has been a marked tendency to give the protest against the Paulista-Mineiro combination a violent turn. After the election of President Bernardes in 1922,

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adherents of the defeated candidate, Nilo Peçanha,[4] attempted to create disaffection in the army and navy, and in July of that year the garrison of one of the forts at Rio de Janeiro, led by the son of a former president, Marshal Fonseca, staged a twenty-four hour revolt. Opposition persisted, inspired in part by the discontent of the military, in part by the autocratic tendencies and vindictiveness of the President. In July 1924 the garrison of São Paulo seized the city and held it for three weeks, until expelled by federal troops; and in the following year there were plots and rumors of plots, in which both officers and civilians were involved. Consequently, during a large part of Bernardes's administration a state of siege was maintained in most of the republic.

Behind the 1924 revolt was a small military cabal whose motives were probably personal. In certain respects, however, the movement was a popular one. Many of the younger officers who really "put it across" believed that they were fighting to overthrow a corrupt oligarchy and to set up a cleaner and more democratic régime in the republic. The revolt failed, but in its wake was organized a young liberal party in São Paulo, which made its influence felt in state elections and allied itself with the Opposition in the presidential contest of 1930. To that extent, at least, the recent revolution represents a demand for political reform.

The uprising of this past autumn was doubtless inspired in part by the recent success in Bolivia, Peru and Argentina, and by the state of mind induced by bad times. But its roots lie deep in Brazilian politics. The state of Rio Grande do Sul, whose president, Getulio Vargas, was the opponent of Julio Prestes in the 1930 elections and the leader of the recent armed uprising, is not unaccustomed to diversions of this sort. Early in the nineteenth century it maintained itself for nearly a decade as a republic independent of the Brazilian Empire, and in 1923 and 1924 it staged local civil wars of its own. Vague rumors of a concerted attempt to put Dr. Vargas into the presidency by force were heard almost from the day of the elections, in March 1930; and as early as August 27, over a week before the Argentine situation became critical, reports of rebellion of the state against the federal government were current.

The revolution was a protest against the continued domination

[4] Supported in the election by the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco.

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in national affairs of the state of São Paulo, and its success was assured by the support of Minas Geraes. The recent president, Washington Luis, was a Paulista, and in the accepted order of things his successor should have been a Mineiro. But he contrived the nomination of Julio Prestes, another Paulista, for the presidency, and Minas Geraes threw its weight into the opposition, both in the election and in the subsequent revolt. It is true that the recent collapse of the coffee valorization plan for maintaining prices by control of exports, which was chiefly a Paulista enterprise and in which the federal government was indirectly involved, supplied a ready grievance against the administration. In spite of huge loans abroad to finance the scheme, after the break in the coffee market in July 1929 coffee stocks were larger than ever and prices lower.[5] And Brazil's prosperity today depends chiefly upon coffee. But the Coffee Defense Institute was organized under Luis' predecessor, a Mineiro, and the state of Minas Geraes was a party to the scheme. The real motive behind the revolt was political, the vexation of Minas Geraes, and the ambition of Rio Grande do Sul, in the face of São Paulo's attempt to monopolize the federal government.

The Opposition made a number of charges. They accused President Luis of military intervention in Minas Geraes and Parahyba to insure the election of his candidate. Congress, controlled by the President, was declared to have fraudulently deprived these states of their legally elected representatives, by rejecting the electoral returns and seating opponents favorable to the President. So the revolution made the elimination of Dr. Prestes and the dissolution of Congress its immediate aims. And resentment was vastly increased by the assassination in July of João Pessoa, President of the state of Parahyba, who had been the running mate of Dr. Vargas as candidate for the vice-presidency. This crime, too, was charged against the federal administration.

The revolution has been featured by its leaders as a liberal movement, a protest against the conservative "Republican" oligarchy which ruled Brazil since the fall of the empire. Its aims are to maintain states' rights and respect for the constitution, to introduce the Australian ballot and reform electoral laws. Its

[5] According to an official bulletin issued by the Coffee Defense Institute, the accumulated stores of coffee in the states of São Paulo and Minas Geraes, as of September 30, 1930, amounted to 22,000,000 sacks.

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success may be a hopeful sign that an enlightened public opinion has begun to develop in the country and to demand recognition. But there are also some who feel that the young liberal movement has stultified itself by alliance with the politicians of the old school, and that as the various political elements, from the north and from the south, each demand their share in representation and power, the new government may prove to be only another chapter in the contest for control between the several state machines. Rio Grande wanted her place in the sun, her right to share with the other two major states the privilege of controlling the nation, and for the time being she has it.

That these recent revolutions in South America are evidence of social progress rather than of retrogression, cannot be seriously denied. There is much to show that they were largely inspired by sincere patriotism. True, a real democracy is not possible as yet in two, and perhaps three, of the four republics, and whether the new governments will bring a greater liberalism time alone will tell. But they have at least done lip service to the demand for democracy and for a purer and more genuine nationalism. With wider and more effective communications, public opinion has come into play as never before; and the appeal to freedom and democracy, even if these ends are not wholly and at once achieved, serves to stimulate the latent political consciousness of the people. A well-conducted revolution, after all, may cost no more than a presidential election, nor need the casualties be any greater.

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THE AFTERMATH OF THE SPANISH DICTATORSHIP

By R. T. Desmond

THE KING

THE liquidation of the Dictatorship is proving a severe test for the stability of Spain's fundamental institution — the Monarchy. This indeed had been amply foreseen and foretold, and the monarch himself knew the risk. But on the unique pinnacle that is the position and also apparently the treasured possession of Kings of Spain, supported by traditions unknown in other countries, communing with the spirits of his long line of Hapsburg and Bourbon ancestors, Alfonso XIII has kept his own counsel and continues to be an autocrat for himself. No consideration for the safety of his dynasty seems to influence him; he is King of Spain, constitutional now only in name, but still proudly King of Spain. Of his predecessors, Philip II appears as his model rather than Amadeus of Savoy, who made such a brave but futile attempt to govern constitutionally and whose sacrifice was never understood by the Spaniards. Such independence of spirit is a true Spanish trait; perhaps it is the most endearing part of the hold which Alfonso of Bourbon-Hapsburg-Lorraine has upon his people.

In the criticism hurled at King Alfonso it is important to distinguish between that of a personal character and that which being of a juridical origin may come to serve as the basis for a royal indictment in the Cortes. To the first class belong the railings of Professor Miguel de Unamuno, whose prejudice against the royal house of Spain is terribly bitter. Unamuno's prestige in the intellectual world opens the ears of a wide public to his black calumny. But the chief import of his campaign lies in the influence which it has on the uneducated masses who form the potential revolutionary mob.

The commonest reproach laid at King Alfonso's door during the Dictatorship was that he was directly responsible for the advent of the Dictatorship and that he was the main support of General Primo de Rivera during his six years of office. Yet there was nothing more evident in the fall of the Dictatorship than the fact that King Alfonso put the Dictator out as resolutely as he is

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accused of having brought him in. One act should therefore balance the other. The situation is not so simple as that, however, and in attempting an estimate it is necessary to recapitulate some of the history of the last years of the Dictatorship, in particular 1927, 1928 and 1929.

THE END OF THE DICTATORSHIP

The Civilian Cabinet which replaced the Military Directorate in the last days of 1926 began to grapple successfully with many national problems. When the triumphant termination of the Moroccan campaign restored confidence in the destinies of Spain, the Finance Minister, Don José Calvo Sotelo, seized the psychological moment to consolidate the floating debt, no mean financial operation for any country but which represented a colossal effort for Spain, for it involved a sum of 5,225,000,000 pesetas ($1,045,000,000 at par). Freed from this burden, government finances began to look up and the peseta exchange recovered without artificial stimulation to 5.50 to the dollar. The outlook was thus brighter than for many years and it seemed that par value (5.18) was within easy reach. The decision to try to attain it, natural as it may have seemed at the time, was the first great mistake, the first step on what proved to be a continual downward path. It would have been easy to stabilize the peseta in the summer of 1927 at a figure within 10 percent of par. Now it has lost more than 50 percent of its value. Truly a golden opportunity lost. Moreover the requirements of stabilization would have obliged Señor Calvo Sotelo to avoid the pitfalls of extraordinary budgets and the course of history would have been altered. It is the old, old story of the nail from the horse's shoe that led to the loss of a battle, and to the loss of a kingdom too.

Discontent in the Artillery Corps concerning rules about promotion,[1] which had led to a dissolution of the Corps, spread to other arms. Learning this, Señor Sanchez Guerra, an ex-Conservative Prime Minister living in voluntary exile in Paris, embarked in January 1929 in a cargo boat at Port Vendres for Valencia. Bad weather delayed his arrival and the conspiracy aborted after a regiment of artillery at Ciudad Real had brought its cannon out into the streets and made a show of resistance for twenty-four hours. This affair led to a second dissolution of the

[1] The Dictator proposed to enforce advancement by selection for Artillery officers who had sworn to accept it only by seniority.

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Artillery Corps. The King signed the decree submitted by the Dictator but in common with many other Spaniards must have doubted the efficacy of such means of dealing with a necessary branch of the army. As chief of the army, the main prop of his throne, King Alfonso was alert to keep in touch with military opinion, and when he saw the Artillery discontent spreading, the doom of the Dictator was sealed. General Primo de Rivera, ill with diabetes but continuing to wear himself to the bone with strenuous office work, must have known that the army was deserting him and in that fact read his defeat also. But he was loath to give up without a struggle and when King Alfonso made bold one day to remind him of the defection of the army the taunt was more than the sick Dictator could bear. Alone in his office in the early hours of the morning, he lost his head and took the desperate and useless resolution to consult the Captains-General over the head of the King. This act of disloyalty — for as such it was construed — was promptly seized by the King as a reason for his dismissal. Thus did the Dictatorship come to an end in sorry manner, to be followed a few weeks later by the pathetic death of the ex-Dictator in a Paris hotel.

Other matters were working for the downfall of General Primo de Rivera. A policy of monopolies (the petrol monopoly followed the telephone monopoly) made fresh and powerful enemies for the Dictatorship among the foreign companies whose business was confiscated: the Shell group, the Standard Oil and others. In addition, large public works and railway concessions, such as the Alberche irrigation works and the Santander-Mediterranean strategic railway, gave rise to grave accusations of graft. Unfortunate university reforms antagonized students and professors and led to disturbances which the Dictator endeavored to put down by closing the universities all over Spain. This attempt to coerce the intellectuals was perhaps the most short-sighted act on the Dictator's part, for it gave rise to a movement of protest among the youth of the country. The Dictator's own nephew, president of the Students' Federation, led the resistance which on several occasions took a form disagreeable for the Crown — the destruction of the royal effigy along with that of the Dictator.

Decidedly it was time to dissolve a dictatorship which was losing its hold on the nation. So long as it was possible the King had indeed proved a loyal supporter of the Dictator, but the moment had come to face the difficulties and dangers of a change

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and to endure in silence the public reproaches and affronts which dissociation from the Dictatorship entailed. King Alfonso did not hesitate.

THE SERVICES OF THE DICTATORSHIP

General Primo de Rivera, whatever his faults and failings, rendered three signal services to Spain, the effects of which will be lasting. He wound up the Moroccan question; he inaugurated a comprehensive and intelligent plan of economic reconstitution; and he brought six years of labor peace. If his army, educational, constitutional and other reforms proved inadequate, the immense benefit brought to Spain by the above-mentioned services can never be overlooked by history and can hardly be overestimated; they carried Spain round a turning point in her history. Spain is again at the crossroads, but with a strength, international prestige and national reserve force, the result of six years of progress, which she did not possess when General Primo de Rivera appeared on the scene.

The financial burden lifted from the shoulders of the nation by the final defeat of Abd el Krim and the pacification of the Moroccan Protectorate enabled reforms to be undertaken at home. The impulse given to railway building, the splendid success of the new roads, the activity in trade and industry opened up by an era of public works, the extension of irrigated areas, all contributed to an increase in the nation's wealth shown in the expanding tax returns.

The endeavor to create a permanent system of arbitration between capital and labor by means of the organization of the workers and employers into unions and guilds with obligatory arbitration in the form of mixed committees of employers and workers, called *comités paritarios*, was a constructive and statesmanlike effort to provide a solution for labor disputes, badly needed to forestall the spread of communism. Trotsky's opinion, after residence in Spain, was that "the Spaniards are ripe in town and country." This situation is due to the preponderance of agriculture, the existence of latifundia and the peculiar structure of industry in the two great centers of Barcelona and Bilbao, where the *patronos* (mill, mine or foundry owner class) are still in many cases benevolent despots. The *comité paritario* idea has survived the Dictatorship but will need force behind it for some time to come.

The military alliance with France for common action against

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Abd el Krim had effects outside Morocco. The return of Spain to the League of Nations and the elevation of the Ibero-American ideal to the sphere of practical politics (*e.g.*, the sale of warships and the loan to Argentina), the cordial invitations for the Ibero-American Exhibition at Seville and the International Exhibition at Barcelona, the economic conference with Portugal, the trans-oceanic air flights and the visit of the Spanish fleet to South America, all contributed to release Spain from isolation and focus national outlook on broader lines. Finally, the twenty-seven treaties of conciliation and arbitration concluded under the Dictatorship will offer, it is to be hoped, lasting proof of its peaceful foreign policy.

Both military and naval reorganization occupied much of the Dictator's energies. In military matters he will perhaps be judged to have failed, for the task was mainly one of retrenchment. On the naval side it was different, for the navy had to be increased, not diminished. As a result the Spanish fleet holds a rank in Europe unknown since the days of the Armada.

Such were the achievements. Their merits cannot be diminished by the grievous mistakes and failings that stand forth during this remarkable period of Spain's history.

THE MISTAKES OF THE DICTATORSHIP

We have already pointed out the excellent opportunity for stabilization of the peseta that was lost, perhaps never to reappear. Let us turn now to the constitutional problem.

In 1923 the Dictatorship broke in on the humdrum life of the Cortes. By extinguishing the legislative chambers it cut short all possibility of giving legal form to a movement of opinion that was leading towards a revision of the constitution in a democratic sense, peacefully, by constitutional means. The Dictator, in the latter part of the Dictatorship when the so-called National Assembly was created, took up this idea of reforming the constitution. He appointed a committee and actually got as far as to publish a 45,000-word draft which it was proposed to ratify by plebiscite. This draft embodied retrograde ideas such as the creation of a Council of the Realm as a buffer between the executive and legislative powers and the king. Moreover it deprived the Cortes, that is to say the nation, of its sovereign power to modify the constitution.

Nothing need be said of this remarkable piece of draft legisla-

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tion, the product of twenty months' laborious travail by the committee, beyond pointing out that it was an endeavor to settle the constitutional problem on lines diametrically opposed to those along which national opinion was working in 1923. The Dictator's good faith and belief in his work was evident, for he had ordered translations to be prepared in English, French, German and Italian with a view to placing this valuable contribution to the constitutional history of modern times within reach of the world. The draft drew down the hostility of the former party leaders, disciples of Canovas del Castillo, who had framed the Constitution of 1876, which occupied a worthy place among the liberal constitutions of Europe and had brought forty years of peace and prosperity to Spain.

King Alfonso, who may well have approved of the new constitution in secret since it would have invested him with greater personal power (a process sympathetic to his known feelings and nature), saw the danger arising from the appearance of confabulation between himself and the Dictator which a reform of the constitution would have signified; he therefore showed his disapproval. This display of resolution on King Alfonso's part undoubtedly increased the rift between him and the Dictator.

One of the most remarkable failures of the Dictatorship was in the matter of military reform. It was thanks to military opinion that General Primo de Rivera made his successful and bloodless *coup d'état*. Yet if we review the six years between 1923 and 1929 it would appear that almost the first acts of the Military Directorate roused opposition in the army. General Berenguer's trial in 1924, the Cavalcanti conspiracy of the same year, the midsummer night conspiracy of 1926 with the complicity of Marshal Weyler and General Aguilera, the first artillery revolt in the same year, the Valencia fracas and second artillery revolt in January 1929, are a long series showing that the army was even more active than the nation in opposing the régime.

The fact that the Dictator had such constant difficulties with army circles throws a strange light on this so-called *military* dictatorship, and is evidence that General Primo de Rivera was not a tool of the army. Indeed, he was in the end its victim, for it was the news of the rebellion being prepared in Andalucía under General Goded, Military Governor of Cadiz, reported to King Alfonso by his brother-in-law, Prince Alfonso of Bourbon-

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Caserta, Captain-General of Andalucía, that furnished the King with proof that army opinion was seriously on the move.

There are two theories regarding the forces behind this conspiracy, which bore its fruit without any open breach of discipline such as occurred at Valencia just a year previously. These two explanations are given here for what they may be worth, subject to revision in the light of history. One is that Prince Alfonso, whose loyalty was unimpeachable, reported such grave disaffection and so rapid a growth of republican feeling in the army that the King was genuinely alarmed. The other is that the Goded conspiracy was a bit of bluff organized from within the Royal Palace to supply the King with a final argument to induce Primo de Rivera to resign. That the Dictator suspected something of the kind is shown by his attempt to appeal to the Military District Commanders, though he might have remembered what took place on his own advent to power, namely that the Captains-General took their cue from the King instead of from the government. These high officers remained silent, though several of them (personal friends of the Dictator) are credibly reported to have advised him not to "act the goat."

There was nothing left for the Dictator but to vacate his position with as little loss of dignity as possible. In a communiqué addressed to the nation he declared he had not been in full possession of his faculties when he appealed to army opinion over the head of his colleagues; he expressed his deep and lasting gratitude to the King and said he proposed to retire in order to submit his shattered nerves to treatment.

While there may have been a touch of humor in the latter statement there was nothing but dead earnestness in the solemn asseveration that "for many years to come some sort of dictatorship will be imperative in Spain, where progress is possible only under the rifles of the police."

This final judgment from the man who for so long was omnipotent cannot be taken lightly, for events tend to confirm it.

THE "RETURN TO NORMALITY"

King Alfonso was ready when the crisis came. He simply nodded to Don Damaso Berenguer, Chief of the Military Household at the Palace and Commander of the Royal Bodyguard, who in the relatively short space of twenty-eight hours produced a cabinet. Those who came to the rescue in this way included

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King Alfonso's personal friend and premier Duke, the Duke of Alba; the court lawyer, Don Leopoldo Matos, and two other lawyers; a marquis; and a general, one of the District Commanders consulted by Primo de Rivera. A university professor was added later. This "scrap team," hastily got together to meet an emergency, has been nine months in office at the time this article is written.

When the Cortes is functioning in Spain cabinets fall like ninepins; otherwise officeholders hold on tenaciously. General Primo de Rivera announced that his tenure of office was to be ninety days. General Berenguer declared that his cabinet was purely temporary and would establish as rapidly as possible constitutional and juridical normality.

The change-over was effected with unexpected smoothness. There was one anxious moment on the evening of the day the Dictator resigned. At the hour when the theaters were emptying a mob of youths shouting "down with the King" approached the Palace followed by many idlers and curious spectators. Had they reached their goal there might have been unpleasant consequences, but armed police (a last service of the Dictatorship) intercepted them and turned them back to the broad artery of the Calle Alcalá, where they harmlessly wrecked and burned a clerical newspaper stand.

During the first weeks of the new régime it rained decrees. General Goded found himself installed at Madrid in the important post of Director of Army Training, shortly to be promoted to Under-Secretary for the Army. One after another the institutions of the Dictatorship went by the board: the National Consultative Assembly was suppressed, an amnesty was proclaimed readmitting 433 officers into the army, while Professor Unamuno and the student leader, Antonio Maria Sbert, returned triumphantly from exile.

King Alfonso signed away as busily as Penelope undoing her work. But the censorship was maintained and there was no sign of immediate convocation of the Cortes. Ministers were instructed to inspect and revise the plans of their predecessors but no discussion of the Dictatorship was to be allowed until the Cortes met. This prudence was successful in preventing a sudden reaction, and the rioting that was generally feared did not occur.

King Alfonso and the Dictator had been so closely associated, however, that it was impossible to suppress an outburst of opinion

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against the King. A former Conservative Prime Minister, Don José Sanchez Guerra, led the attack. With doubtful taste he compared His Majesty to a putrefying corpse, declaring before a crowded auditorium in Madrid's largest theater that he could no longer serve such a disloyal monarch. Señor Sanchez Guerra, however, refused to "go republican." If Alfonso XIII would abdicate he was willing to serve his son. But Señor Sanchez Guerra's own son, along with the son of Antonio Maura (also a former Conservative Premier) and an ex-Minister of War, Señor Alcalá Zamora, went over to the republican ranks, the first important converts to the republican ideal in many years.

The leader of the Reformist Party, Don Melquiades Alvarez, at a meeting in the Comedia Theater, declared that King Alfonso in accepting the Dictatorship had committed the mad act of tearing up the Constitution of 1876 and must abide by the consequences; he accepted the verdict of the nation as pronounced in *Cortes Constituyentes*, said Señor Alvarez, as to whether his people wanted him as king any longer or preferred to redraft the constitution.

From time immemorial it has been the Spanish tradition that the nation is sovereign and that the king only derives his sovereignty as representative of his people. The latest expression of this theory is to be found in the Constitution of 1876, but it extends clear back to the Cortes of Jaca in 1187, when the oath of fealty taken by the members of the Cortes ran as follows: "We and you are equal but we accept you as king provided that you uphold the law and if not, no."

The Bourbon and Hapsburg sovereigns on many occasions successfully defied this tradition and constrained popular liberties, and the people nevertheless remained firmly attached to the monarchist principle. The despotism of Spanish kings led to revolutions during the nineteenth century, but the monarchist tradition survived and vanquished two republics, the people turning joyfully in 1874 to welcome back the son of Isabella II, whom they had expelled ignominiously in 1868. This youth, Alfonso XII, then a student at the British Military Cadet College at Sandhurst, gave the nation guarantees contained in the Manifesto of Sandhurst. "Whatever happens," he declared, "I will be a good Spaniard, a true Catholic as all my ancestors, and also, as a man of today, a liberal." He recalled that in the early days of history the Kings of Spain did nothing without consulting the

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Cortes. "I shall not overlook this most just rule, and the settlement of all outstanding questions will be easy between a royal prince and a free people." Alfonso XII proved a true constitutional sovereign and his premature death was a great grief to the nation. His widow, Queen Maria Christina, brought up her son in strict constitutional practice, earning thereby the undying gratitude of the nation, as was touchingly expressed last year when she died. Under her sure guidance as Regent the Monarchy survived the loss of the colonies, and republicanism dwindled to such an extent that the younger republicans surrendered to the Monarchy and became the Reformist Party.

Spain's constitutional history will enter into a new chapter very shortly, for Alfonso XIII's activities, well meaning but constitutionally questionable, have landed him in the predicament either of having to face revolutionary republicanism as his great grandfather and grandmother did with open force, or else of compounding with his subjects on the Sandhurst principle.

Credited with more than the guile of Ferdinand VII, and with all the sympathy of character that made Isabella II loved while she was hated, Alfonso XIII is unlikely to take the third solution indicated by Señor Sanchez Guerra and other piqued politicians — abdication. But he has had to swallow many bitter pills. Army officers, when he offered them a cigarette, found they did not smoke; the artillery expelled as unfit his deaf and dumb son, Prince Jaime, dedicated at birth to that arm of the service as second Infante of Spain; he must have listened in at Señor Sanchez Guerra's speech, knowing the hall to be full of the highest society in Spain; his bronze bust was decapitated and dragged about the tumble-down university precincts by infuriated students. Such incidents must have been galling to a man of great pride. Yet King Alfonso keeps his countenance and his counsel.

His dearest scheme is to provide Spain with a great University City where the ancient faculties, now crumbling in the insanitary quarters of old Madrid, will be rebuilt out in park lands on the hillside facing the Sierra Gaudarrama. To further this scheme he sends his dentist (provided with a title) to collect funds in far-off America, and his practical mind suggested the extra, monster, yearly lottery as another excellent means to procure money. A student in a recent public speech declared that Spain's youth would feel ashamed to cross the threshold of an institution provided by begging charity abroad and preying on human weakness

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at home in default of legitimate state aid. But King Alfonso carries on, knowing that when the new university is built and endowed Spain will have been served. At a recent inauguration of international hydroelectric works on the Duero, a scheme of immense import for Portugal and Spain financed by a republican millionaire, the King met his political adversary with the remark that republican and monarchist ideals should be secondary to service to Spain.

THE REPUBLICAN MENACE

The Republicans, however, do not credit Alfonso with any but the worst intentions of enslaving the nation, and it is undeniable that apparently large numbers of the Liberal classes, estranged by the restrictions of the Dictatorial régime, profess to have lost faith in the Monarchy.

The case against King Alfonso is made out as follows:

Violating his oath to the constitution, he conferred supreme office on a rebellious general (Primo de Rivera) in mid-September 1923, fifteen days before the Cortes was due to meet. Reason? Because the activities of the committee of twenty-one deputies investigating responsibilities for the military disasters in Morocco had to be stopped. This committee, it is stated, had obtained evidence of correspondence between the King and General Silvestre (the defeated General) over the head of the Commander-in-Chief in Morocco, General Berenguer, which engaged the King in responsibilities for the disaster at Anual which cost 10,000 lives.

What did General Primo de Rivera do once he had come to power? He closed the Cortes and seized the papers of the committee. Further, General Berenguer, condemned by the Supreme Court of Military Justice for his share in the Moroccan disaster, was pardoned and given high office in the Royal Palace, whence in turn he emerged to cover the retreat of General Primo de Rivera. Who pulls all the strings? The King. What a humiliating situation for Spain in the eyes of the whole world. Down with the King! Such is the Republican indictment and verdict.

The Republicans ask further: Is it to be the fate of Spain to be handed back to the dynastic parties which were running her affairs in 1923? This question contains the crux of the situation. If general elections really take place the Cortes will want to begin work where they left off before the Dictatorship. Most of the

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members of the famous committee of twenty-one are alive and stand a good chance of reëlection. They will doubtless remember some of the evidence with regard to the *Responsibilidades* affair that rocked Spain for so many months. That this possibility would drive the King into the arms of another Dictator before the elections was a current belief some months ago. But the date for the elections approaches (they will be held early in 1931) and there is no evidence that General Berenguer is likely either to be replaced by a Dictator or to become one. On the contrary he is advancing, very cautiously but steadily, towards the goal of a Cortes, calling upon the Monarchists to rally round the throne and defying the Republicans to do their worst at the elections, promising to guarantee the rights of all voters.

The censorship has now been abolished and the right of meeting reëstablished. Political propaganda has therefore a free path for pre-electoral activities. And here appears the unexpected — or rather, is it not what those who know Spain may have been expecting? — namely, that no party seems in a hurry to avail itself of the restored liberties for which it had been clamoring for so long. Before the Dictatorship public opinion was weak and disorganized. Now that the Dictatorship is over, and despite the noise made by its adversaries, public opinion appears in even sorrier posture than before, for General Primo de Rivera failed utterly to inculcate a spirit of citizenship.

The Republicans, who boast of their numerical strength, are wavering whether or not to go to the elections, and this despite the fact that their allies, the Socialists (90 percent of Spanish socialists are republicans), have decided to do so. The Monarchist parties, both Conservative and Liberal, appear as divided as formerly. Their leaders, the same threadbare *politicos* as of old, pop out of the warrens into which the Dictator drove them and reassume the leadership of rival groups whose entire energies had been consumed in pre-Dictatorial days in intrigue for office and who appear to have learned nothing from the passing of the Dictatorship.

It is possible that the Republicans may make a bid for office by revolution before the elections take place. Their refusal to appeal to the electorate (they might well secure between 40 or 50 seats in a House of 400) may reasonably be interpreted in the sense that they intend at least to have a try at violence. This supposition finds support in the persistent rumors circulating in

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Madrid as these lines are being penned. To be successful a revolutionary movement would have to be able to count on a considerable portion of the army. Major Franco, the aviator, hero of the flight to South America, expressed republican leanings in a press interview and was recently arrested. Do many of Franco's comrades agree with him? This is a question that can be answered only by events. Nor do those responsible for law and order have only army discipline to think about. The reappearance of the *Sindicato Unico* in Barcelona and the evidence of communist propaganda in many other towns during the recent epidemic of strikes are reminders that socialist doctrines have only a precarious hold on the proletariat in Spain. But it sufficed recently for General Berenguer to make a few (perhaps about one hundred) arrests to stop the strike movement at once, quite possibly depriving thereby the Republicans of the lever they were hoping to use as a means to get their revolution going.

The peseta, one of the few unstabilized currencies in the world today, has recently been the victim of the uncertain outlook. It is typical of the confused situation in Spain that with all the means at hand to stabilize the peseta no attempt was made to do so in good time. It has sufficed now for a committee led by the Governor of the Bank of Spain to visit London and Paris and exhibit documentary proof of Spain's financial resources to secure a rapid improvement in the exchange.

This easy success is an example allowing of optimism with regard to the future, for it demonstrates as clearly as General Berenguer's recent handling of the strike situation that with a little decision the artificial difficulties of many situations can be dissipated, revealing solid ground beneath. At bottom, indeed, Spain is a nation full of vitality, prosperous in spite of all, and with the Sancho Panza element of common sense dominant. Under the circumstances, revolution by violence would be merely an attack of madness — as mad as any enterprise of Don Quixote, but lacking the chivalry. It could occur only in a nation piqued and exasperated by six years of dictatorship to forgetfulness of all reason.

King Alfonso is working to raise the University City as a monument to his reign. He need not trouble. Come what may, the best monument a king could have is the immense material progress realized by Spain since the beginning of the century, a movement in which King Alfonso has been both leader and laborer.

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COMMUNISM IN CHINA

By P

CHINESE Communism did not originate as a direct result of activities carried on in China by the Third International. It owed its first beginnings to Chinese students returned from Soviet Russia. Occupied with the consolidation of the Revolution and throwing the weight of its international effort toward Central Asia, Moscow did not realize the potentialities of China until 1919. Moscow then saw that China offered an almost priceless first step in the world revolution. Fomentation of Chinese turmoil would result in the destruction of the special position enjoyed by "capitalistic" states in China. From that time on Moscow was active. It worked at the beginning through the bourgeois intellectuals, who were to direct the revolution in its first stages, then through the proletariat, which was young, weak and lacking in class consciousness, and finally — and most importantly — through the peasants, who were to achieve an agrarian revolution within the social revolution.

In 1919 and 1920 Soviet Russia proclaimed its desire to establish friendly intercourse with China and its intention to scrap the so-called imperialistic features of the treaties signed during the Tsarist régime. As a result the Peking Government withdrew recognition of the White Russian Legation on September 28, 1920, although it was not until May 3, 1924, that a treaty was ratified with Soviet Russia. From 1920 on, then, the Third International possessed a strong focus for its activities in China. From this outpost, to which Joffe and Karakhan were successively assigned, there flowed a steady stream of direction and propaganda for seven years. Activity was concentrated among the students in Peking and among the laborers in the industrial centers, notably Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin, Canton and Hongkong. It was non-spectacular, dangerous spade work; its value cannot be measured quantitatively, but its effects are still to be seen.

All this time there had been flickering in Canton under the inspiration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the control of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, the fitful flame of the Nationalist Government, in armed civil war with the Peking régime. Dr. Sun realized that military strength was a prerequisite for the survival

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of his government. He unsuccessfully approached several Powers for assistance, notably Great Britain, the United States and Germany. Finally he turned to Soviet Russia. He already had had contact with the Communists through Joffe; and in 1923 Karakhan, quick to perceive the opportunity, sent him Michael Borodin.

Borodin is the strongest personality that has impinged on the Far East in the twentieth century. Virile, alert, of pleasing appearance, fervid in his cause, insatiable in toil, with a genius for organization and with an iron will, he is a figure out of fiction. Had he succeeded in his work in China — and he nearly did succeed — he would have stood beside the Trotsky of 1917–19 in the Red pantheon. Even as it is, his return in person is rumored at every fresh surge of communist activity.

Borodin worked with and through Dr. Sun. Both of them saw the value of nationalism as a rallying cry and both of them realized the necessity of a political and military reorganization within the Kuomintang Party and its armed forces. Both realized that they were adopting a common cause — nationalism — for an identical end — the dominance of China; but their views as to who were to be the eventual dominators were different.

In the reorganization the Kuomintang was provided with a working organization modeled on the Russian system of party government. The army was reorganized, and the propaganda system was provided with a "bite" such as had never before been seen in China. Arms, munitions and technical advisers were made available in quantity. Borodin, with funds at his disposal in substantial if not extravagant amounts, made every effort to place his own men in the key positions. Many of these were communists, although later events were to show that most of them were lacking in stern revolutionary fibre. Many others — of whom Chiang Kai-shek, at present head of the government, is the archetype — were not members of the Communist Party; but they were radical in outlook, and were committed to Borodin's program by self-interest and sometimes by an honest belief that the goal of a united China lay in the general direction that his road was leading, if not actually on it.

Sun Yat-sen failed physically and Borodin's efforts increased. Early in 1925, Dr. Sun went to Peking in search of a political solution to China's internal difficulties. There he died. Immediately dissension flared up in the Kuomintang between its so-called

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communist and non-communist elements, which were actually the Borodin and anti-Borodin factions. Borodin won and began to direct the party to the left with careful, steady pressure. The Communist Party, as such, which had been a secret organization since its formation, was tolerated if not recognized. Reorganization and training of the army continued. The Shanghai incident of May 30 and the Shakee incident at Canton gave a great impulse to nationalism, as interpreted in anti-foreignism and anti-imperialism throughout China. In the north, Feng Yu-hsiang received Russian subsidies, and it was hoped that he would give some military aid. By 1926 one aim of the Third International — a strong bourgeois support of the revolution — was realized. The northern expedition was ready to march from Canton.

From a military point of view that expedition was completely successful. China south of the Yangtze was overrun and by the spring of 1927 was unified under Kuomintang control. But for the communists this success contained within it the germs of failure. The victorious northward march resulted in the dilution of the Kuomintang hierarchy with many feudal leaders who came over and made submission without digesting either the ideology of Sun Yat-sen or its interpretation by Borodin. Again, the professed communists in the Kuomintang were hampered in many cases by inexperience, timidity and venality. They were bold when they should have been inconspicuous. They fled when they should have struck. They yielded to seductions that the tried revolutionary would have scorned. In a word, in battle and in administration they gave communism a bad name. And as their power increased and as the pressure toward the left continued, communism came to be more and more mistrusted and feared. Finally the feudalists of the North, notably Chang Tso-lin and Sun Ch'uan-fang, were quick to take advantage of the opportunity presented. Unable to oppose the slogans of nationalism, they adopted the slogan of anti-communism. Chinese public opinion, that most intangible and unaccountable of all public opinions, veered against communism. The men who led the Kuomintang armies, restive under Borodin's yoke, saw a measure of salvation in the opportunity to link nationalism and anti-communism, and after months of uncertainty and turmoil, Chiang Kai-shek emerged as *de facto* head of the Kuomintang, the communists were read out of the Nationalist Party and on July 13, 1927, Borodin started back to Russia along the ancient imperial route of exile to the west. The

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first ground-swell in the tide of the social revolution in China had broken.

One day in Hankow, as the walls of his mighty edifice were obviously crumbling, Borodin was asked by a bourgeois observer what his next step would be. "The Revolution," he replied, "must go underground." In other words, the swing to the left having failed, the remedy was to move even further to the left. It must be conceded, however, that the element of compulsion in this reorientation was as evident as that of choice. Communism became anathema in Chinese political circles. Its advocates were relegated to the positions of national and international whipping boys for the explanation of untoward incidents. In intra-party feuds the first step taken by the various rivals was to compete for the opportunity of branding opponents as Reds. Following his raid on the Russian Embassy in Peking in 1927, Chang Tso-lin accused almost a score of the prisoners taken there of communism and had them executed. His example spread all over China, and the execution squads still give short shrift to those who espouse the cause of the social revolution.

In consequence, communism has become a very dangerous profession. This is noticeably so in the student world. Red propaganda has here become increasingly selective, owing to the trend toward elimination of bourgeois elements from the Communist Party and also to the fact that the direction of student thought is now emphatically national rather than communist. So while activity in this sphere has not been discontinued, its intensity is notably abated, and few (though probably more reliable) converts are obtained.

Work among the industrial and laboring proletariat is conditioned by numerous factors. While industry in China is still relatively unimportant, its growth continues at an exceedingly rapid rate. Furthermore, it is largely concentrated in a few centers, notably Shanghai, Hankow, Canton and Tientsin. Under the rule of the Kuomintang, which is fundamentally concerned with the improvement of labor conditions, unionization is encouraged, and the novelty of this idea permits of an easy extremism in the unions and a growth of class consciousness. On the other hand, strong repressive measures are invariably adopted by the authorities. All in all, it may be said that the communists are making steady progress among the proletariat. The Red uprising at Canton in December 1927, with its hideous toll of death and destruc-

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tion, cannot be regarded as representative, for the proletariat there had been subject to organized and licensed propaganda for four years. But it is at least symptomatic, and local officials in the industrial centers do not sleep well when they think of it.

By far the most spectacular phase of this second wave in the Red tide, and the one which forms its dominant characteristic today, is the development of the agrarian revolution along the lines of the primary communist directive. The hammer and sickle have replaced the nine-pointed star of the Kuomintang throughout Hunan and Kiangsi, and in considerable areas of two adjoining provinces, Kwangtung and Fukien. Owing to the withdrawal of reliable government troops from these regions, owing to the oppressions of tax-gatherers who have bled the masses white, and owing most of all to a masterly adaptation of bolshevik methods to Chinese conditions, the groundwork of an out-and-out Soviet state is being laid in the very heart of China. Within its fluctuating but still expanding boundaries are approximately 180,000 square miles of territory and 50,000,000 people. The Red armies have captured such key cities as Changsha and Shasi. Installed on the banks of the Yangtze, they harass traffic on China's primary artery of communication.

In the 1927 breakdown of Borodin's effort to dominate the Kuomintang, two generals on the Kiangsi-Fukien border definitely espoused communism. They were said to control some 60,000 men but they soon dropped out of the news. However, in the winter of 1929–30 word began to drift out from Central China that various Red armies were pushing out from that same region and filling the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of government troops to fight in the north. Furthermore, the area under their control was growing and they seemed to be taking permanent root in the lands they occupied.

The methods adopted in this politico-military conquest are an effective blending of Chinese and Russian experience. An area is selected as ripe for overrunning. A Red army appears before the walls of its chief community and by a suitable mixture of force, persuasion, treachery and bribery gets into the town. So far the process is typical of normal Chinese warfare. But once in possession, the Red army inaugurates a reign of class terror. Civil officials and families of wealth are slain wholesale. Their possessions are pillaged. Land records are burned. The poorer elements of the populace are incited to take part in the violence. Most important

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of all, a general propaganda is instituted in favor of a Soviet government in its lowest terms of "take from the rich and give to the poor." Before long government forces usually reappear in enough strength to recapture the town. The Reds decamp, but as soon as the garrison is reduced they return and the process is repeated. Special vengeance is then taken on those who have curried favor with the government agencies, and the category of the "rich" is expanded to include the upper bourgeoisie who escaped during the previous jacquerie. In a few weeks or months the region is prostrate and helpless. Fear of vengeance makes appeal to the national agencies unthinkable. Local Soviet government is then erected. This is usually a very simple affair, as local Chinese administrative agencies are traditionally primitive, and land tenure can be roughly equalized out of the holdings of the dispossessed bourgeoisie.

The forces at work in this convulsion are complex. They involve not only the driving force of the communists but also both banditry and the long-recognized right of the Chinese peasant not to revolution, but to rebellion. The Red armies are the conventional stuff of Chinese soldiery, no more communist in the rank and file than were the Russian Red armies that defeated Kolchak and Wrangel. They are, of course, subjected to the usual flood of propaganda. Some twenty of these armies have been identified and the aggregate of their fluctuating strength is estimated at 75,000 men.

Singularly little is known as to the personalities of the limited number of leaders who direct the armies and the movement as a whole. This is partially because they operate in a remote part of China and consequently are difficult of access by bourgeois, be they Chinese or foreign. According to the reports of ex-prisoners, they are all young, alert, cruel in a rational and detached manner, thoroughly indoctrinated with the concepts of the social revolution and of the special directive for China. They feel they are an integral part of the world revolution. Most of them have never been out of their own country. They are totally lacking in the military-political background which mantles most Chinese leaders. They are a new generation, forceful, sincere, going about a task which they profess to understand. No Russians have been reported among them, though the manner in which their organization dovetails into the machine of the Third International necessarily implies a most intimate contact between the two.

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With the second surge of communist effort in China still mounting, it is difficult to evaluate its force at any given period or to predict its mass effect. However, four general observations may be considered valid at this time.

The most important and the most undesirable fact is that the Third International and the Chinese Communist Party are attaining success in developing in China men dedicated to their cause. The politician who shook hands with communism to gain personal or party ends has vanished, and in his place stands the experienced, sincere revolutionary. This is an omen for the future.

The work of creating a class-conscious proletariat proceeds steadily. The relative growth is rapid, the absolute growth small. The potentialities of this newly class-conscious proletariat as the basis of future communist activities in China should never be forgotten.

The external effects of the movement are on the whole impalpable. The very existence of the class struggle in China has an important moral effect on similar conflicts abroad, particularly in the Far East. The Third International sees to it that its victories are properly emphasized and its defeats minimized. But the concrete effect on China as "an economic colony" is probably small. China has been practically eliminated as a field for foreign investments since the World War. Her foreign trade has fallen off since 1927, but this is ascribable to generally unsettled conditions. The communist's share in bringing about the present economic state of affairs may be regarded as insignificant.

The least predictable situation is the most immediate one, the agrarian movement in Central China. The movement is favored by intelligent and desperate men, by the discontent of the peasants, by the surprising talent of the Chinese masses for being ruled, and by the internecine quarrels between its enemies. On the other hand, the stabilization of the régime would seem to demand the transformation of a jacquerie into a governmental process, and this requires time and immunity from external interference.

The fact must be recognized that communism has taken root in China. It is no longer an agitation conducted largely from outside. It is no longer a purely political phenomenon. It is a social force. Because of the clarity of its objectives and the capacity of its leaders, its extirpation — and nothing less will serve to subdue it — can be achieved only with the greatest difficulty.

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THE COMING OF THE WAR

THE COMING OF THE WAR: 1914. By BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT. New York: Scribners, 1930. 2 vols., pp. 539, 515.

By Harold Temperley

THE publication of Schmitt's important volumes makes it a convenient moment to survey the field between June 28, 1914, and the outbreak of Armageddon. Documents and memoirs now abound. Poincaré has written much and (unlike some chief critics) has carefully read most of the literature and has modified some of his views under criticism. Sazonov wrote an account without documents being to hand. We still await Berchtold's apologia, but the Tisza and Conrad papers have appeared. Grey has given us his full views, as has Asquith; so have several German personages. We are now beginning to sift out the truth from the endless smaller studies. One general survey in German is Ludwig's "Juli 1914." This is better than most historians will admit, for its emotional thesis that all peoples were innocent and all governments guilty has a certain merit. But a close inquiry into Ludwig will show that he puts the most guilt on the government of Austria-Hungary, a good deal on that of Russia, and is rather kind to Germany. Similarly Renouvin, who exhibits a scientific detachment amazing in a Frenchman, on the whole endorses, though very moderately, the French standpoint. Seton-Watson has surveyed one aspect brilliantly in "Sarajevo," but no British writer has given us a complete study.

Fortunately there are a number of American writings which have at least the opportunity of showing impartiality. Fay's "The Origins of the World War"[1] and Schmitt's "The Coming of the War" lift us to an atmosphere of relative serenity. But even these two distinguished writers have their personal views. Schmitt on the whole is kind to the Entente, Fay on the whole is kind to the Central Powers. Impartiality is nearer, but it is by no means attained.

The historian of war origins has to be at once a practical soldier and a practical diplomat before he can understand some things. Recently a German historian quoted evidence to show that before 1914 Belgian and English military experts met and discussed all

[1] "The Origins of the World War." By Sidney B. Fay. New York, Macmillan, 1928. Reviewed by Pierre Renouvin in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. VII, No. 3.

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sorts of details about the French areas of concentration near the Belgian frontier. He argued that this knowledge could have come only from the French themselves and founded on this a "proof" of a concerted Franco-Belgian-British military staff agreement before the war. Without giving any opinion on this specific point, I might suggest that the method of proof shows very little knowledge of military intelligence methods. If intelligence agents supplied Belgian and British staffs with full details of German concentration, etc., would this be proof of a concerted German-Belgian-British staff agreement? If not, can the obtaining of similar full details about French concentration be proof of a Franco-Belgian-British staff agreement? Obviously the answer is no in both cases.

Diplomatic methods, like military ones, must be understood before they can be criticized. Schmitt complains of the "jargon" in which diplomatic dispatches are written, and procedure as well as jargon may mislead us. There is a diplomatic method and manner of doing things, of which the public and even learned historians are often ignorant. Certain things are fair, certain things are unfair, in the diplomatic code. We know, for example, that British statesmen thought Aehrenthal deceived them in 1908 over the Bosnian annexation. In other words, they thought that he had broken the rules of the game. Goschen, however, the man most concerned, did not say that Aehrenthal lied, though the contrary has been asserted. But Schmitt at one time said that von Jagow lied in declaring he knew nothing of the Austrian ultimatum, and he speaks now of his "unreliability as a witness" (I, p. 383) and of the bad effects it had on French, Italian and British diplomats, and particularly just before the end, when it was all-important for Germany's sincerity to be accepted. Fay also says von Jagow was "virtually lying." I am not sure that I would go further than to say that von Jagow's avowal of ignorance was considered to be technical and not real. This attitude was harmful to Germany but it does not strike me that it was resented as Aehrenthal's was in 1908, though it may have produced serious consequences.

But accusations of lying are dangerous unless the matter is very carefully weighed. For instance, H. E. Barnes says "the most crucial and indefensible lie of the whole crisis was that of Sir Wm. Tyrell [*sic*] to Lichnowsky at 4 p.m. on July 31 when he told Germany that England possessed no information of any kind about

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the Russian mobilization."[2] What Tyrrell really denied was that England had information about a mobilization of the *whole* Russian army and navy. This statement was quite true. It was not till 5:20 p.m. on July 31, or over half an hour after Lichnowsky had sent his telegram to Berlin, that England received official intelligence of the general mobilization of the Russian army. Tyrrell could not have been attempting to conceal that he had heard of a partial mobilization. Not only did everybody know it but Grey had sent off a dispatch[3] to Goschen on July 29 in which he mentioned having talked with Lichnowsky on the Russian mobilization (of four military districts) on that day. Now Tyrrell was Grey's private secretary, and his business was to know every dispatch he wrote (and indeed he probably wrote this one himself). Was he likely to deny to Lichnowsky what his chief had admitted to Lichnowsky, *viz.*, that England had heard of a partial Russian mobilization? What he said was that England had heard of no general mobilization, which was true. In fact, the use of the phrase "*whole* army" was a diplomatic hint that he had already heard of a mobilization of a *part* of it. Had he wished to deceive Lichnowsky he would have omitted the word "whole." The only person he deceived was Barnes.

Fay says (II, pp. 263–4) that "Sir Edward Grey, who is often extolled as an example of honesty and sincerity, lied just as deliberately in regard to his foreknowledge of the probable terms of the ultimatum." He points out that on July 20 Grey asked Lichnowsky for news about its probable contents, and remarked that he had not heard anything recently "except that Count Berchtold had spoken reassuringly to the Italian Ambassador." Fay then proceeds to moralize. "This kind of diplomatic lying, unfortunately, was not the monopoly of any one country, but was indulged in all too freely by Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors almost everywhere in July 1914." Fay's complaint here is that Grey had received on July 16 from Bunsen at Vienna the fore-

[2] *Responsibility for the War: Quarterly Review*, Budapest, July–October 1928, p. 17. This is not even a correct quotation. Lichnowsky telegraphed: "Sir William Tyrrell informs me that the Government here has no news of any kind about the mobilization of the *whole* Russian army and navy." *Whole*, which I have italicized, is omitted, and the omission makes all the difference to the meaning. *Cf.* Gooch & Temperley, "British Documents on the Origins of the War," Vol. XI, p. 218. Note to No. 347. Some discussion has arisen as to the delay over the arrival of the telegram announcing general mobilization, but it has been impossible to find that London knew anything about it before 5:20 p.m. on the 31st except via Lichnowsky.

[3] "British Documents on the Origins of the War." Edited by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, Vol. XI, p. 181. No. 285.

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cast of an anonymous friend of what the ultimatum was likely to contain, and yet on July 20 he told Lichnowsky he "had not heard anything recently," etc. Now Bunsen's pessimistic report was qualified in a later dispatch. Also, the British chargé d'affaires at Belgrade sent a telegram in the optimistic sense to Grey on July 18 which was based on the views of the Austro-Hungarian Minister there.[4] Thus Grey had two opposite reports. Which was he to believe? The optimistic Belgrade report in fact seemed better evidence, for it was based on an Austro-Hungarian diplomat's word, the other on that of an ex-diplomat. Both were mere rumors or reports. Now, in any case, Grey would not have denied that he had heard rumors or reports: the Austrian press was full of them. What he meant was that he had received no authoritative information from Berchtold or from his Ambassador in London. He actually indicates this fact by saying "except that Count Berchtold" etc. I quote in the footnote below an example to show that Grey's use of the term "no information" meant "no authoritative information" and I show that this practice conformed to British (and incidentally to German) usage.[5] So even if Lichnowsky was deceived (and, as I read his report of the interview, he was not) he ought not to have been.

Fay's conclusion seems to require that diplomats, if liars, should be good liars. For no one would lie in the way he suggests if the lie could not deceive. Now what lie could be clumsier than for Tyrrell to deny that he had heard of partial Russian mobilization when he knew that Grey had already talked to Lichnowsky about it? How could Grey, who knew that most of the Austrian newspapers were suggesting a stiff ultimatum, pretend that he had received no reports from Vienna about it? Such clumsy fictions are inconceivable. No one who lied in this way could deceive anybody. But the fact that lying of this type can be attributed to men of intelligence suggests very serious considerations. If assumptions like this can be made in matters on which rebutting evidence is available, one cannot help fearing that they are even more likely to be made where no such rebutting evidence is to hand. It is

[4] Gooch and Temperley, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–40. No. 50; p. 41. No. 53; pp. 44–5. No. 56; p. 45. No. 57.

[5] *Cf.* Gooch and Temperley, *op. cit.*, p. 36. No. 44. Sir H. Rumbold writes "I asked von Jagow at his weekly reception what news he had from Servia. He replied that he had none, but added that if the Servian press continued to use the language it did, matters would become serious." Thus von Jagow admits that he has heard about the Servian press but denies that he has any (*i.e.*, any authoritative) information. Rumbold reports this without any comment, thus showing that he knows this will be understood at home.

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apparent, I think, that a natural prejudice against statesmen connected with the origins of the war leads to bias in judging even acts or utterances which are intelligible or defensible. This atmosphere of "war guilt" is like a dark cloud obscuring the light and deadening the senses of those who move beneath it.

There is no part of the whole story where lies are so abundant, and misrepresentation so easy, as the sordid and terrible tale of the conspiracy which ended in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo. It requires indeed a very special knowledge of Balkan statesmen, Balkan *komitadjis*, Balkan students and *agents provocateurs* to gain any insight into the possibilities. For this reason Seton-Watson's "Sarajevo" is admirable. He at any rate understands what is morally possible in Southeast Europe. And his opinions are invaluable as to moral atmosphere, even when one does not accept his conclusions. He suggests, for instance, that Lyuba Jovanovitch has boasted of having a larger share than he really had in the events ending in the murder of Franz Ferdinand in 1914, just as he did of having an undue share in the events culminating in the murder of Alexander and Draga in 1903. Again he tells us that for two years Pashitch subordinated international ethics and the good name of Serbia to the basest considerations of internal party politics. Even if he is not right in either instance (and I cannot feel certain that he is) I feel that he is right in his psychology. He has told us something of which some Balkan statesmen (even if not these particular statesmen) are certainly capable, and it is something of which very few statesmen of the West are capable. Here is a kind of touchstone for the moral psychology of the Balkans.

In this mint lies are coined for propagandist purposes in a manner most difficult for the historian to detect. Thus Fay tells us that Colonel Milan Pribichevitch "fought as a colonel in the Serbian Army at the beginning of the World War, but was murdered by his own soldiers in the woods on Jastrebac Mountain, because they regarded him as the cause of their misfortunes" (II, pp. 80–1, n.). For this statement he quotes three authorities, none of whom can have had any evidence worth the name. For Milan (as I shall hereafter call him) managed to resurrect himself. He came to England after the retreat in 1915, then went to America, where he raised some thousands of Jugoslav volunteers and had his bust made and exhibited by a well-known American sculptress. After the armistice he was Colonel Commandant at

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Zagreb, where I saw him repeatedly, and I have a photograph in which I appear beside him at a parade. Then he was for a time an ardent though unsuccessful politician, and finally settled down on a farm at Kossovo given him by the government; where (as I have recently been told) he still is. The legend of his death was either coined by a Serb prisoner to curry favor with his captors or was more probably a deliberate lie invented to discredit Milan and Jugoslav propaganda.[6] Here the materials for refutation happen to exist, but in how many cases are they lacking?

A stenographic report of the trial of the conspirators at Sarajevo has only recently been available, and not in time for any of our three ablest investigators to use it before publishing their works. Even this report is not enough. The difficulty of understanding the ways of students and *komitadjis* has been mentioned. But those of the spy, informer and *agent provocateur* in the Balkans are at once stranger and darker. Thus Tchabrinovitch, one of the conspirators, admitted that his comrades suspected that he was an Austrian spy, and certain evidence suggests that he at one time was. The probabilities on the whole are against it, for he took a bold stand as a Jugoslav at the trial. But, if true, it would go a long way to justify the old theory that the Archduke was murdered with Austrian complicity. A similar depth of horror and uncertainty is touched in the case of Tsiganovitch. At first an avowed creature of "Apis" (Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevitch), he changed sides and became an agent of Pashitch and gave evidence in 1917 which resulted in the execution of "Apis." But when did he become an informer, or was he so all the time? Here is enough to confuse us completely. Again, the prisoners at the trial made a a number of depositions out of court of which the full text has never been published. These statements, extracted from the prisoners by processes of intimidation, were then used to confute them in court. Printsip complained that he had been severely beaten in prison and was in solitary confinement without books for six weeks before one examination. Michitch said that he had been scared, Grabezh that he had been tortured in various ways, Milovitch that he had been starved for four days and beaten till he was covered with blood, and all this before, or during, their depositions. When they complained of these outrages in court the

[6] An equally groundless statement was made by one of the officials at the trial. One of the accused feared to give evidence against Major Tankositch. He was at once assured Tankositch was dead, a statement which was wholly untrue.

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judge passed hastily on to the next question in each case. It can be seen that in court the bench sometimes pressed the prisoners most unfairly. "Silence means consent." "Not to deny is to avow." "Why do you contradict all your previous assertions?" Prisoners were interrupted in statements they desired to make, and forbidden to criticize the act of accusation. On one occasion the judge even suggested that there had been no "attempts" in Austria-Hungary before that of Printsip. "Stop," answered Tchabrinovitch, "there was Sichinski in (Galician) Poland: at Sarajevo, Zherajitch, then Jukitch, Daychitch, Njegush; I know five or six attempts here." The judge was, of course, trying to suggest that the Printsip attempt came from outside and was confounded when five or six such plots hatched from within Austria-Hungary were quoted. But the judge did not usually get the worst of it. To understand evidence we must find out what the judge or the public prosecutor is trying to ascertain, what he is "fishing" for, as the phrase goes. For when a man is "fishing" he has not much real evidence. The prosecutor was obviously "fishing" to prove by the line of his questions that the Serbian Government was guilty of complicity and that the Narodna Odbrana ("National Defense") was a criminal Serbian organization. He was not exactly "fishing" to prove that the bombs were obtained from Belgrade. On this last point he did get admissions of value, just because he knew something already.

Bearing in mind these difficulties in the way of inquiry into the Sarajevo plot, let us try and summarize any ascertainable facts or probabilities. Let us begin with the latter because the historic background is most important. Seton-Watson is the only writer who gives us the origins of the anti-Hapsburg agitation and describes how discontent arose out of the Balkan War among Serb students in Bosnia, and how it soon became a seething mass of discontent producing several attempts at assassination and ending at Sarajevo. Now to take the history of the agitation three years back is a very good thing, for all the other historians take it only a few months back. But to take it forty years back is a still better thing. It is indeed hardly fanciful to say that Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina who made the revolution of 1875 against the Turks.[7] For that insur-

[7] In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the revolt originated in Nevesinje and is always spoken of as the Nevesinje insurrection. It is significant that the official guidebook, issued by the Austro-Hungarians, carefully omitted all reference to this interesting and picturesque town,

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rection was regarded as the most glorious event of Bosnian history, and the model for all Bosnian youths. It was sacred — holy — an event about which legends were told and songs sung. It was made by the Serbs of Bosnia and of Herzegovina from within, it owed little or nothing to Serbia or to Belgrade. After the Turks went the Hapsburgs came, and ultimately the same heroes, who had revolted against the Turk, rose in rebellion against the Austrians. The revolt was crushed, and completely. But anyone who knows Bosnia knows that the revolutionary spirit and tradition remained. Even the educated class — the students — were imbued with it at their mothers' knees. They were taught that violence and blood had freed them gloriously from the Turk in 1875, and would one day free them from the Hapsburg. But a change of method was needed. They knew by experience that insurrection by arms was impossible, but they thought that a conspiracy with bombs or pistols might succeed. Meanwhile secret Austro-Hapsburg propaganda could be pursued; for a conspiracy and assassination a favorable moment was needed. It was not until the Balkan War that the Bosnian students thought that the favorable moment had come. The Balkan War showed that Serbia might soon be strong enough to beat Austria-Hungary in warfare. Was it not now the time for Bosnian Serbs to realize their dream and to paralyze Austria-Hungary from within? That could be done by secret organization or by assassination. Even before the Balkan War the fashion had been set. In 1910 a youth called Zherajitch fired at the Governor of Bosnia (though without effect) and then shot himself. It was reported, and universally believed by Bosnian Serbs, that the Governor had spurned the body with his foot. Two years later a pamphlet called "The Death of a Hero" exhibited Zherajitch as a martyr and stressed his dying words, "I leave it to Serbdom to avenge me." The effect was tremendous on Bosnian youth. Poems and newspapers glorified the deed. Printsip admitted that he had visited the tomb of Zherajitch and sworn to avenge him. The evil train had already been laid. Several plots and attempts at assassination after 1912 both in Croatia and Bosnia fanned the widespread discontent, the hysterical excitement, of the Serb-Bosnian students. Historic memories all suggested that Bosnia should act for herself or on her own initiative. That was the glorious thing to do. If this was the moral atmosphere in Bosnia, the memories of 1875 were a great incentive to violence and to violence from within. They greatly strengthen the proba-

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bility of Seton-Watson's argument that the initiative of the conspiracy did not come from Belgrade. There is also some independent evidence that students in Split and other Dalmatian towns were prepared to murder the Archduke if he visited them, and these certainly owed nothing to Belgrade. It seems that the assassination idea went on fermenting in Bosnia — and for that matter in Dalmatia and Croatia — quite independently of Belgrade. It was bound to end in the assassination of some important personage. The moral probabilities were all in that direction. But the hour and the man had to coincide.

Moral probabilities are, however, not material certainties. It is obvious in any case that, if the students wanted bombs (and bombs are the material for up-to-date assassins), they must leave Bosnia and go to Belgrade for them. In the same way Orsini had to go to London for bombs to assassinate Napoleon III. There was this important difference, of course, that persons in Belgrade were much more likely to sympathize with Bosnian students than Londoners were with Orsini. And, for that very reason, Bosnian students on their arrival in Belgrade were subject to new and non-Bosnian influences. Yet it is possible to prove, as Schmitt says, that the "idea of assassinating Franz Ferdinand came to the Bosnian revolutionary group independently of any suggestion from Belgrade" (I, p. 227, n.). One of these Bosnians, Pushara, who resided in Bosnia, can hardly have known of the schemes of Printsip, the chief conspirator, at all. Yet, as soon as he heard in March 1914 that Franz Ferdinand was coming to Sarajevo on June 28 (Kossovo Day) he regarded it as an opportunity for assassinating him. So he cut out the newspaper paragraph and sent it to Tchabrinovitch — a Bosnian student residing in Belgrade — with the word "greetings" upon it. Tchabrinovitch at once saw the point and decided to assassinate Franz Ferdinand. Ultimately he revealed his idea to Printsip and found that he and Ilitch had already decided on the same plan. Now the idea unquestionably came from Bosnia to Tchabrinovitch, and it is rather interesting, at least, that Ilitch and Printsip are believed to have first definitely plotted the assassination while on Bosnian soil during the winter of 1913–4. It is also rather significant that Colonel Dimitrijevitch ("Apis"), the chief of the Serbian Military Intelligence, who supplied Printsip and his associates with bombs, does not seem to have taken the conspirators seriously and did not believe their plot would succeed. He said they were too young.

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But such men would come in useful anyhow for sabotage or *komitadji* work, especially if there was war.

The agent of "Apis," who dealt more directly with Printsip, was Major Tankositch, and his creature was Ciganovitch. These two were not people to stick at much and the Major was a particularly reckless and resolute man, a "Black Hander" like "Apis." Tankositch seems to have tried to provoke an assassination plot in Bosnia in the autumn of 1913. It is interesting that this attempt from without did not succeed. Ideas of the same kind came quite independently to various Bosnians in the winter of 1913, notably to Printsip, Tchabrinovitch and Grabezh while they were actually in Bosnia. Their resolves crystallized in Belgrade early in 1914, when they secured the bombs and revolvers; they then crossed the frontier to murder the Archduke. But the four other chief conspirators whom they found in Bosnia were by no means equally resolved. They resembled a number of other young men in Bosnia who in a vague way knew of the plot or approved of someone assassinating the Archduke, though they kept quiet about it. I made careful inquiries in Sarajevo just after the armistice about this, and none of my informants put the number of these at less than 100 and some as high as 150. This is a larger number than I have seen suggested elsewhere but the evidence is important, being of the winter 1918–9. Legend grows quickly in the Balkans and later reports are less trustworthy. In fact the material weapons (bombs and apparently even revolvers) were bound to come from Belgrade, and Bosnians had to go there to get them. While there, they were likely to be influenced by *komitadji* leaders like Tankositch, and in the direction of violence. But so far there is no certain evidence proving that the real initiative came from Belgrade as to the formation of the plot. The inference is the other way. Persons at Belgrade can only have strengthened a purpose already certain, and "Apis" seems to have doubted even whether he had strengthened a purpose.

It would settle most difficulties if we could find out whether the Narodna Odbrana was, or was not, a terroristic society. For it originated in Belgrade and had extensive ramifications in Bosnia. It was launched in 1908 under the auspices of Pashitch and other cabinet ministers. Its head was General Jankovitch, who had special reasons for wishing to ingratiate himself with the government. Consequently it would be diffi-

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cult for the government to disavow responsibility for its formation or even for its growth. Yet it would have been particularly unsafe for the government to permit it to become a criminal society, for they had promised Austria-Hungary in 1909 not to indulge in subversive propaganda. If the Narodna Odbrana really was a terroristic society, the Serbian Government could hardly avoid the charge of complicity in terrorism.

Now at the trial the conspirators made out a pretty good case for the view that the activities of the Narodna Odbrana were purely cultural. But that this was its avowed policy does not mean that all of its members were so pacific. In Serbia training in bomb-throwing formed part of the activities of the society, or seems at least to have been practiced by some members. But that could be for use in guerilla warfare and against the Turks as well as against the Austro-Hungarians. Moreover, there was not much concealment about this activity, nor was it undertaken on Bosnian soil. It is not necessarily proof of a planned assassination.

What were the views of Colonel Milan Pribichevitch, the man we have just resurrected from the dead? Because he really drew up the statute of organization and remained its presiding genius until the war. For reasons too long to be mentioned here, Milan had strong personal reasons for being anti-Hapsburg. Some vague evidence from Austrian sources has been produced to suggest that he favored violence; and it has been stated from Lyuba Jovanovitch at second-hand that Milan knew of the plot and informed Pashitch at the end of May or early in June 1914.[8] Should this be true, it would be decisive as to the complicity of Milan and probably of the Narodna Odbrana. Schmitt has assembled evidence to show that Milan was not a "Black Hander" and "disapproved of terroristic methods." I can confirm this from personal experience. During the winter of 1918–9 I was at Zagreb for six weeks and saw Milan almost every day and discussed all these matters, talking also with others who knew him intimately. I also made inquiries at Sarajevo. Everyone agreed that Milan had held the cultural idea, no one suggested that he knew of or took part in the plot. Seton-Watson in 1911 termed him "a garrulous visionary" and this rather unkind designation hits off a certain aspect of him which was generally admitted. Such a man would not be likely to be told secrets. He was ideal for propa-

[8] Schmitt, I, p. 235.

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ganda. My own notion of him was of an enthusiastic dreamer, with a tremendous belief in moral ideals, but also with a markedly chivalrous strain in his nature even towards personal opponents. Of all Jugoslavs I have ever met he seemed to me the very last man to countenance assassination. That was not his way, for he thought moral ideals were stronger than material ones. Personal impressions may of course be mistaken; but this kind of evidence, of which much could be adduced from other sources, is at least as good as the vague charges made against him by informers or opponents.

If the Narodna Odbrana was innocent of terrorism, at any rate the Black Hand[9] was not. It avowedly represented terrorism in an extreme form and "Apis" and Tankositch were its typical representatives. It is obvious, in fact, that the Austro-Hungarian police at the trial had mixed up Black Hand and Narodna Odbrana. The mistake was very natural, for some persons were members of both, a very important fact. Further, there is some evidence that the Black Hand at times used the Narodna Odbrana as cover for its extremes. One thing, however, is very important in this connection. The Regent Alexander and Pashitch have been accused of complicity in the plot. But it is not denied that Alexander was deeply offended with the Black Hand and had withdrawn his patronage from the society. Nor is it denied that Pashitch was at daggers drawn both with "Apis" and with his society and was only awaiting the result of the general election to crush both of them at one blow. The methods of the Black Hand, *i.e.*, terrorism at all costs, were not such as to appeal to statesmen. "Apis," it seems, was mad enough to think that Austria-Hungary could be paralyzed by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. But no one can believe that either Alexander or Pashitch thought that this was possible.

As has been well pointed out by Schmitt, the arguments of common sense in 1914 were all for delay and for avoidance of all provocation of Austria-Hungary. This policy links up interestingly enough with the view that the Serbian Government sanctioned only cultural promotion of the Jugoslav idea. The longer an active struggle could be averted the more the Jugoslav idea would have time to permeate Bosnia and Croatia — and the more certain would it be that Serbo-Croat soldiers would not fight

[9] The correct name is "Union or Death," but that of "Black Hand" was common and is convenient.

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against the Serbs in case of war, and the nearer came the ultimate paralysis of the Hapsburg Empire. If a gradual cultural influence was to sap the Hapsburg state, time was needed and terrorism must be discountenanced. For the existence of terrorism would discredit, and perhaps lead to the discovery and suppression of, the cultural crusade. What is really interesting is that this silent sapping cultural process was so successful that the Sarajevo police knew only of the existence, and really nothing of the ramifications, of the Narodna Odbrana.

It seems therefore that the Serbian Government must be acquitted of any connection with the Black Hand, or of any direct complicity in the plot. The thing of which they can perhaps be accused is that of having known something of the plot beforehand, and of having failed to warn the Hapsburg Government. Lyuba Jovanovitch[10] in his famous indiscretion stated, in brief, that Pashitch in the presence of some cabinet ministers announced that he had heard that some persons were going across the frontier to kill the Archduke and that he intended to stop them. He tried to stop them and failed, for the frontier guards, being sympathetic with the youths, let them through. The evidence at the trial seems to prove that the frontier guards acted thus on a suggestion from Belgrade. But the suggestion or a hint from Belgrade came ultimately from the Black Hand ("Apis" and Tankositch). There is no absolute proof that the government tried to stop the conspirators but failed; but I see no reason to doubt the fact.

What has since been asserted is that the Serbian Government, knowing that the assassins were now in Bosnia, did not warn Vienna. Jovan Jovanovitch, then Serb Minister at Vienna, says he warned Bilinski, the Minister for Bosnia, but he says the warning was vague, general in its terms, and given on his own authority. He denies having received instruction or suggestion from Pashitch or his government at Belgrade. Now Jovanovitch waited some years before he made any public statements on this subject, and in the interval he had been badly treated by Pashitch. With every respect for his character, I cannot help wondering if his just resentment at Pashitch has not obscured his judgment. It seems at least possible that he acted on a hint from Belgrade which he has subsequently forgotten. Pashitch was notoriously

[10] Seton-Watson has given strong reasons for suspecting his story, but Fay and Schmitt point to the artlessness of the narrative and this is certainly rather convincing.

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hostile to independence among his diplomats, and Jovanovitch has not convincingly explained why he dared to take so unusual a step without authority.

Now the situation was very difficult. Lyuba (not Jovan) Jovanovitch explains that the warning was not officially given because of the peculiar character of Austro-Serbian "relations." Vienna would have thought that the warning was a Serb way of preventing the Archduke going to Sarajevo, and might have become very irritated. This is quite probable in itself. But there were other very strong reasons why Pashitch had to be wary. Suppose he had given instructions as follows: "Tell Vienna that I (Pashitch) know that assassins have been provided with bombs at Belgrade and have crossed into Bosnia to kill the Archduke. I tried to stop them but failed because the frontier guards sympathized with them." Vienna would have at once seized on the admission that the conspirators had got the bombs from Belgrade. The Foreign Office at Vienna would not have believed the assertion of Pashitch that he had tried to stop them, and would have pointed out that the sympathy of the frontier guards either proved the complicity of the Serb Government or called for the most careful investigation. Vienna would thus have had better and more plausible evidence than they actually had when they drafted their ultimatum. It was, therefore, very dangerous to give a direct warning. On the other hand it was even more dangerous to give no warning at all. The plot might succeed and that would help the Black Hand and precipitate war, both of which things Pashitch wanted to avoid. The obviously right policy was therefore to give the warning, so as to make the plot fail.[11] But it had to be given in a roundabout way, so that the Serbian Government would avoid chief responsibility for the plotters and for the compromising action of the frontier guards in enabling them to cross the frontier. To give the warning in the way Jovan Jovanovitch gave it was a very good way of getting out of the difficulty. The fact is, if we assume Pashitch to be a man with a conscience, he would certainly have warned Vienna. But if we assume him to be a man purely swayed by expedients, we must accept the logic of the position. "Apis" may have believed Franz Ferdinand's murder would avert war; but Pashitch knew that it would pro-

[11] Schmitt enumerates six pieces of evidence in favor of Pashitch having given a warning, and then shows the difficulty of accepting each (I, pp. 241–4). I admit the difficulties, but think the moral probabilities in favor of the view in the text.

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duce it and must have been anxious to avert it, which he could do only by authorizing some sort of warning. This conclusion was reached by me some time ago and since then has been given out independently by Fay. It has since been confirmed by two witnesses, though not of the best type.[12]

There, then, the Serbian mystery rests. The moral initiative for assassination came from Bosnia, the materials (bombs and revolvers) and some secondary stimulation from the Black Hand came from Belgrade. The probabilities seem to me in favor of the directors of the Narodna Odbrana not being terroristic, and of the Serbian Government having given some kind of warning to Vienna. But these remain matters of opinion.

There are three other points which do not seem matters of opinion. It seems to me that Russian complicity in the plot is really impossible. Schmitt shows there is no real evidence against Hartwig, the Russian Minister, and a document published by Seton-Watson shows that Hartwig on June 24 (four days before the murder) addressed a letter to the Russian Military Attaché, then on holiday, not only suggesting that there was nothing pressing to demand his return, but stating that the military dispatches from St. Petersburg were piling up unopened on his desk![13] Is it possible to supply a more decisive proof of Russian innocence?

The second point is connected with the ultimatum. It is true, as Schmitt says, that the Serbian Government was not directly charged with complicity. From a technical diplomatic standpoint it was difficult so to charge any government. But the point is more technical than real. The charges practically amount to that, and the evidence then known did not justify Vienna in even making the accusations it did. And Schmitt treats this matter so fairly (I, pp. 362–3) as actually to obscure its meaning. As Grey pointed out, and as most people admit, Demand No. 5, which gave Austria-Hungary power to appoint officials who should have authority in Serbian territory, was inconsistent with Serbia's independence. And it was one of several demands infringing her sovereignty. Now the logic here is irresistible. What right had Austria-Hungary to destroy the independence of the Serbian

[12] Magrini, "Il Dramma di Seraievo," pp. 106–7, quoted by Schmitt. One of these witnesses is likely to have known the truth. But the statements are reported by an Italian journalist and are rather of the "hearsay" type, and some other statements in the book are incorrect.

[13] *Slavonic Review*, March 1928, p. 710. The document was supplied by Artamonov, the military attaché to whom it was addressed.

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state, unless that state in its official capacity had sanctioned or promoted the murder?

The third point need not be stressed — because it has been admitted by both Fay and Schmitt — *viz.*, that Austria-Hungary's ultimatum was not meant to be accepted. Yet Musulin has stated — and it is rumored that Berchtold is going to state — that it *was* meant to be accepted. I can only refer to the words of that great diplomat, Sir Ernest Satow, when I discussed Musulin's book with him: "There are not many things of which I feel certain at my age [he was over eighty], but no one with my diplomatic experience can believe that that document was meant to be accepted." These were among the last words of a man unrivalled in Europe for his knowledge of diplomatic practice, technique and phraseology.

Alongside the picture of Serbia between June 28 and the outbreak of war we can now for the first time place an authentic description of the action of Montenegro. The pro-Serbs have always contended that King Nicholas played a double game with Serbia; they say that, while professing openly to support Serbia, he was negotiating secretly with Austria-Hungary, offering to exchange Mount Lovchen for Scutari in return for neutrality, and that he desisted from this attempt only because he feared public opinion in Montenegro. It has often been said (and sometimes thought) that these charges were slanders, and were simply pretexts to disguise the Serb design (now accomplished) of absorbing Montenegro. It is remarkable, as Schmitt points out, that these suspicions appear to be largely justified by the newly published Austrian documents. King Nicholas and his Foreign Minister are represented as saying to Vienna that "Montenegro might be forced by public opinion, altogether against the King's will, to take part, in the event of a war between the Monarchy and Serbia." And clear suggestions are made that the price of their neutrality would be Scutari. Conrad, the Austro-Hungarian chief-of-staff, commented: "Don't spare money." We do not know whether he did spare it, but it is pretty safe to assume that the Serb charges are — in substance — true.[14]

It is impossible to deal with all the other contentions in

[14] Schmitt: II, pp. 456–7. I may say that a study of the Austrian documents as a whole, to which he refers, is even more convincing as to general impressions.

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Schmitt's new book within the limits assigned. There are so many interesting suggestions. We must confine ourselves to some of great importance connected with the British entry into the war. Schmitt examines (II, pp. 40–2) Grey's attitude towards Russia. He discusses with admirable candor the question how far Grey thought it right not to object to Russian mobilization and how far this attitude encouraged her to mobilize. But I do not think Schmitt, or any other writer to date, has quite grasped England's relations to Russia at the moment. It was very important for England to be on good terms with her because of pending negotiations in Asia, and these considerations influenced her until the war became imminent. Next — and not least important — if Grey put pressure on Russia *not* to mobilize, Russia might say, "All right, we will not mobilize now, because we rely on you. You will support us, will you not, if it comes to war?" To that suggestion Grey certainly could not have said "Yes" until August 2, and probably not till the 3rd. In deciding not to condemn a Russian mobilization Grey was keeping his hands free as regards the larger question of England's coming into the war. The situation of France was different and it is not always remembered that, as in the case of Germany with Austria-Hungary, it was the duty of the ally to put on the pressure. England was not the ally even of Russia. Her situation as third party in relation to each group of allies was therefore most delicate.

Two points about which much misunderstanding has arisen may be taken here. Fortunately, Sir Austen Chamberlain's revelations, which have hardly yet been used by historians, seem to settle both. Mr. Churchill has made very grave assertions as to Sir Edward Grey. He says that after dinner on August 1 he found Asquith, Grey, Haldane and Crewe at 10 Downing Street. Churchill said he was going to finish mobilizing the fleet, though unauthorized by the Cabinet. Grey said to him [Churchill], not apparently in the hearing of the others: "I have just done a very important thing. I have told Cambon [the French Ambassador] that we [England] shall not allow the German fleet to come into the Channel."[15] Schmitt quotes this and says quite rightly: "There is no record of this conversation in the published British or French documents." He assumes, however, that it is true, and that Asquith had sanctioned this action without waiting for the Cabinet. Here I think our admirable guide "nods," for it seems practically

[15] Churchill, "The World Crisis," Vol. I, p. 231. Schmitt, II, p. 356.

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certain that Churchill misinterpreted the facts of Grey's interview with Cambon on August 1. Grey wrote a dispatch on this day in which he says that he refused to give Cambon the pledge required — *i.e.*, defense of the northern coasts of France. But Grey says that he added: "*The French might be sure that the German fleet would not pass through the Channel, for fear that we should take the opportunity of intervening, when the German fleet would be at our mercy.*"[16] Thus Grey indicated the probability that the Germans would not attack the French fleet in the Channel, but refused to assure Cambon that the English fleet would intervene to prevent them. His dispatch goes on: "I promised, however, to see whether we could give any assurance that, in such circumstances, we would intervene." Now there seems to be good evidence that no such assurance was given by Grey to Cambon at any time until the afternoon of August 2. After the August 1 interview with Grey, Cambon went out and complained to Sir Arthur Nicolson (Permanent Under-Secretary): "*Ils vont nous lâcher.*" Sir Arthur was much moved. He went and spoke angrily to Grey and afterwards wrote an urgent minute to him, based on a suggestion of Cambon's. This was acknowledged by Sir Edward Grey as follows: "I have spoken to the P[rime] M[inister] and attach great importance to the point being settled tomorrow (*i.e.*, August 2). E. G. 1/8/14."[17] This document suggests that he gave no assurance on the 1st. There is other evidence. George Lloyd (now Lord Lloyd) was acting as intermediary between Cambon and the leaders of the Conservatives in opposition. Cambon told him on the 1st, apparently in the afternoon or evening, that England would give no assurances to France. He added — in the one undiplomatic utterance of his life — "Honor, does England know what honor means?"

Cambon was thus in despair because Grey had refused to give him an assurance. Now if Churchill is right, Grey had given Cambon an assurance anyhow before 8 p.m. on the 1st. But at about 11 a.m. on the 2nd, Lloyd gave Sir Austen Chamberlain a paper which he had just received from the French Embassy, of which the text exists. The important part for our purpose is: "*Private.* Grey tells Cambon we probably shall not allow an attack on French coasts." Now this was an authorized communication

[16] Gooch and Temperley, *op. cit.*, p. 260. No. 447. Italics my own.

[17] Nicolson, "Portrait of a Diplomatist," p. 304. Sir Austen Chamberlain's revelations are in the *Sunday Times*, December 1 and 8, 1929, based on a contemporary diary and documents.

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from the French Embassy to the leaders of the Opposition, describing Cambon's view of the attitude of Grey up to 11 a.m. on the 2nd. It does not quite agree with Grey's own quoted version. Cambon assents Grey said that "England will probably not allow," Grey asserts he said that "Germany will not venture upon," an attack upon French coasts. But the two versions agree that Grey discussed only "probabilities," and that no assurance, as stated by Churchill, was given to Cambon on the 1st or before 11 a.m. on the 2nd.[18] Whether Grey gave an assurance verbally on the 1st or not, all agree that he gave the required written assurance to Cambon after 2 p.m. on the 2nd, Churchill says at 2:20 p.m., Chamberlain at 4 p.m., anyhow *before* 4:45 p.m. That Churchill misunderstood Grey on the 1st is made clear by Sir Austen's evidence as well as by that of Grey and even of Cambon. At that time of fever and excitement, when Churchill was seeking for any pretext to finish mobilizing the fleet, misunderstanding was easy. He did go off and finish mobilizing the fleet on the 1st. But it is impossible now, in the face of the evidence, to assert that Grey gave an assurance to Cambon about defending the French coasts on the 1st, when evidence direct from Cambon himself denies he did.

One more point — again from Sir Austen's evidence — can perhaps be quoted. Sazonov and Poincaré have asserted, and others with wearisome reiteration have repeated, that there would have been no war if England had said — early in the crisis, at any rate at some time before August 1 — that she would stand by France and Russia if they were attacked. Now it is, of course, quite arguable that this bold stand by Great Britain might have succeeded in averting war. But it is not arguable, in view of evidence soon to be quoted, that Grey could at any time have given this pledge before August 2nd. If any such pledge were to be possible, it would have required a long process of education among the less directly interested ministers and long discussions in the Cabinet of what Lord Sanderson wrote that Cabinets never satisfactorily discussed — that is, of potentialities. For not discussing such potentialities, at some date or year previous to July 24, 1914,[19] Grey and Asquith may have been to blame, though

[18] Wickham Steed ("Through Thirty Years," II, p. 14) says he had a conversation on the lines of Lloyd with Cambon at midday on the 2nd. Unfortunately Roux (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, August 15, 1926, p. 739), quoting Cambon, puts this conversation on the evening of the 1st.

[19] This was the date at which the Cabinet began to sit almost *en permanence*, after it recognized the seriousness of the crisis.

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such discussion is extremely alien to the mind of the British politician. But, as the evidence will show, it is not fair to blame them for not adopting this attitude after July 24. The majority of the Cabinet were absolutely against any such action till the 2nd or even till the 3rd of August. The Cabinet was sitting constantly and Grey kept reporting to it. It was absolutely impossible for him to have given a pledge on his own responsibility even had he himself desired to do so.

British Cabinets always keep their secrets well. There is not much published hitherto, except Asquith's diary, which is in the exactest sense contemporary. The accounts of Grey, Churchill, Morley and some others are influenced — to some extent, at least — by subsequent revelations, and all, even Asquith's diary, are necessarily individual in their point of view. But Sir Austen has revealed a document expressing the sense of the Cabinet as a whole on August 2, at the most crucial moment of decision. It is most regrettable that its whole text has not been published. The Cabinet had received promise of Conservative support in case of war and this probably influenced its decision about giving the assurance to Cambon. It rose at 2 p.m. on Sunday, the 2nd, and Grey gave assurance to Cambon soon afterwards.

Some time in the afternoon of the 2nd, Asquith gave a memorandum to Bonar Law which was discussed by some of the Conservative leaders in the evening. This memorandum was intended to express the policy of the Cabinet and is described by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the following terms: "It was most unsatisfactory. It stated that we were under no obligations to France. We rather inconsistently admitted immediately afterwards that the disposition of the French fleet made it impossible for us to allow the German fleet to attack them in the Channel [*i.e.*, the assurance to Cambon]. It referred us to Mr. Gladstone's declaration (Hansard 203, 1887)[20] for the Government's view of the obligations of the Treaty of Guarantee of Belgium. It admitted that it was a British interest not to see France crushed. But the whole document appeared extremely wavering and looked as if the Government were searching for excuses to do nothing."

At an interview held between Lansdowne, Bonar Law and Asquith before the Cabinet of August 3 at 10:30 a.m., the Prime Minister revealed that his memorandum "did not represent his real state of mind. He apparently was with Grey and Winston

[20] This reference is, I think, wrong, and should really be Third Series, Vol. 203, p. 1787.

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Churchill, but was mainly occupied in trying to preserve as large a portion of his Cabinet as possible." A Cabinet was held by Asquith soon after this interview on the 3rd. It was known by then that Belgium had received an ultimatum from Germany, and though Asquith doubted the truth of the statement before the interview, it seems to have been assumed as certain at the Cabinet. To judge by the evidence available, the state of uncertainty in the Cabinet had been cleared up even before it met. The waverers had rallied to the Grey-Asquith side in spite of certain resignations being inevitable. Decisions were then taken. Formal sanction was given to the completed mobilization of the fleet and to the immediate mobilization of the army. These were all the decisions the Cabinet itself ever took. Grey's speech in the afternoon of the 3rd decided the country, and the ultimatum to Germany, the declaration of war, and the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force were all on the authority of the Prime Minister acting with individual colleagues. But all were, in effect, anticipated by the decisions of the Cabinet on the 3rd of August.

If Sir Austen is right, and Asquith's memorandum seems to prove it, a curious situation still existed on August 2. The assurance to Cambon was accepted by him as decisive. "I calculated that the game was won. . . . A great country does not make war by half." But, despite assertions to the contrary, the "extremely wavering" memorandum of Asquith seems to prove that this was not the case and that the Cabinet had on the 2nd decided on what they thought was a half-measure, and probably one which they did not think would necessarily mean war.

Here, then, is the key to the whole situation in Great Britain during the days of crisis. If Asquith only with great difficulty and after disclosing promises of Conservative support, brought the Cabinet to give Cambon the assurance of the 2nd, it is quite clear that no suggestion of England going into the war could possibly have been accepted by the Cabinet before that date.

Whatever, therefore, were the merits of the Poincaré-Sazonov suggestion that England should have declared herself earlier than she did, the suggestion was not practical politics. The earliest day at which any decision was reached by the British Cabinet was August 2, and it is very doubtful if the decision then reached was regarded by the majority as committing them to war. The steps taken on the 3rd were more decisive, as is shown by the resignations of Morley and Burns. And on that day we may assume

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that the majority of the Cabinet had decided on war or at least to run the risk of it.

This survey of the immediate origins of the war has touched only two points, Serbia and Great Britain. For reasons of space all other questions have been omitted. Yet it may be that on these two cardinal points decisions ultimately turned. Had there been no contacts between these two poles the lightning might not have flamed forth. The murderous tendencies of certain Bosnians, aided by one or two Serbs, involved the governments of their respective countries and produced the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. But it was just because these events were so remote — and the interests of England in the Balkans so small — that the English Cabinet held so long aloof from the struggle. Little sympathy with Serbia was felt in England until the Continent was involved in the struggle and Belgium at length threatened. It is one of the most profoundly interesting studies in history to note how the actions of a few individuals in a remote corner of Europe eventually involved the fortunes not only of nearer and more interested neighbors but of a great Empire which knew and cared very little about them. It was said of Pitt when he decided to enter the European war in 1793 that his decision was the most important of any belligerent, for England alone had it in her power to remain neutral. It was added, "With every justification for war, the highest wisdom would have chosen peace." It is an interesting question for Americans to decide, whether either of these observations applies to Great Britain's entry into the war in 1914.

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GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS

December 31, 1853 — November 9, 1930

UP TO a short time before his death General Bliss maintained the full measure of his extraordinarily wide interest in the affairs of the world, past, present and to come. He still read the classics; handy editions of Horace or Livy, Herodotus or Thucydides, were always in some pocket. He still drew, for his talk and his writing, on the vast store of experience he had gained through army service in many fields and in all ranks up to that of full General, a title which he shared with Pershing and March — the first three full Generals in the United States Army since Grant, Sherman and Sheridan. He still read discriminatingly and thoughtfully (or, at the last, was read to by devoted friends), in particular missing nothing that was written about the World War, during which he served first as Chief of Staff and then as American member of the Supreme War Council, or about the negotiations at Paris, where he was one of the American delegates plenipotentiary. He still pondered on the lessons, not only of that particular war, but of war in general — and not only of the art of war, to which he had dedicated his active life and in the pursuit of which, as the Secretary of War said after his death, "he won by sheer ability the highest positions open to a professional soldier," but of war as a human failing and as an instrument of national policy. Indeed, this old soldier gave the last ten years of his life, with all his accumulated knowledge of the ways of men, to close study and reasoning as to how war, man's habit from primitive times, might be eliminated from the experience of nations just as it has been largely supplanted by processes of law in the relations of individuals.

The readers of FOREIGN AFFAIRS are not unfamiliar with General Bliss's manner of argument and conclusions. The fruits of his thought have been set down in these pages on several occasions: never better than in the article "What is Disarmament?" in the issue of April 1926. For several years past he was a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the review. As in every relationship of his life, he was simple, outspoken, generous with his mind and his time. He also was one of the two honorary members of the Council on Foreign Relations. This was in recognition not only of his eminence (understood perhaps more in

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Europe than in this country, for he was averse to all the practices of publicity on which American opinion relies so largely in the formation of its judgments), but also of the fact that it was under his chairmanship that a group of the American experts at Paris came together and formed the American Institute of International Affairs, one of the two associations which later united to form the present Council on Foreign Relations. When he spoke at the meetings of the Council, it was always with a clearness, deliberation and logical sequence which stamped him as a man of intellectual and moral powers far beyond the ordinary.

This is not the place to relate his varied achievements, his services to this and other countries in war and peace. His name and (what he would have cared very little about) his fame are secure. But this issue of a publication in which he had great faith and to which he was a true friend could not appear without an affectionate word of salute and farewell. A mountain is gone from the scene. It was not one of those mountains which, imposing and azure-hued on the horizon, seem somehow smaller instead of larger on close approach. It was a majestic peak, and without it there is a permanent gap in the landscape.

H. F. A.

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THE REVISION OF THE STATUTE OF THE WORLD COURT

By Manley O. Hudson

THE recent failure, for the time being, of the effort to revise the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice seems to have produced some confusion of thought at Geneva as well as in America. Apparently it is not clear to some people why the revision was undertaken, or what it would have accomplished, or why it has failed to become effective; and it does not seem to be understood that the failure has little or no effect on the proposed acceptance of the Court's Statute by the United States.

Though the work of the Court has from the beginning produced very general satisfaction, it is only natural that there should have been some criticism. The psychology of the defeated litigant is not limited to individuals, and the procedure followed by the Court has features that are strange to peoples in various parts of the world. In each country there is some tendency to criticize those features which do not accord with the national practice; dissenting opinions, for example, though a familiar practice in the United States, are anathema to lawyers in some other countries. But in spite of this tendency, there was no general criticism of the Court in its earlier years which would have indicated the existence of glaring defects. It is well known, however, that difficulty was at times encountered in getting a quorum for a meeting of the Court — some of the judges were advanced in age, some lived at great distances from The Hague, some were busily engaged in other affairs. It cannot be said that any grave delays resulted, but attention was particularly directed to this difficulty when the Court met for its fifteenth session, on November 13, 1928, to consider the Serbian loans case; only six of the ten living judges and three deputy-judges were present, making a bare quorum of nine; and when one of the deputy-judges fell ill, a quorum was lacking and the session had to be closed without any disposition of the business before the Court.

But even before this difficulty appeared, various governments began to give thought to the fact that a second general election of the judges was imminent, and at the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations in 1928 a resolution was adopted calling for a study of the provisions of the Statute "with a view to the introduction of any amendments which experience may show to be necessary." The original draft of this resolution was offered in the names of the delegations of twenty members of the League, but the initiative had been taken by the French delegation. The records of the Assembly contain little indication of the motives inspiring this initiative, but some misgivings had been current in France since the Court's judgment in the *Lotus* case between France and Turkey in 1927, given by an evenly divided court of twelve judges upon the deciding vote of the President. When in March 1929 a special Committee of Jurists met to consider the question of possible amendments, it had no specific proposals before it, and the French jurist present could only suggest that the Statute be studied to see whether any amendments were desirable. Two members of the Court itself, attending the meeting, were careful that their partici-

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pation should not be taken to indicate any opinion that a revision was necessary.

On the whole, then, there apparently was no impelling reason for undertaking to amend the Statute, and it might have been better to postpone the attempt until more experience had accumulated. A popular supposition in America that the revision was an indirect way of dealing with the question then pending as to the basis for the adhesion of the United States, has no justification in fact. It was a fortunate result that this Committee of Jurists was able to draft a new Protocol for American adhesion, but this was entirely an afterthought, due to events occurring after action had been taken by the Assembly in 1928.

After the Committee of Jurists had made their report, a conference of the signatories of the original Court Protocol of 1920 was held at Geneva, and a separate Protocol for revision was opened for signature on September 14, 1929. This would have effected amendments to twenty of the sixty-four articles of the Court Statute, and would have added four new articles dealing with advisory opinions. The amendments are of varying importance; some are only the consequence of others, some are designed to produce greater correspondence between the French and English texts, some deal with matters of no great moment. The significant amendments would have effected the following changes: 1, an arrangement for certain states not members of the League to participate in the election of judges; 2, an increase in the number of judges from eleven to fifteen and the elimination of the deputy-judges; 3, a procedure for resignation of the judges; 4, a requirement that judges devote all their time to the work of the Court without engaging in any other occupation of a professional nature; 5, a provision that the Court be in permanent session; and 6, a provision envisaging larger salaries to be voted by the Assembly.

Each of the changes proposed may be desirable in itself, but none of them is vital. Of those enumerated, the first would apply at present only to Brazil, which, though a party to the Court Protocol of 1920, cannot now participate in the election of judges, because she has no representative in the Assembly and the Council. It would not apply to the United States, whose participation in the elections is provided for in a separate Protocol for American adhesion.

The proposal to increase the number of judges was partly due to the anticipation that the work of the Court would grow in volume; but though such a growth seemed likely in 1928, there has been no great increase in 1929 and 1930, and there is now little prospect of increase in the near future. Another reason for this change was a desire to give the deputy-judges, who had been frequently called upon to sit as judges, the dignity of the higher position. A court of fifteen judges is in some ways less manageable than a court of eleven judges; there would seem to be some psychological limitation to the number of men who can sit in common judgment, though the amendment would avoid too large a bench by providing that some of the judges need not sit in certain cases.

The new provision for resignations would fill an obvious lacuna in the original statute, but one that has occasioned no serious inconvenience. The requirement that judges devote all their time to the work of the Court seems particularly desirable. Some of the judges have engaged in practice before national courts, and we have had what some people regard as the unseemly spectacle of a judge of the World Court leaving The Hague to plead in an inferior national tribunal. The question arises, however, whether the best qualified men can be

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attracted to serve on the Court, giving it their full time, if the work will not demand all of their energies. During its first eight years, the average annual duration of the sessions of the Court was 147 days. When the time occupied in necessary travel is added to this, it would seem that most of the judges must devote more than 175 days a year to their duties — perhaps an adequate complement for even the most energetic of men. The amendment would also have provided that except for liberal vacations, the judges must "hold themselves permanently at the disposal of the Court," a phrase generally interpreted to mean that they must live at or near The Hague; this would require a degree of expatriation which some might be reluctant to undertake. The amendment requiring the Court to remain permanently in session might expedite the hearing of some cases and might overcome some of the past difficulties in getting a quorum; but as the Court's work does not demand continuous activity, the permanent session would probably have little advantage over the present system of annual ordinary sessions and occasional extraordinary sessions.

The proposed new articles of the Statute do little more than to incorporate provisions concerning advisory opinions now existing in the Rules of Court. They would fill a clear lacuna in the existing statute, which fails to mention advisory opinions expressly; but this lacuna has caused no difficulty in practice. The only inconvenience resulting has been in connection with the American reservations, and this is adequately covered by the provisions of the separate Protocol for American adhesion.

The substantive importance of the proposed revision is, therefore, not great — M. Politis explained to the Assembly in 1929 that it was "a very slight revision" — and some of the results can be accomplished without any change in the Statute itself. The Assembly, acting on the proposal of the Council, may increase the number of judges, and it also has power to determine their salaries; the Court itself is given power by the Statute to make rules of Court which would control the duration of its sessions.

Unlike the Covenant of the League and the constitution of the International Labor Organization, the Statute of the Court makes no provision for its own amendment. This is a lacuna which the proposed amendments would not fill. It is a recognized principle of international law that a treaty cannot be amended without the consent of all the parties, and the Court Protocol of 1920, to which the Statute of the Court is annexed, being for this purpose a treaty, can be amended only with the consent of all the states which have signed and ratified or adhered to it. But no particular formality is required by international law for the giving of this consent, and it may be less formal than the instrument which is to be affected.

The Conference of Signatories of 1929 was fully aware of this question. The principal reason advanced for undertaking the revision at that time was that the judges to be elected in September 1930 might take office under the revised Statute; hence it seemed very important that the Protocol for revision be brought into force before the 1930 election was held. This meant that the consent of the forty-five states that have now signed and ratified the Court Protocol of 1920 had to be obtained. Formal ratifications always require a great deal of time, and as it seemed very improbable that the requisite number of formal ratifications would be forthcoming in the limited interval, the Con-

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ference of Signatories put into the new Protocol a provision that it should come into force on September 1, 1930, if on that date the Council had satisfied itself that none of the qualified states which had failed to ratify had objection to the coming into force of the amendments. This action was taken by unanimous vote, though the Cuban representative abstained.

The Council was not in session on September 1, 1930; when the question came before it on September 9, 1930, thirty-two of the parties to the Protocol of 1920 were reported to have ratified the new Protocol, and of the others none except Cuba had offered positive objection to the coming into force of the amendments, though Brazil and Uruguay had stated that they lacked the necessary parliamentary approval for agreeing. Both the Dominican Republic and Guatemala had supported the objection of Cuba, but as these states had not ratified the Protocol of 1920 their support was ineffective. The position of Cuba made it impossible for the Council to declare fulfilled the condition on which the Protocol for revision might have come into force. It would serve little purpose to inquire into the grounds of the Cuban Government's objections; the reasons advanced in the Cuban letter of August 16, 1930, are far from convincing, and except for the contention that the amendments would unduly favor the continent of Europe by compelling the judges to live at or near The Hague, they are of little substance. Possibly the Cuban Government might have voiced its objection before thirty-two other states had proceeded with their ratifications, but it would be impossible to say that any expectations were disappointed, for the Protocol for revision was never signed in Cuba's behalf.

The question then arises whether the new Protocol may still come into force. The Eleventh Assembly seems to have given an affirmative answer, for on September 25, 1930, it expressed a hope that all the states should ratify as soon as possible. The view seems to have prevailed at the Assembly that the Protocol for revision, if it is to come into force in the future, must be ratified by all the states which have or may have ratified the Protocol of 1920; indeed, no other view seems possible, for the Council has now discharged its only function with respect to the former Protocol. It seems most improbable, then, that the necessary ratifications will soon be forthcoming. Even if Cuba withdrew her objections, experience has shown that it is a most difficult thing to get as many as forty-five ratifications of an international instrument; after twenty-three years, the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of October 18, 1907, amending the earlier convention which set up the Permanent Court of Arbitration, has been ratified by but twenty-six of the forty-three signatories. It would have been a possible if not a wiser course for the Assembly to have declared the Protocol for revision to have lapsed, so as to open the way for any fresh effort thought desirable; but no inconvenience is to be anticipated from the present situation. The ground was prepared for the coming into force of the amendments by the election of fifteen judges for the new term of nine years, and that event will have no embarrassing consequence for the Court, though of course it will abolish the post of deputy-judge.

The Protocol for revision was signed on behalf of the United States; by courtesy it had been so drafted that the amendments could not come into force if the United States expressed any objection even before its adhesion to the original Court Protocol became effective. Before the Council's meeting in

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September, the United States notified the Secretary-General of the League of Nations that it had no objection to the amendments. In his letter of November 18, 1929, recommending to the President the signature of the three Court Protocols, the Secretary of State placed some reliance on the pending amendments. The question then arises whether the failure for the time being of the Protocol for revision affects the fate of the separate Protocol for American adhesion, also opened for signature on September 14, 1929.

The United States proposed to adhere to the Court Protocol of 1920 with the original Statute annexed; its adhesion would be effected by the coming into force of the separate Protocol of September 14, 1929, which makes no mention whatever of the revision Protocol of the same date. The Protocol for American adhesion can become effective only when it is ratified by the forty-five states which have ratified the 1920 Protocol and by the United States; it has now (November 1, 1930) been signed on behalf of all those states except Abyssinia, and ratified by some thirty states, not including the United States. The Protocol of 1920 and the Protocol for American adhesion are the only instruments essential for support of the Court by the United States, and as the two stand quite apart from the Protocol for revision they are in no juridical sense affected by the fate of the last-named instrument.

Nor is there any substantial reason for the adhesion of the United States to be opposed on account of the failure of the amendments. The amendments were not designed to meet the special requirements of the United States, though the addition of the four new articles on advisory opinions was in line with American insistence. The Conference of Signatories of 1929 endeavored to meet the reservations adopted by the United States Senate in 1926 in the provisions of the separate Protocol for American adhesion, and when that Protocol comes into force, adequate satisfaction will have been given to the American reservations. One article of the proposed amendments not covered by the provisions of the Protocol for American adhesion resulted from the insistence of individual Americans, not of the Government of the United States — Article 68, which provides that "In the exercise of its advisory functions, the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable." As this article leaves a wide discretion to the Court, which already has the settled policy of assimilating advisory procedure to that in contentious cases, its omission can hardly occasion any grave concern in the United States.

It would seem that no very urgent reasons existed for initiating the revision of the Statute of the Court in 1928. The proposed amendments would have filled some obvious lacunas and they included some desirable changes; but they were not vitally important in themselves, and some of their results can be, indeed have already been, accomplished without any change in the existing instruments. The amendments have so far failed to come into force, chiefly because of the objections of a state which is in the best of relations with the United States; if, legally, they may still come into force, it is very improbable that they will do so in the near future. But no serious inconvenience would result from their failure, and such an outcome will affect neither the legal possibility nor the practical desirability of proceeding with the measures necessary for the United States to give its support to the existing Court.

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THE PASSING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA

By Walter H. Mallory

OF LATE years there has been a growing conviction on the part of governments whose nationals enjoy extraterritorial privileges in China that these privileges, which confer on foreigners in China immunity from Chinese jurisdiction, must be given up. The fact that this conviction is due to a more yielding attitude on the part of foreign chancelleries rather than to very marked improvement in the administration of justice in China makes the inevitable relinquishment no less certain.

The idealism voiced by Allied leaders during the World War did not fall on deaf Chinese ears. Self-determination was not a new phrase, but it derived a new connotation when voiced by the statesmen of countries which had long been regarded as leaders of "imperialism." Thus when she was invited to join the Allies in 1917 China seized the opportunity, thinking thereby to establish herself as a full equal in the family of nations and to gain sympathetic consideration of her efforts to improve her international position. Beginning with the Peace Conference, and at every possible opportunity since, China has sought the abolition of the so-called unequal treaties which for nearly a hundred years have provided foreigners in China with a status which she has come to regard as a national humiliation. China obtained the desired concessions from Germany and the other vanquished Powers with comparative ease. But the victors have found it difficult to yield. The progress which China has made toward abolition, despite disturbed conditions, is a testimonial to the sincerity of present-day statesmen of the West in their effort to redeem the implied promises of their predecessors.

While it is true that several countries have been forced to relinquish extraterritoriality, or have agreed to do so under certain hypothetical conditions, none of the Powers with really large interests has done so. The Chinese accomplishment has been in gaining sympathetic interest in their plea. All nations now agree in principle that the treaties should be redrafted, and that jurisdiction over foreigners should eventually be placed in the hands of China. It still remains to determine when and how this may be achieved.

So far as this country is concerned, the State Department on November 13, 1930, made the following statement:

"On September 18, 1930, the Department announced that it would be prepared in October to resume the conversations begun some time ago in regard to American extraterritorial jurisdiction in China. Proposals of the American Government have recently been communicated to the Chinese Minister, Dr. C. C. Wu, in Washington, and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China, Dr. C. T. Wang, in Nanking.

"The proposals are in keeping with the statements of the Department issued under dates September 4, 1929, and November 11, 1929, that the American Government was prepared to enter into negotiations which would

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have as their object the devising of a method for the gradual relinquishment of extraterritorial rights, either as to designated territorial areas or as to particular kinds of jurisdiction, or as to both, provided that such gradual relinquishment proceeds at the same time as steps are taken and improvements are achieved by the Chinese Government in the enactment and effective enforcement of laws based on modern concepts of jurisprudence.

"Broadly speaking, the proposals are constituted in part on the principle of transfer of jurisdiction in reference to specified kinds of cases and in part on the principle of such transfer in all but a specified area or areas.

"The proposals are similar to, but not identical with proposals made to the Chinese Government by the British Government on September 11, 1930."

In the days of early intercourse between the East and the rest of the world, China claimed universal overlordship, a claim which the other states never accepted. Of her own volition China did not belong to the family of nations and her intercourse with outsiders was carried on more or less arbitrarily and not according to the rules of international law. It therefore became necessary for other nations to evolve a procedure modeled on existing forms of relations between nations but adapted to meet Chinese conditions. This resulted in the creation of an international status which is most complicated. China is now a member of the family of nations, but some of the old limitations still remain, and any rapid change of status would adversely affect the enormous foreign and Chinese interests which have grown up under the old rules.

Conflicts of jurisdiction occurred from the beginning of intercourse between China and the West until they finally culminated in the Opium War between China and Great Britain. As a result of this war, Great Britain imposed on China the General Regulations of Trade of 1843, the first treaty to regularize extraterritoriality. The treaty was followed in 1844 by similar treaties with the United States and France and then with other nations, until on the outbreak of the World War there were eighteen nations enjoying extraterritoriality.

In 1900 the Boxer uprising aided greatly in consolidating the position of the Powers *vis-à-vis* China. The resulting protocol placed greater restrictions on China's sovereignty; and the Diplomatic Corps, owing to the functions which it assumed in carrying out the provisions of the protocol, took on a more formal organization, with the *doyen* speaking to the Chinese Government with the voice of eighteen nations. This was the position in 1914. It seemed so unlikely that there would be an early change in the status of foreigners in China that little attention was attracted by China's cautious intimations that extraterritoriality was irksome to her dignity as a member of the family of nations.

The war brought a great change. China entered the war on the side of the Allies. With the coming of peace, Germany, the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia were forced to renounce extraterritoriality. The Diplomatic Corps at Peking then found itself unable to speak with one voice on the subject. There were dissenters in their midst, though none of the other three nations were admitted to the society of the "Protocol Powers." China then initiated the course, which she has since pursued with marked success, of dealing with the Powers individually. Thus the Diplomatic Corps at Peking has now practically ceased to have any voice as a unit save in the usual ceremonial sense.

At the Paris Peace Conference, China brought her grievance before the

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world. Owing to the preoccupation of the Powers in European matters, her plea gained little notice. But at the Washington Conference in 1921 she was accorded a better hearing. Her request was taken under sympathetic consideration, and a commission was appointed to investigate the administration of justice in China. This commission rendered its report in 1926, and while laying down certain prerequisites, expressed itself in favor of eventual abolition.

Meanwhile the so-called Nationalist Movement was growing in China, and in 1927 and 1928 the military campaign of the Nationalists succeeded in establishing the Nanking Government. This government, the organizers of which had long spoken of the revision of the so-called unequal treaties as one of their principal objectives, proceeded to address itself vigorously to treaty revision. Thus in 1928 and 1929 China renewed her request to all the Treaty Powers individually (except Japan and two or three others whom she treated differently), for the relinquishment of extraterritoriality. The American Government replied that it was prepared to negotiate with the object of devising a method for the gradual relinquishment of extraterritorial rights, provided such gradual relinquishment "proceeds at the same time as steps are taken and improvements are achieved by the Chinese Government in the enactment and effective enforcement of laws based on modern concepts of jurisprudence." China countered with a note on September 12, 1929, pointing out that the Nationalist Government had made great progress since the report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in 1926, and urged the United States to proceed with the negotiations. The United States replied that it was ready to proceed, as stated before, on the basis of gradual abolition *pari passu* with improvements in China's administration of justice.

This, however, was not fast enough for China. So at the end of the year, December 28, 1929, the following mandate was issued:

"For the purpose of restoring her jurisdictional sovereignty, it is hereby decided and declared that on and after (January 1, 1930) all foreign nationals in the territory of China who are now enjoying extraterritorial privileges shall abide by the laws, ordinances and regulations duly promulgated by the central and local governments in China.

"The Executive Yüan and the Judicial Yüan are hereby ordered to instruct the ministers concerned to prepare as soon as possible a plan for the execution of this mandate and to submit it to the Legislative Yüan for examination and deliberation with a view to its promulgation and enforcement." [1]

On its face this seemed to be the initiation of unilateral action for the immediate abolition of extraterritoriality; but two days later the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs issued an explanatory statement as follows:

"The year 1930 is the decisive time, and the actual process of reëstablishing Chinese sovereignty by the abolition of extraterritoriality begins on January 1.

"The Chinese Government . . . believes that there is no difference between those Powers and China regarding the principle involved; and is prepared to consider and discuss within a reasonable time any representations made with reference to the plan now under preparation in Nanking. In this respect the issuance of the mandate of December 28 should be regarded as a step toward

[1] *Cf.* "Survey of American Foreign Relations, 1930," p. 187.

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removing the cause of constant conflict, and at the same time promoting the relations between Chinese and the foreigners."

When these negotiations first started, at the close of the World War, nineteen Powers enjoyed extraterritorial privileges in China.[2] Of these, three have unconditionally given them up, and eleven more have signified their willingness to yield to China's demands under certain specified conditions.

The Extraterritorial Powers at the close of the World War were as follows: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, British Empire, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.

Of these Germany and Russia have unconditionally relinquished extraterritoriality, as have the new states of Austria and Hungary.

The Powers which have promised under certain contingencies to relinquish it are eleven in number. Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain have made treaties since 1928 containing declarations to that effect. The others have made such declarations at earlier dates, as follows: British Empire, by Article XII of the Treaty of 1902; Japan, by Article XI of the Treaty of 1903; Mexico, by the *inter alia* statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 12, 1929; Sweden, by Article X of the Treaty of 1908; Switzerland, by the most-favored-nation clause in the Treaty of 1918; and the United States, by Article XV of the Treaty of 1903. The United States subsequently confirmed and developed the position which it adopted in 1903 on several occasions, most recently by the statement of November 13, 1930, quoted above.

[2] There were eighteen in 1914. But Switzerland became an Extraterritorial Power in 1918 by the Treaty of Tokyo, Article II and the declaration attached to the Treaty.

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DUTCH PROBLEMS IN THE WEST INDIES

By Amry Vandenbosch

A PECULIAR economic and international situation exists in the islands of Curaçao and Aruba, two of the three Dutch West Indies lying off the coast of Venezuela. During the last few years these two islands have enjoyed a period of great prosperity, induced by the oil boom in Venezuela. The Gulf of Maracaibo, about whose shores the Venezuelan petroleum industry has developed, is too shallow for deep ocean-going vessels, with the result that the petroleum is pumped over to the Dutch islands, where it is refined and shipped. Besides good harbors, these near-by islands have the advantages of a stable government and a comparatively large and efficient laboring population; this has made them not only a great refining and export center, but also a fueling station for the numerous oil-burning ships traveling between the Americas.

In practically all the years of Dutch rule previous to 1923 Curaçao was a drain on the treasury of the mother country. However, for 1929 the income of the Curaçao Government was 120 percent more than it had been five years before, nearly 187 percent more than it had been ten years before, and almost 540 percent more than it had been fifteen years before. The budget has in recent years enjoyed an actual surplus. Imports have increased about thirty times in the last fifteen years. Curaçao has become the center of one of the largest petroleum industries of the world, and the tonnage of its shipping has surpassed that of Amsterdam.

The Dutch are wondering whether this prosperity is of a passing or a permanent nature. The islands have had short periods of prosperity before, only to lapse again into long periods of depression. They flourished as a smuggling center and as a slave-trading center in the days of the monopolistic Spanish colonial commercial policy, and during the American Civil War they enjoyed a short period of prosperity from the blockade runners. The present prosperity would seem to have a better and more permanent basis, but its weakness is still that the oil on which it is based comes not from Dutch soil, but from without.

It is a question whether Venezuela will always be satisfied for Curaçao and Aruba to be the refining centers and ports of export of Venezuelan oil. The Dutch also entertain some misgivings regarding the expansion of the United States in the Caribbean. The Dutch West Indies colony is composed of the three islands near the Venezuelan coast and also three smaller ones 500 miles to the northeast — St. Martin (half of which belongs to France), St. Eustatius and Saba. This northern island group constitutes the connecting link between the Greater and the Lesser Antilles, and in some quarters it is felt that, as the United States found it desirable to acquire possession of the Virgin Islands (which lie only 100 miles from St. Martin), so it may ultimately desire the Dutch West Indies for the protection of the Panama Canal. The recent difficulties of the Standard Oil Company in obtaining concessions in Aruba led the Chicago *Tribune* to declare that the possession of territory in the Americas by

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a non-American power was an anomaly; this statement caused no little consternation in Holland.

The enforcement of the United States prohibition laws also finds its repercussion in the Dutch West Indies. Several years ago Dutch ships encountered many difficulties in American ports in the execution of the prohibition regulations. The United States Government hinted that it would apply these regulations more leniently if the Netherlands Government would take measures to prevent smuggling from its West Indies to the United States. Accordingly the Netherlands Government instituted the rule that the rebate of excises on distilled liquors when exported would be granted only when landing certificates were produced from the country of destination. This, of course, is exactly what the liquor smugglers cannot do. But apparently the only result of this change in policy is a greater income for the treasury of the Curaçao Government, since it now retains considerable sums in liquor excises which it formerly rebated. The Dutch have followed with keen interest the attempt to obtain Canada's aid in the execution of the United States prohibition laws, for if the United States Government were successful with Canada it would undoubtedly turn to its other neighbors with similar requests.

No less difficult are the governmental problems which the Netherlands faces in ruling these isolated colonial communities. Although the two small island groups have entirely different interests, they constitute a single colonial unit under Netherlands sovereignty. The total population of the three northern islands is less than 5,000, while the population of the southern group approaches 100,000, of which 75,000 live in Curaçao. The northern group is agricultural, the southern group industrial; and while the southern group has come into an era of prosperity, the northern group is suffering a severe economic depression. The population of the northern islands has been decreasing; some of the people have gone to work in the sugar industry in Cuba and Santo Domingo, and in the last few years many have migrated to Curaçao and Aruba. Not only do the islands have very different interests, but the transport communication between the two groups is very poor. There is in addition a difference in language: the people of the northern islands speak English, while those in the southern islands speak Papaimento, composed of Spanish, Dutch, English and native words.

The government of Curaçao (the name applied to the two groups of islands jointly) is composed of a Governor, appointed by the Netherlands Government, and a Colonial Council of thirteen members. The Council is coöptive in nature; whenever a vacancy occurs in the membership the Council itself recommends two names, from which the Crown selects one. The seat of government is at Willemstadt, on the island of Curaçao. Because of the small population of the northern group and its distance from the capital, practically all of the members of the Council are inhabitants of the southern islands; accordingly, the vastly predominant weight in the government is with the southern islands. The people of the southern islands feel that if money is to be spent in improving conditions in the northern islands it had better be Netherlands money. Moreover, the officials on the northern islands are appointed not from The Hague but from Curaçao.

The dissatisfaction of the northern islanders has become so great that it

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has created a "free from Curaçao" movement. These people are not disloyal to the Netherlands. They desire to be cut loose from Curaçao and placed under the direct government of the Netherlands; but if they must remain a part of the Curaçao colony they desire a government which will be truly representative of all the six islands. Both schemes have been proposed in the Netherlands States-General.

The Dutch press has in recent years discussed at great length the character of the government of Curaçao. The policy of a recent Governor was characterized as one "without steadiness, without thought of tomorrow, without moral influence, and free from everything except petroleum," and it was charged that the government through a long-term lease granted by this Governor to the Curaçaosche Petroleum Industrie Maatschappij for the land about Carácasbaai, had lost all control over the best of Curaçao's harbors, even in time of war, and retained only a limited authority for purposes of quarantine.

But in spite of all these governmental difficulties, the suggestion frequently made in the States-General that the Netherlands Government sell its West Indies islands is repelled as unworthy of a great colonial Power.

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

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General International Relations

PROBLEMS OF PEACE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1930, 236 pp. $3.00.
The fourth series of lectures at the Geneva Institute of International Affairs, ranging over a large field and including an interesting address on the Monroe Doctrine by Señor de Madariaga.

THE PATH TO PEACE. By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER. New York: Scribners, 1930, 333 pp. $2.50.
A collection of essays and addresses dealing largely with the renunciation of war and the Pact of Paris.

THE BRITISH YEAR-BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. New York: Oxford University Press, 1930, 285 pp. $6.00.
The current volume of this notable publication contains an interesting article on the Indian States as well as several contributions to the problem of international tribunals.

DÉMARCHE, ULTIMATUM, SOMMATION. By WERNER BRAUN. Berlin: Stilke, 1930, 84 pp. M. 4.50.
A much-needed scientific analysis of terms frequently misused. There is a valuable chapter dealing with the Austrian ultimatum of 1914.

EDUCATING FOR PEACE. By ELIZABETH E. AND JOHN L. LOBINGIER. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1930, 216 pp. $2.00.
World peace studied as an educational problem.

THAT NEXT WAR? By K. A. BRATT. London: Allen and Unwin, 1930, 280 pp. 10/6.
A Swedish soldier and historian stresses the view that the danger of conflict is as great now as it ever was, and that some economic equivalent for war must be found.

MARS, OR THE FUTURE OF WAR. By ALAIN. New York: Cape and Smith, 1930, 318 pp. $2.50.
Essays by a French philosopher and pacifist who knows war at first hand.

THE PROBLEM OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By DAVID DAVIES. London: Benn, 1930, 796 pp. 21/-.
An extensive study of the main problems of international relations and the modes of dealing with them.

DE ECONOMISCHE EN FINANCIEELE ORGANISATIE VAN DEN VOLKENBOND. By J. A. LEVERT. Wageningen: Veenman, 1929, 197 pp.
A monographic study of an important aspect of the League organization.

LA SECURITÉ INTERNATIONALE ET SES MODES DE RÉALISATION. By OLAF HOIJER. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1930, four volumes.
The author examines in detail the working of alliances and guarantees of neutrality, agreements like the Locarno Agreements and the Kellogg Pact, the methods for the pacific solution of disputes and the problems of disarmament.

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L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL ET LE CONSEIL DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Stanislas Dotremont. Brussels: Lamertin, 1929, 464 pp.

An authoritative monograph on the machinery of arbitration and how it works.

DIE REFORM DES MINDERHEITENSCHUTZES. By Heinrich Rauchberg. Prague: Calve, 1930, 76 pp. Kc. 36.

Primarily a discussion of recommendations recently made by various international organizations and a critique of the League Council's stand.

DIE OFFENE WUNDE EUROPAS. Edited by Oskar Wittstock. Hermannstadt: Krafft, 1930, 192 pp. M. 7.80.

Really a brief handbook of the minorities questions.

MARITIME TRADE IN WAR. By Lord Eustace Percy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930, 114 pp. $2.00.

Williamstown lectures, in which the author discusses the freedom of the seas from the practical standpoint and stresses the need for a complete revamping of international law on this subject.

THE TERRITORIAL SEA. By Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante y Sirven. New York: Oxford University Press, 1930, 175 pp.

The Spanish original of this work, by an eminent authority, has already been noted.

INTERNATIONAAL RIVIERENRECHT. By Willem Q. Arent. Amsterdam: Paris, 1930, 147 pp.

This dissertation reviews the present status of the international law of rivers.

VERANDERINGEN IN HET RIJNREGIEM NA DEN WERELDOORLOG. By A. J. Struycken. 's Gravenhage: Langenhuysen, 1929, 125 pp.

A convenient statement of the Rhine control as set up in the peace treaties.

LE DROIT DU DANUBE INTERNATIONAL. By Henri Hajnal. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1929, 324 pp.

The work of the Danube Commission will always be interesting as one of the first experiments of its kind, and there has been no dearth of treatments of the subject. But this book, by an eminent Hungarian jurist, is unique because it reviews the whole question in the light of the unpublished material in the archives at Vienna. Going back to the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, the author examines the working of the commission and the various modifications made by later international agreements. An important part of the book is devoted to the war and post-war periods, and there is an illuminating discussion of the vexed problem of the representation of non-riverain states on international river commissions. The author speaks as a recognized authority on the subject, and the book is of real importance for the study of general principles as well as for the history of a concrete case.

LES PAIEMENTS INTERNATIONAUX. By P. Jaudel. Paris: Chauny and Quinsac, 1930, 312 pp. Fr. 40.

A competent examination of the organization and technique of international payments.

International Relations of the United States

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC MIND. By Peter H. Odegard. New York: Columbia University Press, 1930, 317 pp. $2.50.

An able sociological study of the type now much in vogue.

CIVIC ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS. By Bessie L. Pierce. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1930, 297 pp. $3.00.

This capable analysis of American school books deals in large measure with the for-

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mation of the American attitude towards foreign countries, and will give the reader much cause for thought.

IN THE SENATE. By George W. Pepper. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 1930, 148 pp. $2.00.

Reminiscences containing interesting chapters on the World Court and International Conferences, as they were dealt with in the Senate.

DÉCOUVERTE DES AMÉRICAINS. By René Puaux. Paris: Charpentier, 1930, Fr. 12.

This appreciation of the American scene was awarded a prize as the best French work of the year on the United States.

GLI STATI UNITI DI DOMANI. By M. Orsini Ratto. Milan: Treves, 1930, 232 pp. L. 18.

Travel impressions of a high type.

THE GIANT OF THE WESTERN WORLD. By Francis Miller and Helen Hill. New York: Morrow, 1930, 318 pp. $3.00.

A study of the political, economic and social relations between Europe and America.

The World War

THE COMING OF THE WAR: 1914. By Bernadotte E. Schmitt. New York: Scribners, 1930, two volumes, $10.00.

Schmitt's work will stand for a long time as a major discussion of the outbreak of the war, whatever view may be taken of his conclusions, for it is based upon long years of careful study of the tremendous mass of source material and a complete command of the subject. When it is considered that these two volumes contain more than one thousand pages of closely reasoned argument, buttressed with voluminous references and extensive footnotes, it will be clear that no detailed discussion of their content would be possible in a brief note. (See the review by Professor Harold Temperley in this issue of Foreign Affairs.)

A REFUTATION OF THE VERSAILLES WAR GUILT THESIS. By Alfred von Wegerer. New York: Knopf, 1930, 415 pp. $3.00.

This is perhaps the best presentation of the German view of the origins of the war, and may well be read with the preceding.

EUROPE: THE WORLD'S BANKER, 1870–1914. By Herbert Feis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930, 492 pp. $5.00.

This book, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, does not deal directly with the war or with its origins, but it has been included in this category because few books published in recent years have made more substantial contributions to the history of pre-war international relations in the broadest sense. Feis's book is the first adequate treatment of international loans in the years from 1870 to 1914, a subject the importance of which has long been recognized but the discussion of which has never got far beyond the stage of loose generalities. The scientific treatment of it involves a thorough command of the extensive literature of pre-war diplomacy as well as an intimate acquaintance with the sources of international finance. So far as the reviewer can see, Feis has not missed anything of importance. He not only knows the material, but he knows how to use it; he understands the political motives and considerations which lay behind these financial transactions. A large part of the volume is taken up with a pioneer study of the character of British, French and German foreign investments and the general policies followed by the governments towards investments abroad. The remainder is devoted to a review of the major enterprises — the financing of Russia, the Balkan States, Egypt, Morocco, China and some of the

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less important countries. Other chapters deal with the vexed problems of Balkan and Asiatic railways. In many instances Feis's treatment is the only adequate one in existence, but even in the larger sense the book is a reliable and thoroughly readable piece of research, one that no student of international relations can afford to overlook.

THE GREAT WAR OF 1914–1918. By Sir George Aston. London: Butterworth, 1930, 252 pp. 2/6.
An excellent brief introductory survey.

COLOSSAL BLUNDERS OF THE WAR. By William S. Woods. New York: Macmillan, 1930, 282 pp. $2.50.
Admitting that mistakes in war are inevitable, the editor of the *Literary Digest* reviews the great blunders on all sides that cost hundreds of thousands of lives in the world conflict.

BEHIND THE SCENES IN MANY WARS. By Lieutenant-General Sir George MacMunn. London: Murray, 1930, 370 pp. 15/-.
Contains interesting material bearing on the administrative side of such campaigns as Gallipoli and Mesopotamia.

LIAISON, 1914. By Brigadier-General E. L. Spears. London: Heinemann, 1930, 598 pp. 25/-.
An important contribution to the history of the early days of the war, with special reference to the relations between Generals French and Lanrezac.

WITH BEATTY AT JUTLAND. By T. C. Bridges. London: Collins, 1930, 302 pp. 3/6.
Interesting reminiscences.

U-BOOTE WESTWÄRTS. By Ernst Hashagen. Berlin: Mittler, 1930, 220 pp. M. 5.
The author took part in many expeditions to the English coast. This is one of the most valuable books on submarine warfare.

SAGGIO CRITICO SULLA NOSTRA GUERRA. By R. Bencivenga. Rome: Agostiniana, 1930, 345 pp. L. 20.
The first volume of a careful study of the war from the Italian side.

GALITSIISKAIA BITVA. By A. Beloi. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1929, 371 pp.
An authoritative Russian account of the great battle in Galicia in 1914.

COME CI VIDE L'AUSTRIA IMPERIALE. By Amedeo Tosti. Milan: Mondadori, 1930, 312 pp. L. 20.
A very detailed study of Austrian opinion of Italy during the war, based on examination of the Vienna archives, parliamentary debates, newspapers and memoirs.

LE SILENCE DE SARRAIL. By Paul Coblentz. Paris: Querelle, 1930, 321 pp.
The controversy centering on Sarrail flares up from time to time. This volume adds a few new documents.

AI-JE TRAHI SARRAIL? By General Cordonnier. Paris: Les Etincelles, 1930, 352 pp. Fr. 30.
An elaborate defense against the charges brought against him, by one of the commanding officers of the French army of the Orient.

BLOKADA I NARODNOE KHOZIAISTVO V MIROVUIU VOINU. By I. Joffe. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1929, 224 pp.
A study of the blockade and its effects.

VOENNO KHOZIAISTVENNAIA POLITIKA. By M. Bukshpan. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1929, 544 pp.
A detailed monograph on the forms and organs of economic regulation employed during the war.

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Western Europe

THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE. By Édouard Herriot. New York: Viking, 1930, 330 pp. $3.50.

The question of a United States of Europe has been discussed so frequently by journalists and political agitators that it is a great relief to have a detailed presentation of the subject by an experienced statesman. As the readers of Foreign Affairs will remember, ex-Premier Herriot strongly believes it not only desirable but necessary to set up some type of union. After outlining the past history of the idea of European solidarity, he analyzes the problem as it confronts the Continent at the present time. The approach is from the economic angle, with reference especially to the question of tariffs, cartels, international finance and labor. These factors, M. Herriot believes, impose the union upon the states of Europe. But the union, to be successful, must be within the framework of the League of Nations. It must, furthermore, respect national institutions, must be open to all states which wish to join, including England, in spite of her extra-European interests, and must give all members a position of absolute equality. The form might be modelled upon the Pan-American Union, at any rate it must be flexible and not over-ambitious. The primary purpose should be industrial concentration and the protection of the European market. The abolition of tariff barriers should be considered as the end rather than the beginning of economic organization. Finally, in order to assure stability, the union should be accompanied by a system of arbitration, disarmament and security. M. Herriot's little book is beautifully written and very stimulating.

GLI STATI UNITI D'EUROPA E DEL MONDO. By G. Quartara. Turin: Bocca, 1930, L. 10.

A dialogue in which the advantages of union, based on the American example, are set forth.

S. O. S. EUROPA. By Oscar Ebner von Ebenthall. Vienna: Amalthea, 1930, 204 pp. M. 4.50.

A general discussion of the European problem. The writer advocates some sort of British-European union.

PAIX OU GUERRE? By Albert Renard. Paris: Alcan, 208 pp. Fr. 15.

A former French senator and nationalist reviews some of the fundamental problems of the Continent, such as Eupen-Malmedy, Alsace-Lorraine, the *Anschluss* and Belgium.

AN AMBASSADOR OF PEACE. By Lord D'Abernon. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1930, 318 pp. 21/-.

The third and concluding volume of the interesting and instructive memoirs of the former British Ambassador to Berlin. This volume is concerned with the Dawes Plan, the Locarno Agreements and the German entry into the League.

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE GREAT WAR. By Ramsay Muir. London: Butterworth, 1930, 252 pp. 2/6.

Nationalism, internationalism, parliamentary government and other major post-war problems, discussed from a thorough-going English liberal viewpoint.

SOME ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE GREAT WAR. By A. L. Bowley. London: Butterworth, 1930, 252 pp. 2/6.

Like the preceding, this is a volume in the Home University Library Series. The author sets in high relief the destructive effects and general economic disruption resulting from the great conflict.

ON PREPARE UN CRIME. By Mario Simonatti. Paris: La Revue Mondiale, 1930, Fr. 12.

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Sensational exposure of Italian aims and designs, which, the author believes, threaten to end in a Franco-Italian war.

DA VERSAILLES ALLA'AJA. By A. Cabiati. Turin: Bocca, 1930, 156 pp. L. 8.
A keen critique of the political and economic ideas underlying the handling of the reparations question, followed by an analysis of the Young Plan.

THE WORLD'S ECONOMIC DILEMMA. By Ernest M. Patterson. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1930, 330 pp. $3.50.
The dilemma is plain enough: "A competitive world organized on a national basis." In this capable book the effort is made to relate the deep-lying problems of international economic life and the fundamental questions of world political organization. The author lays great stress upon the pressing population question, the effects of large-scale production, the difficulties of international finance and the competition for sources of raw materials and markets. In succinct fashion he reviews the situation as it confronts the leading countries — Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Japan — and stresses the peculiar position of the United States. It is clear that some way out of the dilemma will have to be found, but the exact solution is not so easy to discover. The author is convinced that in business matters business methods will have to be applied. The League can help, through the organization of economic conferences and in other ways, but there is more immediate hope of alleviation through the development of commercial treaties with the inclusion of the most-favored-nation clause, through the extension of international trusts and financial consortiums, and through the international chamber of commerce. The expert will not find much that is new in this volume, but as a general introduction to international relations in their larger aspects the book has unusual qualities.

FRENCH PARTIES AND POLITICS, 1871–1930. By Roger H. Soltau. New York: Oxford University Press, 1930, 90 pp.
This is the latest edition of a well-known survey, now brought up to date.

FRANKREICH. By Ernst R. Curtius and Arnold Bergsträsser. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1930, two volumes, M. 20.
A book comparable to Dibelius's "England," surveying the cultural and economic-political life of France. The review of French politics, finance, industry and international relations is splendidly done.

LA VIE VOLONTAIRE D'ANDRÉ TARDIEU. By Michel Missoffe. Paris: Flammarion, 1930, 252 pp. Fr. 12.
An enthusiastic chronology of the Premier's career.

INFLATION UND STABILISIERUNG DES FRANZÖSISCHEN FRANC. By Peter Oestergaad. Jena: Fischer, 1930, 178 pp. M. 8.
A scholarly study of the French monetary problem.

GERMANY IN THE POST WAR PERIOD. By Erich Koch-Weser. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1930, 222 pp. $2.00.
A translation of one of the sanest discussions of German policy in the past decade.

REVOLUTION ÜBER DEUTSCHLAND. By E. O. Volkmann. Oldenburg: Stalling, 1930, 393 pp. M. 6.50.
Not so much an account of the German Revolution as a discussion of the deeper forces and aims. A very stimulating book.

DIE REVOLUTIONÄRE BEWEGUNG AUF DER DEUTSCHEN FLOTTE, 1917–1918. By Heinrich Neu. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1930, 82 pp. M. 3.
A scholarly investigation of a rather obscure subject. The author attributes responsibility to the representatives of the Independent Socialists.

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DEUTSCHLAND. TOD ODER LEBEN? By Paul Rohrbach. Munich: Bruckmann, 1930, 256 pp. M. 3.80.

A well-known nationalist writer looks for a national regeneration through electoral reform, federalism, etc.

ARMES DEUTSCHLAND, ARMES FRANKREICH. By Gustav Gonder. Metz: Even, 1930, 175 pp. M. 2.50.

A critique of the projected Franco-German rapprochement.

DIE DEUTSCHEN GRENZLANDE. By Max H. Boehm. Berlin: Hobbing, 1930, 346 pp. M. 15.

A new revised edition of the best descriptive work on the German border lands and their problems.

ETHNOPOLITISCHER ALMANACH. By O. Junghann and M. H. Boehm. Vienna: Braumüller, 1930, 182 pp. M. 5.50.

A handy survey, by various authors, of some of the outstanding minorities problems of Europe, with an appendix containing the more important documents.

REGIERUNG UND VOLKSVERTRETUNG IM SAARGEBIET. By Hellmut Katsch. Leipzig: Weicher, 1930, 173 pp. M. 9.50.

The author analyzes the governmental system as set up by the League in the Saar, and criticizes the League as an administrative organ.

DIE PFALZ UNTER FRANZÖSISCHER BESETZUNG. Munich: Süddeutsche Monatshefte, 1930, 453 pp. M. 10.75.

An official chronology of events in the Palatinate during the French occupation, 1918–1930.

L'AUTRE ALLEMAGNE. By E. L. Ney. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1930, 268 pp. Fr. 12.

An exposure of the German revenge movement, by a French official.

THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY. By René Martel. London: Williams and Norgate, 1930, 199 pp. 7/6.

Translation of one of the best studies of the German-Polish frontier problem.

POLAND, GERMANY AND THE CORRIDOR. By Casimir Smorgorzewski. London: Williams and Norgate, 1930, 164 pp. 6/-.

A careful and authoritative presentation of the Polish view regarding the Corridor.

OSTPREUSSEN, DANZIG UND DER KORRIDOR ALS VERKEHRSPROBLEM. By Albert von Mühlenfels. Berlin: Osteuropa Verlag, 1930, 61 pp.

This publication of the Osteuropa Institut is a scholarly treatment of the extremely difficult question of communications across the Corridor.

DER KAMPF UM UNSERE SCHUTZGEBIETE. By Josef M. Abs. Düsseldorf: Floeder, 1930, 314 pp. M. 24.50.

A comparison of the German colonies as they were with their present status.

DER NEUE PLAN ALS GRUNDLAGE DER DEUTSCHEN WIRTSCHAFTS-POLITIK. By Moritz J. Bonn. Munich: Duncker and Humblot, 1930, 266 pp.

A well-known German economist reviews the development of the whole reparations problem, examines the Young Plan and discusses its implications for Germany's financial organization. One of the best books on the subject.

DEUTSCHLAND UND DER YOUNG PLAN. By Carl Bergmann. Berlin: Christians, 1930, 168 pp. M. 4.40.

An excellent treatment of the Young Plan, by Germany's leading expert on the reparations problem.

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DER NEUE PLAN. By Friedrich Raab. Berlin: Hobbing, 1930, 208 pp. M. 6.

This is the last of a series of competent volumes on the various phases of the reparations problem. The author stresses the political side of the question, and prints all the important documents.

DIE STRUKTUR DER DEUTSCHEN REICHSBANK UND IHRE GELD UND KREDITPOLITIK UNTER DER HERRSCHAFT DES DAWES PLANES. By Curt Hennig. Berlin: Ebering, 1930, 202 pp. M. 8.40.

A technical study, covering the operations of the Reichsbank from 1924 to 1928.

ERINNERUNGEN AN KAISER FRANZ JOSEPH I. Edited by Eduard von Steinitz. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1930, 438 pp. M. 16.

A very valuable collection of essays on various aspects of Franz Joseph's activities, written by those who were closely associated with him.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE. By Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau. London: Dent, 1930, 348 pp. 25/-.

An English edition of this valuable work is highly welcome.

CIVIC TRAINING IN SWITZERLAND. By Robert C. Brooks. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1930, 436 pp. $3.00.

An excellent volume. The author deals with the functioning of democracy under the peculiar conditions of a multi-national country.

ITALIEN VON HEUTE. By Robert Michels. Zurich: Füssli, 1930, 410 pp. M. 14.60.

The eminent German-Italian sociologist reviews the evolution of modern Italy. A most informative and stimulating volume.

IL PAESE E LO STATO. By Alberto di Stefani. Milan: Trèves, 1930, 334 pp. L. 25.

Collected essays of the Italian statesman, dealing chiefly with current economic problems.

LA VIGILIA. By Giovanni Giurati. Milan: Mondadori, 1930, L. 25.

The Fascist leader and former president of the Trento and Trieste Society tells the thrilling story of the society's irredentist activity and agitation in the period from January 1913 to Italy's entrance into the war. An important book.

SU ALCUNI MIEI RAPPORTI DI GOVERNO CON LA SANTA SEDE. By V. E. Orlando. Naples: Sabina, 1930, 104 pp. L. 12.

The former minister throws much light on the relations between the Italian Government and the Holy See during the war and immediately after.

AL SERVICIO DE LA DOCTRINA CONSTITUTIONAL. By M. de Burgos y Mazo. Madrid: Esapsa Calpe, 1930, 224 pp. Pes. 5.

The trials and tribulations of a Spanish liberal, with a confession of faith.

LES DICTADURES DELS NOSTRES DIES. By Andrés Nin. Barcelona: Libreria Catalonia, 1930, 236 pp. Pes. 5.

The European dictatorships as a background for the recent Spanish experiment.

EL REY Y LA POLITICA. By Julio Cola. Madrid: Gráfica Universal, 1930, 142 pp. Pes. 3.

The author tackles the vexed question of the king's position and policy.

LA DICTADURA A TRAVÉS DE SUS NOTAS OFICIOSAS. By Dionisio Pérez. Madrid: Compañía General de Artes Gráficas, 1930, 339 pp. Pes. 5.

A useful compendium of the leading decrees of the Rivera period.

LA GUINEA ESPAÑOLA U SUS RIQUEZAS. By Julio Arija. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1930, 229 pp. Pes. 6.

An excellent book on the Spanish possessions in West Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eastern Europe

ORIENTE EUROPEO. By Umberto Nani. Foligno: Campitelli, 1930, 246 pp. L. 12.
A general survey of the situation in Eastern Europe, written from a Fascist standpoint.

LES ÉTATS BALTES ET LA RUSSIE SOVIÉTIQUE. By E. Sobolevitch. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 267 pp.
An informative study of the political and economic relations of Russia and the Baltic states since the war.

SVERIGES LÄGE UR INTERNATIONELLTRÄTTSLIG OCH POLITISK SYNSPUNKT. Stockholm: Beckmans Bokförlag, 1930, 130 pp. Kr. 1.50.
A summary of the Memorandum on the post-war political and military position of Sweden, prepared by an advisory commission which was appointed in March 1929 by the Conservative Ministry of Admiral Lindman.

LA CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE LETTONIE. By M. C. Helstein. Paris: Sirey, 1930, 275 pp. Fr. 50.
The best study of the Latvian constitution.

HISTOIRE DU TERRORISME RUSSE. By General Alexander Spiridovitch. Paris: Payot, 1930, 672 pp. Fr. 60.
The most complete account of the activities of the social revolutionary group, from 1886 to the revolution of 1917.

THE OCHRANA. By A. T. Vassilyev. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1930, 320 pp.
The original of this work, by the last director of the Russian secret police, has already been noted.

RUSSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT DURING THE WAR AND THE UNION OF ZEMSTVOS. By Tikhon Polner and others. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930, 332 pp. $3.25.
A volume of the Carnegie series, of great interest to the student of the Russian Revolution. The book is really a history of the Zemstvos and their activity, particularly during the war, when they did much that the government should have done and were turned into anti-governmental channels by the hostility of the bureaucracy.

AGRICULTURAL RUSSIA ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION. By George Pavlovsky. London: Routledge, 1930, 340 pp. 15/-.
A much-needed investigation of the land and peasant problem in the period just before Russia's collapse.

THE WHITE ARMY. By General A. Denikine. London: Cape, 1930, 368 pp. 15/-.
An abstract of the author's five-volume work in Russian, and a very important contribution to the history of the Russian counter-revolution.

MEMORIES OF LENIN. By Nadezhda K. Krupskaya. New York: International Publishers, 1930, 220 pp. $1.50.
These recollections of Lenin by his widow throw much light on his earlier career and the evolution of his ideas.

INTELLIGENZA DI LENIN. By Curzio Malaparte. Milan: Trèves, 1930, 174 pp. L. 10.
An able study of the Russian situation, with emphasis on the psychology of the revolution as represented by Lenin and his followers.

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THE SOVIETS IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By Louis Fischer. New York: Cape and Smith, 1930, two volumes, $10.00.

In the field of post-war politics this is one of the most important books that has appeared during the past quarter. It is the most extensive treatment of Bolshevik foreign policy in existence and its intrinsic value is enhanced by the fact that it is based in large measure on Russian sources. The author has had the advantage of using Russian documents and of talking with many leading Russian diplomats. Nevertheless, he does not make any effort to conceal the mistakes and failures of Bolshevik policy. His judgment on this or that question may be debated, but taken in the large this is a notable and much-needed contribution to the history of world politics.

DIE AUSWÄRTIGE GEWALT DER SOWJETUNION. By W. von Metzler. Berlin: Rothschild, 1930, 88 pp. M. 4.

A technical study of the position of Russia in international affairs, of the organization of the foreign service, the status of Russian agents abroad, etc.

ARMENIA, MEJDUNARODNAIA DIPLOMATSIA I S.S.S.R. By B. A. Borian. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1929, two volumes.

An exhaustive treatment of the Armenian question, the diplomacy of the Powers and the policy of the Bolsheviks.

THE EXPERIMENT OF BOLSHEVISM. By Arthur Feiler. London: Allen and Unwin, 1930, 256 pp. 10/6.

The translation of one of the best German studies of Russia.

AUS DER GESCHICHTE DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN PARTEI DER SOWJETUNION. By E. Jaroslawski. Berlin: Hoym, 1930, 367 pp. M. 3.

The first volume of an extensive history, covering the story from the period of the Populists to the World War.

THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF SOVIET RUSSIA. By Paul Haensel. London: King, 1930, 190 pp. 9/-.

An authoritative statement written by a former professor and financial expert under the Bolshevik régime.

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN OF THE SOVIET UNION. By G. T. Grinko. New York: International Publishers, 1930, 340 pp. $3.50.

One of the best statements in English of the famous plan, written by the vice-chairman of the Soviet planning commission.

OUI, J'ACCUSE. By Gregoire Bessedovski. Paris: Redier, 1930, Fr. 15.

An indictment of Bolshevik activities, by a former Soviet representative.

IN KAMPF UND TODESNOT. By Johannes Schleuning. Berlin: Bernard and Graefe, 1930, 255 pp. M. 3.25.

The sufferings of the German colonies in Russia under the Bolshevik régime.

AL CENTRO DELLA MACCHINA SOVIETICA. By Guido Puccio. Foligno: Campitelli, 1930, 336 pp. L. 18.

Keen observations, by an unconvinced visitor.

DIE GESCHICHTE DER SLOWAKEI. By Alexander Szana. Bratislava: Grenzbote, 1930, 327 pp. M. 5.

The best modern history of the Slovaks, with special reference to the nationalist movement.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LA CRISI POLITICA IN JUGOSLAVIA. By M. Bassi. Rome: Istituto per l'Europa Orientale, 1930, 300 pp.

A review of developments since 1919, with an analysis of the work of the dictatorship to date.

L'ÉCHANGE GRECO-BULGARE DES MINORITÉS ETHNIQUES. By André Wurfbain. Paris: Payot, 1930, 217 pp. Fr. 4.50.

A careful monographic treatment of an important Balkan problem.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By Stephen Leacock. London: Constable, 1930, 246 pp. 7/6.

A brilliant but not very closely reasoned attack upon the problem from the imperialist point of view.

L'ANGLETERRE D'APRÈS-GUERRE ET LE CONFLIT HOUILLER. By Floris Delattre. Paris: Colin, 1930, 440 pp. Fr. 35.

A really noteworthy book. The author, a French professor of English literature and culture, takes the coal problem as a reflection of the social crisis in post-war England. After studying the coal industry and setting forth its place in the economic life of the country, he examines the causes of the post-war crisis, stressing the larger national and international factors as well as the narrower dispute between the owners and the workers. In this way the treatment of the specific problem becomes the starting point for an analysis of the general situation and the new social psychology. The author discusses the general strike with great detail; he was in England at that time. As the detached account of a scholarly outsider, the chapters dealing with this momentous episode are among the best that have been written on the subject. The book is heavily documented throughout and will prove valuable as well as interesting to all students of modern England.

PHILIP SNOWDEN. By A. Andréadès. London: King, 1930, 110 pp. 5/-.

A fine brief study, marked throughout by sympathy and understanding remarkable in a foreigner.

IMPRESSIONS AND RECOLLECTIONS. By Brigadier-General F. P. Crozier. London: Laurie, 1930, 330 pp. 21/-.

Light on the events in Ireland in the period just before and just after the war.

THE FAILURE OF FEDERALISM IN AUSTRALIA. By A. P. Canaway. New York: Oxford University Press, 1930, 221 pp. $5.00.

A scholarly examination of the Australian system.

GANDHI. By Agustín Piracés. Barcelona: Edition Iberia, 1930, 222 pp. Pes. 4.

A Spanish account of the Indian leader's life, work and doctrine.

INDIA AND THE SIMON REPORT. By Sir John Simon. New York: Coward-McCann, 1930, 56 pp.

A brief statement by the chairman of the Statutory Commission.

INDIA AND THE SIMON REPORT. By C. F. Andrews. London: Allen and Unwin, 1930, 192 pp. 5/-.

This really is less an examination of the Simon Report than an interesting exposition of the views of Gandhi.

THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL THOUGHT IN INDIA. By Nath Topa Ishwar. Hamburg: De Gruyter, 1930, 176 pp. M. 11.

A wholly uncritical presentation of the extreme nationalist view.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECONSTRUCTING INDIA. By Edward Thompson. New York: Dial, 1930, 416, pp. $4.00.

The best book of the quarter on India. The author reviews the history of the British in India, makes a calm assessment of their accomplishments, expounds the views of the nationalists, and points out the great difficulties in the way of a satisfactory settlement.

DISILLUSIONED INDIA. By Dhan G. Mukerji. New York: Dutton, 1930, 224 pp. $2.50.

A well-known Indian writer sets forth the results of recent investigations on the spot.

INDIAN STATES AND BRITISH INDIA. By Gurmukh Nihal Singh. Benares: Nand Kishore, 1930, 380 pp.

A competent discussion of one of the most knotty problems in the Indian situation.

THE POPULATION PROBLEM OF INDIA. By B. T. Ranadive. London: Longmans, 1930, 216 pp. 10/6.

Though not directly concerned with politics this book will serve to give an understanding of some of the deeper factors in the present crisis.

The Near East

NEAR EAST POLITICS AND THE BIBLE. By the Reverend J. H. Burridge. Birmingham: Old Gospel Press, 1930, 152 pp. 3/6.

The title indicates the nature of the book.

TOWARDS DISASTER. By Prince Andrew of Greece. London: Murray, 1930, 320 pp. 15/-.

The writer throws much light on the part played by the army in Greek politics after 1909 and at the same time upon the causes of the great disaster in Asia Minor in 1922.

ITALIEN IM ÖSTLICHEN MITTELMEER. By Ibrahim Seyfullah. Berlin: Vowinckel, 1930, 92 pp. M. 4.

The problem of the Dodecanese, with special reference to its economic aspects.

PALÄSTINA ERINNERUNGEN. By Lamec Saad. Berlin: Mulzer and Cleemann, 1930, 143 pp. M. 3.

Interesting pre-war and post-war reminiscences of a Turkish doctor in Palestine.

MOHAMMEDANSK TANKEGANG I VORE DAGE. By Alfred Nielsen. Copenhagen, 1930, 182 pp.

A detailed study of the Moslem press of Damascus since the war, reflecting the evolution of public opinion in Syria.

ARABIA. By H. St. J. Philby. London: Benn, 1930, 387 pp. 18/-.

A general treatment of the history of Arabia in the last few centuries, with special reference to the rise of the Wahabis and the post-war period.

ARABIAN PEAK AND DESERT. By Ameen Rihani. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1930, 280 pp.

Though a travel book, this volume gives a full description of the politics and general conditions in the Yemen.

GELD UND GOLD IN ASIEN. By Josef Hans. Vienna: Author, 1930, 148 pp. M. 7.50.

An account of the currencies of the Near, Middle and Far Eastern countries. A unique volume.

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Africa

REPORT ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 1929. EDITED BY OWEN CLOUGH. London: Harrison, 1930, 368 pp. 10/-.

A valuable semi-official report, dealing with such matters as agriculture, education, immigration, labor, native policy, etc., in all the British possessions in Africa.

LA TUNISIA. BY ATTILIO MORI. Rome: Cremonese, 1930, 172 pp.

A general historical and descriptive work, specially useful for the discussion of the position of the Italians in Tunis.

BLANC ET NOIR AU CONGO BELGE. BY Y. M. JADOT. Paris: Revue Sincère, 1930, Fr. 15.

A competent discussion of the color problem, by a Congo magistrate.

DIE UNION VON SÜDAFRIKA UND IHRE BEVÖLKERUNG. BY RUDOLF NARATH. Leipzig: Teubner, 1930, 262 pp. M. 12.

A scientific history and analysis of the population of South Africa.

The Far East

CHINA, THE COLLAPSE OF A CIVILIZATION. BY NATHANIEL PEFFER. New York: Day, $3.00.

One of the best recent treatments of the Chinese problem and its causes.

THE INNER HISTORY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. BY T'ANG LEANG-LI. New York: Dutton, 1930, 406 pp. $5.00.

In this interesting volume the author, a representative of the Kuomintang, reviews the development of the nationalist movement from the time of the Boxer Rebellion.

THE SPIRIT OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. BY ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE. New York: Knopf, 1930, 191 pp. $2.00.

Lowell Lectures, in which the author analyzes the leading tendencies in the revolution, and discusses the most representative leaders.

THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF THE MISSIONARY MOVEMENT IN CHINA. BY CHAO-KWANG WU. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1930, 294 pp. $2.50.

A Chinese professor examines the missionary problem with special reference to the legal position and political influence of the missionaries.

CHINESISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSPSYCHOLOGIE. BY RICHARD WILHELM. Leipzig: Deutsche wissenschaftliche Buchhandlung, 1930, 120 pp. M. 8.

The late German economist studies the organization of Chinese economic life and the connection of industrialism and nationalism. A most original and stimulating essay.

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY OF THE CIVILIZATION OF JAPAN. BY YOSOBURO TAKEKOSHI. New York: Macmillan, 1930, three volumes, $16.50.

An authoritative pioneer work, reviewing the economic development of the empire in great detail.

REALISM IN ROMANTIC JAPAN. BY MIRIAM BEARD. New York: Macmillan, 1930, 531 pp. $5.00.

A keen analysis of the problems of modern Japan.

JAPANS REICHSERNEUERUNG. BY KARL HAUSHOFER. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1930, 158 pp. M. 1.80.

Really a constitutional history of Japan in the last hundred years.

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GAIKO YOROKU. By Viscount Ishii. Tokio: Iwanami, 1930, 526 pp.

It is to be hoped that these informative memoirs of the eminent Japanese diplomat will be translated into English. They throw much light on such subjects as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement.

KOREA OF THE JAPANESE. By H. B. Drake. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1930, 225 pp. $4.00.

One of the best recent accounts of the situation in Korea, by one well acquainted with the country.

Latin America

THE PEOPLE AND POLITICS OF LATIN AMERICA. By Mary W. Williams. Boston: Ginn, 1930, 852 pp. $4.60.

Though primarily intended as a college text, this volume will serve as a timely introductory history of the Latin American world.

MÉXICO DE CERCA. By R. de Belausteguigoitia. Madrid: Edition Historia Nueva, 1930, 237 pp. Pes. 5.

Current politics and conditions.

MEXICO AND HER FOREIGN CREDITORS. By Edgar Turlington. New York: Columbia University Press, 1930, 449 pp. $6.00.

This, the first of a series on "Mexico in International Finance and Diplomacy," is a very fine study of the history of Mexico's indebtedness. Like Feis's "Europe, the World's Banker," this book aims at the integration of the financial and political sides of the question. But although this aim is difficult of achievement and requires long years of extensive research, it must be admitted that Mr. Turlington, who has had practical experience in the State Department, has been eminently successful. Those interested in the financial problem of Mexico will find here a detailed and competent discussion of the political forces and factors that lay behind the action of foreign Powers, while the student of diplomacy will find an authoritative presentation of the economic aspects of Mexican international relations. In the extensive appendices many of the more important contracts and documents are printed. There is no bibliography, but the book is fully documented throughout.

Miscellaneous

GOD IN FREEDOM. By Luigi Luzzatti. New York: Macmillan, 1930, 833 pp. $5.00.

A huge miscellany of writings by the Italian statesman, dealing with various aspects of the problem of religious liberty. There are supplementary chapters by a number of American writers.

JÜDISCHE WANDERBEWEGUNGEN VOR UND NACH DEM WELTKRIEGE. By Michel Traub. Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1930, 142 pp. M. 9.

Chiefly a discussion of the post-war migrations of Jews to the New World.

DIE MEISTBEGÜNSTIGUNG IM MODERNEN VOELKERRECHT. By Klaus Bonhoeffer. Berlin: Springer, 1930, 64 pp. M. 4.80.

A scholarly study of the legal aspects of the most-favored-nation clause.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 551 Fifth Ave., New York. *France:* Gerda M. Andersen, 12 Ave. Ernest Reyer, Paris XIV^e^. *League of Nations, Int. Labor Office and Perm. Court of Int. Justice:* World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted. A list of national Government documents recording chiefly the economic, financial and social publications is regularly printed in the *Monthly list of Books catalogued in the Library of the League of Nations,* which has been published since 1928.

ARBITRATION, CONCILIATION

BELGIUM. Arbitration. Treaty between the United States of America and Belgium. Signed at Washington, March 20, 1929. Washington, 1930. 4 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 823.) 5 cents.

BELGIUM. Conciliation. Treaty between the United States of America and Belgium. Signed at Washington, March 20, 1929. 4 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 824.) 5 cents.

ESTONIA. Arbitration. Treaty between the United States of America and Estonia. Signed at Tallinn, August 27, 1929. Washington, 1930. 3 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 816.) 5 cents.

ESTONIA. Conciliation. Treaty between the United States of America and Estonia. Signed at Tallinn, August 27, 1929. Washington, 1930. 3 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 817.) 5 cents.

LATVIA. Arbitration. Treaty between the United States of America and Latvia. Signed at Riga, January 14, 1930. 3 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 818.) 5 cents.

LATVIA. Conciliation. Treaty between the United States of America and Latvia. Signed at Riga, January 14, 1930. Washington, 1930. 3 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 819.) 5 cents.

LUXEMBURG. Arbitration. Treaty between the United States of America and Luxemburg. Signed at Luxemburg, April 6, 1929. Washington, 1930. 4 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 825.) 5 cents.

LUXEMBURG. Conciliation. Treaty between the United States of America and Luxemburg. Signed at Luxemburg, April 6, 1929. Washington, 1930. 4 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 826.) 5 cents.

PRELIMINARY Report to International Joint Commission relating to Official Reference re Levels of Rainy Lake and Other Upper Waters. Tables. Plates. Text. Ottawa, F. A. Acland, 1930. 323-41-44 p. 25 cm.

TRAIL SMELTER Reference. Brief for the Government of the United States Submitted to the International Joint Commission. Washington, 1930. 100 p. 23¼ cm. (Publications of the Department of State, No. 71.)

TRAIL SMELTER Reference. Reply Brief for the Government of the United States Submitted to the International Joint Commission. Washington, 1930. 60 p. 23¼ cm. (Publications of the Department of State, No. 114.) 15 cents.

AVIATION

ORGANISATION for Communications and Transit. Enquiries into the Economic, Administrative and Legal Situation of International Air Navigation. Geneva, 1930. 207 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, C. 339. M. 139. 1930. VIII. 6.)

BOUNDARY QUESTIONS

CONVENTION between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and Her Majesty the Queen of The Netherlands respecting the Delimitation of the Frontier between the States in Borneo under British Protection and Netherlands Territory in that Island (with a map), The Hague, March 26, 1928. London, 1930. 5 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 32 (1930). Cmd. 3671.) 9d.

INTERNATIONAL Water Commission, United States and Mexico. Report of American section of International Water Commission, United States and Mexico. 1930. viii-492 p. il. 6 pl. 58 p. of pl. and maps, 17 maps. (H. doc. 359, 71st Cong., 2d sess.) $1.00.

CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

ACTS of the Conference for the Codification of International Law. Held at The Hague from March 13 to April 12, 1930. Vol. I. Plenary Meetings. Geneva, 1930. 178 p. 33½ cm. (League of Nations, C. 351. M. 145. 1930. V. 14.)

PROGRESSIVE Codification of International Law. Report by the First Committee. Geneva, 1930. 3 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 82. 1930. V. 24.)

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COMMERCIAL TREATIES

COMMERCE and Navigation. Treaty between the United States of America and the Turkish Republic. Signed at Ankara, October 1, 1929. Washington, 1930. 9 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 813.) 5 cents.

FRIENDSHIP, Commerce, and Consular Rights. Treaty between the United States of America and El Salvador. Signed at San Salvador, February 22, 1926. Washington, 1930. 26 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 827.) 5 cents.

MOST-FAVORED-NATION Treatment in Customs Matters. Provisional Commercial Agreement between the United States of America and Egypt. Effected by Exchange of Notes signed May 24, 1930. Washington, 1930. 3 p. 23¼ cm. (Publications of the Department of State No. 106, Executive Agreement Series, No. 5.) 5 cents.

MOST-FAVORED-NATION Treatment. Provisional Commercial Agreement between the United States of America and Rumania. Signed August 20, 1930. Washington, 1930. 5 p. 23¼ cm. (Publications of the Department of State, Executive Agreement Series, No. 8.)

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

DOCUMENTS Relating to the Order of August 19th, 1929. Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex. Vol. I. Minutes. Speeches. 478 p. 24 cm. (Series C, No. 17–I. Seventeenth (Ordinary) Session (1929).)

DOCUMENTS Relating to Judgment No. 16 (September 10, 1929), Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder. 695 double p. 24 cm. (Series C, No. 17–II. Seventeenth (Ordinary) Session (1929).)

SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT of the Permanent Court of International Justice (June 15, 1929–June 15, 1930). 578 p. 24 cm. (Series E, No. 6.)

GENERAL ELECTION of the Members of the Permanent Court of International Justice. List of Candidates [and Supplements] Nominated by the National Groups. Letter Addressed to the Secretary-General by the Representatives of Various Latin-American States on the Subject of the Composition of the Court. Geneva, 1930. 25 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 31 and 31 (a), 31 (b). 1930. V. 19, 20, 21.)

ORGANISATION of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Report of the First Committee. Geneva, 1930. 3 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 57. 1930. V. 23.)

COLLECTION of Advisory Opinions, Free City of Danzig and International Labour Organization. August 26, 1930. (Publications, Series B, No. 18.)

COVENANT AND PACT OF PARIS

AMENDMENT of the Covenant of the League of Nations with a View to Bringing It into Harmony with the Pact of Paris. Report of the First Committee. Geneva, 1930. 7 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 85. 1930. V. 26.)

CUSTOMS FORMALITIES AND NOMENCLATURE

INTERNATIONAL Convention of November 3, 1923, Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities. Application of Article 10, Paragraphs 6 and 8, and of Article 11, No. 2, of this Convention. Second Series. Geneva, 1930. 19 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 563. M. 224. 1930. II. 40.)

UNIFICATION of Customs Nomenclature. Report submitted to the Economic Committee by the Sub-Committee of Experts on the Occasion of the Eleventh Assembly. Geneva, 1930. 4 p. 33½ cm. (League of Nations, E. 609. 1930. II. 32.)

DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

DOCUMENTS of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference entrusted with the Preparation of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Series IX. Minutes of the Fourth Session of the Committee on Arbitration and Security. Geneva, 1930. 222 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 357. M. 149. 1930. IX. 3.)

COMMUNICATIONS of Importance to the League of Nations at Times of Emergency. Facilities to be granted to Aircraft and Motor Transport. Report of the Third Committee to the Assembly. Geneva, 1930. 4 p. 33¼ cm. (League of Nations, A. 73. 1930. IX. 6.)

CONVENTION on Financial Assistance. Report of the Third Committee to the Assembly. Geneva, 1930. 18 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 70. 1930. IX. 4.)

GENERAL CONVENTION to Strengthen the Means of Preventing War. Report of the Third Committee to the Assembly. Geneva, 1930. 2 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 71. 1930. IX. 5.)

EUROPEAN FEDERAL UNION

DOCUMENTS relating to the Organisation of a System of European Federal Union. Geneva, 1930. 77 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 46. 1930. VII. 4.)

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COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY for European Union. Minutes of the First Session. Held at Geneva on Tuesday, September 23, 1930. Geneva, 1930. 2 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 565. M. 225. 1930. VII. 5.)

FRANCE — DOCUMENTS

MINISTÈRE des Affaires Étrangères. Commission de Publication des Documents Relatifs aux Origines de la Guerre de 1914. Documents Diplomatiques Français (1871–1914) 1re Série (1871–1900) Tome Second (1er Juillet 1875–31 Décembre 1879). Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1930. 621 p. 26½ cm.

GOLD

INTERIM Report of the Gold Delegation of the Financial Committee. Geneva, 1930. 87 p. 26 cm. (League of Nations, C. 375. M. 161. 1930. II. 26.) $0.75.

SELECTED DOCUMENTS submitted to the Gold Delegation of the Financial Committee. Geneva, 1930. 87 p. 26 cm. (League of Nations, C. 374. M. 160. 1930. II. 34.)

LEGISLATION on Gold. Geneva, 1930. (League of Nations, C. 373. M. 159. 1930. II.)

HAITI

REPORT of the President's Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in the Republic of Haiti. Washington, 1930. 45 p. 23¼ cm. (Publications of the Department of State, No. 56, Latin American Series, No. 2.) 15 cents.

INTELLECTUAL COÖPERATION

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE on Intellectual Coöperation. Minutes of the Twelfth Session. Held at Geneva from Wednesday, July 23, to Tuesday, July 29, 1930. Geneva, 1930. 148 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 428. M. 192. 1930. XII. A. 2.)

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE on Intellectual Coöperation. Report by the Committee on the Work of its Twelfth Plenary Session. Submitted to the Council and to the Assembly. Geneva, 1930. 85 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 21. 1930. XII. A. 3.)

WORK of the International Committee on Intellectual Coöperation. Report of the Second Committee to the Assembly. Geneva, 1930. 3 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 67. 1930. XII. A. 5.)

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

ANNEX to the Supplementary Report on the Work of the Council and the Secretariat to the Eleventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League. Ratification of Agreements and Conventions concluded under the Auspices of the League of Nations. Geneva, 1930. 91 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 6 (a). 1930. Annex. G. Q. 6.)

RATIFICATION of International Conventions Concluded Under the Auspices of the League of Nations. Report of the First Committee to the Assembly. Geneva, 1930. 5 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 83. 1930. V. 25.)

TABLES, Diagrams and Graphs showing the State of Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions in Agreements and Conventions concluded under the Auspices of the League of Nations up to September 1, 1930. Geneva, 1930. 29¼ cm. (League of Nations, A. 20. 1930. V. 18.)

To be cumulated as of January 1, May 1 and September 1 of each year.

LABOR

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference. Draft Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the Conference at its Fourteenth Session, June 10–28, 1930. 45 p. 32½ cm.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

FINANCIAL Position on August 31, 1930. Geneva, 1930. 7 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 32. 1930. X. 2.)

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REPORT [on Immigration, Land Settlement, and Development in Palestine, by Sir John Hope Simpson]. London, 1930. (Cmd. 3686.) 3s.

STATEMENT of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in Regard to Palestine. London, 1930. (Cmd. 3692.) 4d.

PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION. Minutes of the Seventeenth (Extraordinary) Session. Held at Geneva from June 3–21, 1930, including the Report of the Commission to the Council and Comments by the Mandatory Power. Geneva, 1930. 154 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 355. M. 147. 1930. VI. A. 1.)

PORTUGUESE FINANCES

RÉPUBLIQUE Portugaise. Exposé des motifs précédant le décret-loi qui a ordonné la réforme de la Comptabilité Publique, par le Ministre des Finances, Dr. A. De Oliveira Salazar. Appendice: Décret n° 18.381, du 24 Mai 1930, qui réforme la Comptabilité Publique. Lisbon, Imprimerie Nationale, 1930. 23 p. 26¼ cm.

RADIO COMMUNICATION

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EXCHANGE of Notes (September 27, December 19, 1928) recording an Agreement between Canada and the Union of South Africa governing Radio Communications between Private Experimental Stations in the Two Countries. Ottawa, 1930. 5 p. 25 cm. (Dominion of Canada, Treaty Series, 1929, No. 3.) 25 cents.

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INTERNATIONAL Radiotelegraph Convention and General Regulations. Signed at Washington, the 25th November, 1927. Canadian Ratification deposited the 29th October, 1928. Ottawa, F. A. Acland, 1930. 113 p. 25 cm. (Dominion of Canada, Treaty Series, 1929, No. 1.) 25 cents.

INTERNATIONAL Technical Consulting Committee on Radio Communications. First Meeting The Hague, September 18–October 2, 1929. Report of the Delegation of the United States of America and Appended Documents. Washington, 1930. 532 p. 23¼ cm. (Publications of the Department of State, Conference Series, No. 5.) 90 cents.

REPARATION (DAWES PLAN)

REPORT of the Agent General for Reparation Payments, May 21, 1930. Berlin, 1930. 392 p. 24½ cm. (Also Reparation Commission, XXII. Official Documents.)

REPORT of the Commissioner for the German Railways (May 10, 1930). Report of the Commissioner of the Reichsbank (May 17, 1930). Report of the Commissioner of Controlled Revenues (May 17, 1930). Report of the Trustee for German Industrial Debentures (June 17, 1930). London, 1930, 292 p. 24½ cm. 5s. (Reparation Commission. XXIII. Official Documents.)

The final reports under the Dawes Plan. The Agent General deals with the fifth year and the transition period, September 1, 1929, to May 17, 1930.

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